Recently, a unit from China’s Rocket Force appeared on Chinese state media , displaying a formation of 20 missile launch vehicles lined up for inspection outdoors, along with five other vehicles demonstrating launch procedures indoors. From the video, it’s clear that the missiles showcased belong to the PLA’s DF-26.

The PLA Showcases the DF-26

According to public data, the DF-26 missile is approximately 14 meters long, with a diameter of 1.4 meters, and weighs 20 tons at launch. It can carry a single 1.8-ton warhead or three independent reentry warheads. With a maximum range of 5,000 kilometers, the DF-26 offers mobile launch capabilities without needing fixed infrastructure. This missile series can perform both nuclear and conventional strikes, making it suitable for attacking ground-based fixed targets, mobile targets, and deeply buried bunkers through its kinetic impact, enabling precise underground strikes.

The DF-26 missile first debuted at China’s 70th Victory Day Parade in September 2015, later appearing in the Zhurihe Parade and the 70th National Day Parade.

In April 2018, Ministry of Defense spokesperson Wu Qian introduced four key characteristics of the DF-26: first, it is fully developed and manufactured in China, with entirely independent intellectual property rights. Second, its warhead is dual-capable, allowing it to execute rapid nuclear retaliation as well as precise conventional long-range strikes. Third, it is capable of targeting both land and sea targets, with the ability to strike important land-based targets and large vessels at sea. Finally, it integrates multiple advanced technologies, achieving high levels of standardization, integration, and informatization.

A game-changer since the Age of Sail.

With the deployment of DF-26 missiles, the Rocket Force is now capable of precise strikes on U.S. military bases in Guam, leading Chinese military enthusiasts to nickname it the “Guam killer,” or “Dongfeng Express.” The phrase “Dongfeng Express, Mission Achieved” has since been adopted by the Rocket Force’s official social media channels.

In August 2020, the DF-26 gained global attention when the Rocket Force launched it from Qinghai, an inland province in Northwestern China, striking a moving target ship in the South China Sea. With this, the DF-26 has become China’s new-generation “carrier killer,” following in the footsteps of the DF-21D.

The recent footage from Chinese state media may suggest one thing: that a DF-26 missile brigade could possess at least 25 missile launch vehicles. Reports indicate that each launch vehicle is supported by two dedicated missile transport vehicles, which suggests each launch vehicle could have three missiles in reserve. Consequently, a DF-26 missile brigade may be able to launch at least 75 missiles in a single round of combat, signifying an immense strike capability.

Over the past few decades, China’s ballistic missile program has progressed significantly. Although it entered the field later than other countries, China has led the way in conventional theater ballistic missile applications. Following the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, China recognized the urgency of preparing for military conflict and the dangers posed by U.S. military intervention. U.S. forces, especially its air power, could intervene from carriers and bases like Kadena and Guam.

In those years, when long-range air and naval strike forces were limited, ballistic missiles offered the only viable strike option. For the Taiwan Strait, a substantial arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles, represented by the DF-11 and DF-15, provided the firepower needed for a potential cross-strait conflict. In the vast Western Pacific, the DF-21 became China’s primary strike force, while the DF-16, with similar dimensions and weight to the DF-15 but nearly the range of the DF-21, and the DF-17, with its hypersonic glide capabilities, further enhanced China’s penetration abilities.

Ballistic missiles have been known for their formidable penetration capabilities since the V2 era. In China, mid-to-short-range ballistic missiles, from the DF-11 onwards, have been developed as dual-capable theater ballistic missiles, primarily equipped for conventional strikes. This approach significantly lowered their usage threshold and enhanced their tactical flexibility, transforming them from pure deterrent weapons to actual combat tools.

With the DF-21D, China achieved a milestone in sea-based defense by developing a missile capable of targeting ships, essentially turning centuries of maritime dominance since the Age of Sail.

Historically, coastal batteries fared well in confrontations with naval guns due to their firepower and reduced vulnerability unless directly hit. But mobile warships could choose when and where to engage, concentrating their strength to eliminate shore defenses. The DF-21D reverses this dynamic by putting warships within the effective range of shore-based artillery, diminishing the significance of naval mobility.

From the outset, the U.S. Navy took reports of the DF-21D’s anti-ship capability seriously. Despite initial skepticism, the technology behind anti-ship ballistic missiles is achievable, and after a successful test in desert conditions, the U.S. concerns were validated, with anti-missile defense becoming an increasingly pressing issue.

Anti-ship ballistic missiles essentially combine a ballistic missile with terminal guidance and maneuverability. The defenses against such missiles include terminal phase interception and midcourse interception. The absence of a boost-phase defense is due to its impracticality, even though the concept is appealing.

In practical terms, the high speed of midcourse ballistic missiles means that an interceptor station too far from the missile’s trajectory would be unable to reach the intercept point in time. Thus, only pre-positioned interceptors along the missile’s flight path can effectively achieve midcourse interception.

