EU’s Weakness Stops It from Confronting Trump to the End
Since Donald Trump declared his tariff war on April 2, global affairs have plunged deeper into a state of high uncertainty. Whether Trump’s “Liberation Day” marks the prelude to the demise of neoliberal globalization remains to be seen, but one thing is certain: under Trump’s leadership, the United States has been rapidly abandoning its economic and cultural leadership under the neoliberal global order. The evaporation of trillions in U.S. stock market value is a direct manifestation of this reality.
Setting aside the emotional reactions, the pressing issue is how to respond to Trump’s tariff stick. Since Trump took office, the Chinese government has been assessing the scope and intensity of the tariff war. The imposition of reciprocal tariffs and a series of accompanying measures are clearly the results of strategic planning, rather than mere retaliation. Other economies have also made their own judgments regarding Trump’s tariffs. For instance, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s PR acumen is one reason why U.S. tariffs on the UK remain relatively low.
On April 2, Keir Starmer said: “I really do not think it’s sensible to say the first response should be to jump into a trade war with the US”
It must be noted, however, that some views predicting a U.S. “isolationist lockdown” and a newly formed global supply chain among the rest of the world may be overly optimistic about the roles of countries other than China. The more realistic scenario is that—excluding China and the EU—most other economies are simply negotiating when and how much to concede to the U.S. in trade terms. Israel and Vietnam lowering their own tariffs are early signs of such concessions.
The EU, due to the differing industrial structures and fiscal conditions among its member states, is also unlikely to mount a substantial resistance to U.S. tariffs. This not only means that China may be the only economy capable of standing up to Trump in the long run, but also that the EU, as one of the world’s three primary economic blocs, is standing at a crossroads. Whether the EU chooses to raise tariffs or not, internal political and economic tensions are likely to intensify. In a time when the illusion of EU unity has largely dissipated, whether the Union will continue to unravel is a question worth serious consideration.
In my previous article, I outlined why Trump initiated this tariff war. Analyzing the long arc of his ideological development, it’s clear that tariffs are part of his broader plan to reshape the United States and are one of the key sources of his stubborn confidence. The undeniable decline of U.S. power and Trump’s own advancing age have heightened his sense of urgency, compelling him to adopt more forceful and radical measures in an effort to reverse what he sees as neoliberal globalization’s erosion of American strength. In this respect, Trump is somewhat akin to former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who forcefully dismantled Jewish settlements despite fierce opposition.
Donald Trump on April 2 announced a 10% tariff on all imports but even higher rates on dozens of trading partners including China and the EU.
On a technical level, Trump’s confidence in launching the tariff war is based on two factors. First, the tolerance of his core supporters—particularly the MAGA base—toward the economic pain tariffs may cause; and second, the fact that the U.S. dollar still serves as the dominant currency in global trade. The MAGA crowd’s tolerance stems from the fact that they are closely tied to those who have suffered under neoliberal globalization. While tariffs inevitably impact everyday life, their effects are felt differently in globalization hubs like New York or Los Angeles versus in rural Ohio.
A shortage of cheap eggs in Manhattan doesn’t mean people in rural Kentucky will go without. Wall Street’s stock meltdowns have little direct connection to a farmer in Montana. As the Chinese saying goes, “The barefoot people aren’t afraid of those who wear shoes,” meaning that those with little to lose are less fearful in confrontation. This aptly describes the contrast between MAGA supporters and the beneficiaries of neoliberalism.
The second factor is Trump’s exploitation of the global dominance of the U.S. dollar. While his destruction of neoliberal globalization will inevitably wound the dollar’s supremacy, there is a time lag. During this interim, Trump can wage his tariff war while the dollar still retains its role as the dominant global currency. This is why only China and the EU have a real chance at resisting Trump’s tariffs.
In practice, we’ve seen that most countries either remain silent or call for restraint to avoid escalation. As former British Prime Minister Tony Blair put it, “I don’t think it is in the UK’s best interest to retaliate.”
This explains why much of the current media narrative centers on tolerance. Rather than trying to dislodge the dollar, chipping away at Trump’s support base seems like a more achievable goal. A flood of media stories and analyses claim that Americans will suffer deeply under tariffs, with particular focus on the impact on MAGA supporters.
Trump’s “win, win, win” rhetoric is essentially a way to raise this tolerance threshold. It serves a similar function to wartime propaganda and information control, which are used to sustain internal morale and the support of core voters. As more countries cave and offer concessions to the U.S., Trump will gain ample leverage. It’s foreseeable that as this tariff war drags on, global media battles over its narrative will only intensify.
