A Russia-Ukraine Ceasefire Cannot Happen Without China’s Involvement

Guancha.cn: What will the final ceasefire agreement look like given the differing peace conditions between the US and Russia? Will Putin achieve his goals?

Zhou Bo: First of all, I personally believe that achieving a ceasefire currently poses significant challenges, for a simple reason: Russia’s Kursk region remains under Ukrainian control. Therefore, the possibility of negotiations fully materializing before Putin reclaims Kursk is slim.

During Trump’s first term, Russia and the US had differences.

Ukraine’s occupation of undisputed Russian territory has a clear objective: to add leverage for future land swaps in negotiations. Putin must adhere to reclaiming this undisputed Russian land to maintain credibility domestically. It can be foreseen that until the Kursk issue is resolved, any form of negotiations is unlikely to succeed.

If negotiations were to start immediately, the primary discussion would inevitably be about how to achieve a ceasefire. When it comes to ceasefires, people often advocate for unconditional and immediate ceasefires, driven by weaknesses or virtues in human nature—an appeal frequently seen in UN resolutions. The problem, however, is that neither side will spontaneously sign a ceasefire agreement without thorough negotiation and struggle.

Regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict, neither side is satisfied with the current situation. If a hasty ceasefire occurs now, not only would Russia lose part of its territory, but Ukraine would also seek to continue fighting, given that four regions remain under Russian control. At the extremes, even if a ceasefire agreement is reached, it might only result in a temporary ceasefire along a demarcation line, similar to the Korean Peninsula armistice, which is essentially still in a state of war as the ceasefire hasn’t translated into legal peace.

Furthermore, there are numerous issues post-ceasefire, one of which is particularly concerning for Ukraine: ensuring that the situation does not give Russia the opportunity to regroup and reignite the conflict in the short term. Thus, Ukraine repeatedly emphasizes that the ceasefire must have collective security guarantees. As Zelensky mentioned, major powers and neighboring countries must jointly provide assurance.

I’ve noticed that the list of major powers involved in mediation, according to statements from his presidential office, does not include China, indicating that China is not considered part of Ukraine’s security guarantee framework. In contrast, Russia clearly states that China, India, and Brazil can serve as forces ensuring conflict resolution. Despite Russia’s military advantage, it also does not wish to appear isolated and therefore seeks collective security guarantees.

Given this need from both sides, it can be anticipated that when a security guarantee mechanism is established, major powers including China will definitely participate. This would potentially be the first time China is invited by European countries to engage in European security affairs, which is unprecedented.

As for the exact location of the ceasefire, this remains the most challenging issue as it involves determining the ultimate outcome of the war, which no one can currently predict with accuracy. From the bargaining chip perspective, Trump undoubtedly holds the most cards. As the biggest supplier of aid to Ukraine, the US has the ability to exercise influence in this matter—it can warn Ukraine, “If you continue your current approach, I will halt aid”; simultaneously, it can pressure Russia, “If you don’t act according to my wishes, I will intensify aid to Ukraine.”

However, this does not mean that the US can entirely dictate the course of the war, as the positions of other countries, including the combatants, need to be considered, and not all countries will fully comply with US directives. Comparatively, Putin is in no hurry to act, as he currently has the upper hand, a position challenging to disrupt.

In fact, over a year ago, Ukraine, supported by Western countries, organized several counterattacks, most of which ended in failure. Following these, Ukraine’s chance of turning the tide has diminished, and it is now in a state of a cornered battle. Nonetheless, the performance of the Ukrainian army remains commendable, and intense confrontations continue on both sides. Therefore, the demarcation of the final ceasefire line remains undetermined at this time.

Guancha.cn: As an important force in promoting peace and halting the war, China has been steadily advancing Russia-Ukraine negotiations. Given the shift in the U.S. stance, what role should China play? How will the turning point in U.S.-Russia relations affect Sino-Russian relations?

Zhou Bo: Regarding China’s specific role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, I believe there are three main points:

First, China can work with other major powers to jointly provide security guarantees.

Second, in situations where peacekeeping is needed, China can send peacekeeping troops to participate in related operations. Both Polish Prime Minister, British Prime Minister, and Zelensky have mentioned the possibility of carrying out peacekeeping tasks in Europe, each proposing different solutions. Zelensky even suggested sending 200,000 European troops for peacekeeping.

However, such proposals are clearly difficult for Russia to accept. For Russia, sending Western troops to Ukraine under the guise of peacekeeping would undoubtedly be another form of NATO’s eastward expansion, which was precisely the cause of the Ukraine issue. The entry of 200,000 European and American military personnel into Ukraine as peacekeepers would undoubtedly further intensify Russia’s security concerns. Since the nature of the European and American military forces has not changed, Russia is unlikely to accept this form of peacekeeping.

China, on the other hand, can address these shortcomings. China has maintained neutrality in the war, and its peacekeeping forces are known for their discipline and excellent equipment. Compared with peacekeepers from some African countries, Chinese peacekeepers are more qualified.

Additionally, China is willing to take on more international peacekeeping responsibilities. For example, in 2015, President Xi Jinping announced the establishment of an 8,000-member standby peacekeeping force at the United Nations, and combined with the approximately 2,500 peacekeepers deployed by China in eight regions around the world, a peacekeeping force of more than 10,000 was formed. This scale is equivalent to the entire military strength of many African countries. This fully demonstrates China’s positive attitude toward peacekeeping affairs, as peacekeeping is not only assistance to other countries but also helps shape China’s image as a peace force on the international stage.

At the same time, as a major power, China should shoulder corresponding international responsibilities. While there are many peacekeeping forces from African countries in the United Nations, sending African peacekeepers to carry out tasks in the core areas of Europe may face some cultural and political recognition issues. Therefore, when peacekeeping forces need to be formed, it would be more appropriate for the force to consist primarily of countries like China and India—non-NATO, non-Western countries.

Chinese Peacekeeping Forces, Xinhua News Agency

Finally, China can play an important role in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. Although the source of reconstruction funds is currently unclear, once the funds are in place, China’s unparalleled infrastructure capabilities will undoubtedly make the reconstruction work faster, more efficient, and cost-effective.

As for Sino-Russian relations, I personally believe that the shift in U.S.-Russia relations will not have a significant impact on Sino-Russian relations. In fact, as some Russian experts have said, Sino-Russian relations have developed very closely, and even in the post-Putin era, it will be difficult for his successor to change this situation because Russia’s dependence on China is continuously strengthening.

Recently, while watching a short video from a Russian blogger, I was surprised to find that Chinese products are very popular in Russia. For example, handmade tofu and Lao Gan Ma (a popular chili sauce) are selling well locally. Over time, the local people will become accustomed to, and even gradually rely on, Chinese products.

In other words, even if U.S.-Russia relations undergo some changes in the future, I do not think this will fundamentally damage Sino-Russian relations. Russian experts have also thought about this issue, and they generally believe that in the post-Putin era, it will be very difficult for Russian leaders to change their attitude toward China because Russia’s dependence on China has already become very deep. China and Russia are neighbors that cannot be moved, so Russia must place its relationship with its neighbor in an extremely important position.

The greatest characteristic of China’s policy is its stability. In this context, it is hard to imagine that any new leader could fundamentally change China’s basic stance.

Editor: Zhongxiaowen