This interception strategy may protect fixed targets or intercept missiles launched from known sites, like the missile defense base in Fort Greely, Alaska, which intercepts missiles from North Korea aimed at the U.S. west coast. However, the mobile launch platforms and targets of anti-ship ballistic missiles make it impractical to establish midcourse intercept stations.

Terminal interception primarily relies on a counter-ballistic path, adjusted with maneuvering corrections. However, anti-ship ballistic missiles employ extensive maneuvers in their terminal phase, making counter-ballistic interception nearly impossible. Given both missiles and interceptors are already operating under extreme conditions, interceptors would need to outperform incoming missiles’ maneuvering capabilities significantly—a highly challenging task.

Mobile warheads make it difficult for missile defense systems to achieve their targets.

Even if an anti-ship missile reaches its target and is intercepted in the final moments, the resulting debris can still inflict significant damage. A ship’s antennas, electronic systems, and weaponry could be severely impaired, rendering it “mission killed,” or unable to continue fighting. Such a vessel would become vulnerable to a finishing strike.

Initially, the U.S. Navy attempted to counter by targeting launch sites. Part of the Air-Sea Battle strategy involved deploying long-endurance, highly stealthy unmanned combat aircraft to hunt DF-21Ds positioned along the coast, giving carriers safe passage within 1,500 kilometers.

However, the DF-26 rendered this tactic obsolete. With a range of 5,000 kilometers, the DF-26 can still control the ocean within 2,500 kilometers of China’s coast from inland locations. No long-endurance, stealthy drone can maintain survivability or effectiveness at such distances, which also exceed the typical operational range of carrier-based fighters.

The extensive range also means DF-26s can mutually support each other at long distances. Since all DF-26 missiles within 5,000 kilometers of a target can participate in a strike, their position and mobility are less critical.

Strategic missiles keep the U.S. on edge.

While the basic DF-26 model mainly targets land-based, fortified targets, reports suggest a variant equipped with a hypersonic glide warhead. If confirmed, this would further boost China’s intermediate-to-long-range ballistic missile reach and penetration capabilities.

The Taiwan Strait and South China Sea are the most likely hotspots for U.S.-China conflict. For the U.S., the vast distance favors its mainland safety but complicates intervention, requiring forward bases and regional allies.

In the Asia-Pacific, Guam is the U.S.’s most critical overseas territory and support base. However, Guam alone may be insufficient for sustained combat with a major power like China. And with DF-26s aimed at Guam, it is just the first wave of a broader assault strategy.

In the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. maintains a network of vital bases and allies. At the forefront are Guam, an American territory, and Diego Garcia, a strategic base though not an official territory. Japan and Australia stand as key allies, while the Philippines presents a more unpredictable regional partner. South Korea, meanwhile, may stay out due to pressures from North Korea.

Yet, as extensive as Guam’s facilities are, they remain insufficient for a sustained battle with a major power like China. Worse, the ‘Guam Express’ nickname isn’t limited to DF-26 strikes alone but suggests that China has multiple means to target Guam if conflict arises.”

Although modern defenses are more resilient, Iran’s missile strikes on Israel revealed that a single barrage may temporarily overwhelm but lacks enduring impact. China’s missile capabilities surpass those of Iran, while U.S. defense and recovery systems are stronger than Israel’s.

Iran’s Ballistic Missile Strike on Israel

Thus, while temporarily disabling Guam’s air defense and command-control systems, a follow-up with sea-, submarine-, and air-launched cruise missiles, including extended-range loitering munitions, may be necessary to truly dismantle Guam’s defenses on a larger scale—not to mention the potential addition of Chinese aircraft carriers.

The Nimitz-class carriers carry roughly 2,000 tons of aerial munitions, whereas the slightly smaller Fujian-class, while dedicating tonnage to fuel, still carries up to 1,500 tons, or the equivalent of 830 DF-26 warheads, enough to shut down Guam’s operations.

Diego Garcia, within DF-26’s range, poses similar vulnerabilities. Though China’s missiles and bombers would need to cross Indian airspace, a challenge mirrored by U.S. operations, Diego Garcia’s limited size and weaker defenses make it more susceptible.

Australia, while geographically larger and uncertain in its U.S. alliance commitments, still has bases within DF-26’s range. Japan and the Philippines would not even require the DF-26, as DF-16 and DF-17 missiles, along with H-6 bombers and J-16 fighters, cover these areas comprehensively.

Furthermore, the DF-26’s dual capability in both nuclear and conventional strikes complicates U.S. responses. Although all Dongfeng series missiles are theoretically dual-capable, shorter-range models like the DF-11, DF-15, DF-16, and DF-17 are more numerous and less costly, making them primarily conventional. However, the DF-26’s longer range, higher cost, and more limited numbers provide greater justification for nuclear escalation if necessary.