Let’s now return to the realpolitik of global affairs. How many countries can bear the cost of resisting Trump’s tariff war? In theory, that depends on whether other economies can unite in confronting the challenge posed by his tariffs. But in reality, small countries have no choice but to accept the situation as it is. For them, Trump’s tariff war is like a natural disaster.
Singapore as a city-state is a typical example—it must passively absorb the negative externalities exported by Trump’s tariffs. However, for countries like Japan, South Korea, and the UK—those that do have the capacity to deliberate on how to respond to Trump’s tariff war—inaction has also emerged as the preferred choice.
This is primarily because there are few effective alternatives to reciprocal tariffs for those large economies. Not imposing them is not only seen as politically weak but also as a de facto concession. While there are ways to shift some of tariff costs onto American consumers without resorting to reciprocal tariffs, these methods are neither as direct nor as effective—and they often come with significantly higher implementation costs.
In practical terms, refusing to impose reciprocal tariffs is tantamount to direct concessions to the U.S.—and worse, it lowers the bar for future demands from Trump. After all, dismantling neoliberal globalization is his ultimate goal; reducing trade deficits is just one of many surface-level expressions.
For economies considering reciprocal tariffs, they must evaluate three key factors: their trade surplus with the U.S. (exposure level), their domestic economic and fiscal strength (how much pain they can absorb), and their political-military dependence on the U.S. In simple terms, strategic autonomy in political, economic, and military spheres determines a country’s capacity to respond.
Ultimately, countries like the UK, Japan, and South Korea have effectively abandoned any resistance. For a post-Brexit UK, the relationship with the U.S. is its last thread of global influence—so that PM Starmer viewed a 10% tariff as a relative victory. In Japan, Shigeru Ishiba called the tariffs a “national crisis.” While pleading with the U.S. for exemption, the Japanese government quietly began drafting support measures for businesses and households, including plans for supplementary budgets. In South Korea, where President Yoon Suk Yeol has been removed from office and a new election isn’t scheduled until June, making decisions on tariff policy seems even more unlikely.
Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba said on April 5 that he plans to speak with Donald Trump “within the next week” to discuss the president’s decision to slap Tokyo with tariffs.
The wavering stance of these major economies is part of Trump’s winning formula: even if he fails to pressure China, he can still exploit their weakness to recoup the costs of his tariff war. Those who believe Trump is simply reviving 19th-century imperial trade preferences misread his strategy. Any similarities are merely side effects—not the central objective—of his international trade policy.
Currently, only China and the EU remain as possible challengers to Trump (Russia, partially excluded from the neoliberal global trade system, might count as a “half” challenger). The EU, like China and the U.S., has a sufficiently large economy, a somewhat alternative trade settlement currency, and a degree of industrial independence. It also consistently emphasizes strategic autonomy and refuses to see itself as an economic colony of the U.S. From a pure perspective of currency internationalization, the EU even enjoys an advantage over China—the euro is more internationally integrated than the RMB. Moreover, the EU, outside North America, is a core pillar of neoliberal globalization.
However, unlike China’s swift imposition of reciprocal tariffs, the EU’s only responses so far have come from Macron’s largely ignored threats and vague warnings from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. This just exposes the EU’s lack of genuine strategic autonomy.
As I’ve previously argued, one of the EU’s greatest structural flaws lies in its supranational institutions, which are powerless to prevent member states from prioritizing self-preservation. The dream of a pan-European identity is beautiful, but each country’s real concern is maximizing its own share of the pie.
As a result, EU member states have been unable to reach a consensus on Trump’s tariffs, as each country has its own concerns. On one hand, as the most important second-tier economies within the EU, they are too big to fail. Greece may be allowed to go bankrupt, but a collapse of either Italy or Spain would have devastating consequences for the broader EU economy. On the other hand, these two countries also reflect the stark fiscal realities of Southern Europe, where sovereign debt levels are already alarmingly high. Any comprehensive EU confrontation against Trump’s tariffs would only further limit their already shrinking fiscal room for maneuver. (France faces a similar dilemma, though to a slightly lesser extent.) This is why, despite sitting on opposite ends of the political spectrum, the governments of both countries have called for calm and urged the EU to avoid a full-scale confrontation.
Eastern European countries, by contrast, are more likely to oppose tariff escalation due to their political and military dependence on the United States. Compared to Western Europe, these nations generally run smaller trade surpluses with the U.S.—a consequence of their more modest economic scale—and rely far more heavily on American security guarantees. While many of them are frustrated with Trump’s shifting stance on the Russia-Ukraine war, that dissatisfaction isn’t strong enough to override a basic reality: unless they surrender to Russia, their only viable security partner is the United States. This is a widely accepted truth not only in the Baltic states but also in major Eastern European powers like Poland. As Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk put it, “A severe and unpleasant blow, because it comes from the closest ally, but we will survive it. Our friendship must also survive this test.”
France and Germany are the most vocal resisters—or, more accurately, the only real drivers of pushback. For Germany, already suffering from a severe industrial downturn, Trump’s tariffs delivered a direct blow to the incoming government. The Guardian even described it as “another nail in the coffin” for Germany’s auto industry. Macron, who takes every opportunity to perform France’s commitment to strategic autonomy, was even more proactive. Well before Trump’s tariff hammer came down, France had been pushing for a unified European response. If France and Germany were operating outside the EU framework, they might well have chosen to give up resistance like the UK, Japan, and South Korea. But with the weight of the EU behind them, they clearly have more ambitious ideas.
However, by leveraging the EU to counter U.S. tariffs, France and Germany are effectively offloading part of their own costs onto other member states. If they truly wanted to act independently, they could bypass the EU and impose tariffs on the United States directly. Of course, many readers might point out that the EU holds exclusive authority over external trade policy. But let’s not forget: even policies like the Schengen Agreement—which also fall under EU jurisdiction—can be swiftly suspended when national governments invoke a state of emergency. Put bluntly, if France and Germany decide to break EU rules, what can Brussels realistically do to stop them?
This cost-sharing approach has already sparked strong resentment among other EU member states. Worse still, while pushing for a collective EU response to U.S. tariffs, France and Germany have also sought to shift as much of the economic burden as possible onto other members. For example, France is the EU’s largest wine exporter and much of its wine goes to the U.S. When Trump threatens retaliatory tariff on European wine after EU proposed American whisky tax, the French prime minister last month requested that American bourbon be excluded from the EU’s retaliation list. Similarly, Germany’s incoming government has unveiled a €500 billion stimulus plan aimed at boosting domestic production, prompting accusations from other EU countries that Germany is engaging in unfair competition within the Union.
Clearly, the internal scheming among member states and bureaucracy are the key reason behind the EU’s failure to respond to Trump’s tariffs. This is a long-standing issue for the EU as a supranational body, and Trump’s tariff war has only deepened existing fault lines. After prolonged bargaining, the EU will likely offer some form of response—but its lack of true strategic autonomy makes it highly likely to blink first in this game of chicken. Every time Trump raises the stakes, internal divisions within the EU are further exposed, and the darker side of European integration becomes more apparent. Put more precisely, Trump has numerous ways to circumvent the EU, France, and Germany, targeting and splintering individual member states one by one.
Ursula von der Leyen stated that Brussels has a “strong plan to retaliate” against Trump’s reciprocal tariffs
As for the once-frequent talk of strategic economic cooperation between China and the EU, one can only say the theory sounds promising, but political reality is far more sobering. It’s become increasingly clear to Chinese observers that, since the COVID-19 pandemic and especially the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, the EU has been losing weight in China’s strategic economic calculus. More importantly, even today, the EU’s mainstream political forces show little genuine willingness to strengthen economic cooperation with China.
In the various signals coming out of the EU, there has been emphasis on strengthening southern market agreements and building a Mediterranean economic zone—but notably little discussion of enhanced China-EU trade cooperation. In fact, this perspective barely exists outside academic circles. On the contrary, one of the hottest topics in the European Parliament right now is Huawei’s bribery scandal, which a significant number of European politicians are using as pretext to intensify strategic competition with China. Not to mention that the Chinese spy case involving Prince Andrew is currently one of the most popular tabloid stories in the UK. The once-celebrated China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment was effectively dead on arrival.
When China and the U.S. clash, it’s true that Europe often suffers as collateral damage. But history has shown Europe’s consistent tendency to side with the U.S. under pressure. As more and more economies concede to the U.S. in this tariff war, China will become the last line of resistance against Trump’s trade offensive. This unprecedented pressure will pose a major test to the strategic resolve of both China and the United States. That is why I continue to emphasize the importance of building stronger domestic communities and regional economic circulation.
Trump’s tariff policy signals a profound reordering of the global economic landscape. Only by accelerating internal market integration can countries build resilience against extreme external volatility. The illusion of strategic partnership under neoliberal globalization is over—welcome back to the harsh and painful era of great-power strategic competition.
Editor: Li Jingyi