China has long declared a “no first use” nuclear policy, but the U.S., viewing it through its own lens, has always doubted this stance. The issue is that if China launches a DF-26, it won’t be clear whether it carries a nuclear warhead until it hits the target—by which point, it’s too late. However, for the U.S. to hastily initiate a “launch-on-warning” response against an intermediate-range missile like this would be overly rash, as it risks triggering mutual destruction unnecessarily. At the heart of this tension lies the erosion of the U.S.’s once-unquestioned nuclear advantage, now increasingly in doubt. The contrasting results of recent intercontinental missile tests between China and the U.S. have reminded everyone that times are changing.

While the DF-26 is not an intercontinental missile and does not target the U.S. mainland, it functions as a tactical nuclear weapon aimed at theater-level military objectives. Though the U.S. often views tactical nukes as enhanced conventional explosives, the DF-26’s dual capability poses a real challenge to the U.S.

The DF-26, however, signifies a bigger shift as the spearhead of China’s rapid-reaction strike system in the region. Traditionally, theater ballistic missiles targeted pre-planned, fixed locations rather than emerging threats. Historically, the lengthy command chains and preparation times hindered prompt response to mobile or emergent targets.

Today, China’s ability to promptly detect, command, launch, and accurately strike moving carrier targets suggests its readiness to engage land-based objectives with similar speed.

For instance, if a satellite spots a B-21 on Diego Garcia’s tarmac, a launch command could be issued within 30 minutes, potentially hitting the aircraft’s position within the hour. Even if initial strikes don’t permanently disable Guam or Diego Garcia, reactive strikes may prevent aircraft like the B-21, B-52, KC-46, and C-17 from deploying from these bases.

Furthermore, unlike high-resolution reconnaissance satellites with sub-meter accuracy, civilian SAR satellites are sufficient for detecting large aircraft on expansive tarmacs, making it more difficult to disable satellite surveillance of these targets during wartime. Even more advantageous is that, at forward bases, large aircraft are often parked in the open due to limited or inadequate sheltered hangars or fortified mountain bunkers. This makes them easier to detect and strike. Tactical aircraft face similar constraints, as large groups are usually parked in open areas, making them equally detectable and vulnerable to attack.

Although the threat of ballistic missiles has been well-known for some time and various nations have ramped up anti-missile technology since the Gulf War, Iran’s missile attacks to Israel highlight a key limitation: current anti-missile systems still struggle to intercept even a single medium-range ballistic missile reliably. This implies that while China can’t count on the DF-26 to accomplish a one-hit knockout, the U.S. likewise can’t rely on systems like THAAD, Patriot, or the Navy’s Aegis to provide foolproof defense. The vulnerability is especially concerning given that THAAD and Patriot systems themselves are high-priority targets, raising questions about Guam’s missile defense network’s survivability in the face of a large-scale attack. As for the Aegis system, if all its Standard missiles are used to intercept DF-26s, the U.S. Navy would have little left to protect its carriers.

The PLA Showcases the DF-26

To counter the DF-26 threat, the U.S. may consider “hot refueling,” keeping aircraft engines idle to expedite refueling and reduce the “vulnerability window” during refueling.

While bombers like the B-21 and B-52 could theoretically operate from bases outside the DF-26’s range and perform refueling in Guam or Diego Garcia, this approach would increase wear on aircraft and pilot fatigue. Tactical fighters would find such long-distance and refueling operations unsustainable due to heightened mechanical wear and pilot fatigue.

This approach also requires time, and the reliability of supply chains to these isolated islands is questionable. Airlifted supplies for such refueling operations carry risks, while maritime resupply faces an even greater danger given the DF-26’s anti-ship capabilities. It’s worth noting that if the DF-26 can target fast-moving carriers, then slow or moored tankers and cargo ships are essentially sitting ducks. Additionally, storage facilities on these islands—fuel depots, warehouses, and ammunition stockpiles—are primary targets for missile strikes. As stationary, exposed soft targets, they are easy to detect and destroy.

Post-WWII, the U.S.’s military advantage rested heavily on air superiority and secure rear bases. Air dominance enabled deep, unrestricted strikes, while secure rear areas allowed for unhindered strategic planning and logistics.

With the arrival of the DF-26, these assumptions may no longer apply in the Asia-Pacific. The reliability of rear areas and air superiority now face serious challenges, fundamentally shaking U.S. military strategy and likely affecting political decision-making.

Satellites are the core of this recon-strike system. While China’s military satellite launches are classified, the visible increase in civilian SAR satellites with high resolution points to potential military applications. Though satellites may be vulnerable to U.S. anti-satellite operations, the large number of Chinese satellites complicates such a strategy. China’s rapid re-launch capability, with mobile solid-fuel “Kuaizhou” rockets, ensures continued satellite support. Additionally, HALE drones, long-endurance autonomous boats and submarines, and advanced signal and cyber reconnaissance supplement satellite intelligence.

With the integration of advanced automated and digital command-and-control systems that streamline every stage from reconnaissance to strike, it’s the swift, precise, and unified recon-strike chain—unseen in the footage—that truly concerns the U.S.

Just like FedEx doesn’t limit itself to local delivery zones, the DF-26 isn’t restricted to targeting Guam alone. This is “Dongfeng Express, Mission Achieved.”