Nelson Wong: Mr. Klußmann, thank you for agreeing to participate in our “Meet the Expert” programme and join this interview which I admit is long overdue. You and I have known each other for years and we should have conducted this dialogue last year. But I guess it’s never too late, and particularly in view of the prolonged conflict in Ukraine and the changing dynamics in European politics, our talk today may still prove to be current and therefore timely. Before we move to the questions I have prepared, I would like you to give a brief introduction of yourself to allow our audience to know who you are and where you come from. As I know, you have led quite an extraordinary life, not the conventional life of an average German, I would say, which has given you a unique perspective when examining the world today, let alone the developing politics of Germany as a major European country.
Uwe Klußmann: Thank you, dear Nelson, for the invitation. Pleasure is all mine to participate in your programme which I already know, and talking with you is always a delightful and interesting experience. Besides, I had the opportunity of visiting your great country last year and saw with my own eyes the remarkable achievements of China. I am very happy to share my views and thoughts with you and your audience across China and beyond. So first, a few words about myself.
I was born in 1961 in Flensburg, West Germany, the son of a former soldier in the German Wehrmacht who, at the age of 18, was forced on 22 June 1941 to take part in the Hitlerite fascists’ invasion of the Soviet Union and who survived that war, having been seriously wounded. This had a profound effect on me and, from my early youth, led me to study both the history of German imperialism and nationalism and the history of the Soviet Union. During my formative years, I read numerous works by Lenin and Chairman Mao, as well as the Chinese Communist Party’s critique of the positions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), published in the 1960s, particularly the ‘Controversy über on the General Line’.
From 1978 to 1982, I was a member of the Communist League, an organisation inspired by Mao’s philosophical views, without, however, sharing the shifting positions of the Chinese leadership of the time before and after the end of the ‘Gang of Four’. From 1980, I began studying history, political science and literary studies at the University of Hamburg, graduating in 1987 with a Master of Arts degree. The subject of my thesis was ‘The Policy of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany during the “New Course” of 1953–54’. Essentially, the question at the time was how a socialist state, following the end of the Stalin era, could reform its political and economic structures without calling into question the stability of the state.
Between 1987 and 1990, I worked as a freelance journalist for, amongst others, the monthly magazine “konkret”, for which I served as a travel correspondent in the GDR. Whilst there, I interviewed, amongst others, the Deputy Minister for Culture, Klaus Höpcke, and the former Deputy Minister for State Security and long-term head of the Main Department of Foreign Security, Markus Wolf. Furthermore, in 1988 I managed to visit the People’s Republic of Albania, which was officially off-limits to journalists; this gave me not only an insight into the extent of Chinese aid to that country, but also an impression of the disastrous consequences of the self-isolation of the Hoxha regime, which was incapable of reform.
These ‘exotic’ topics led to “Der Spiegel” taking me on as an editor in October 1990. Between 1990 and 1998, as a correspondent based in Schwerin, Leipzig and Berlin, I reported on the transformation taking place in the territory of the former GDR, as well as the rise of nationalist forces. In 1997–98, I learnt Russian on my own initiative, in Moscow and in the Crimea – which was still under Ukrainian control at the time, although most of its people already sympathised with Russia as I recognised. The language skills I acquired enabled me to work as a correspondent in Moscow for eleven years, from 1999 to 2009. Among other things, I covered the suppression of armed separatism in Chechnya, the elimination of politically influential oligarchs and the growing tensions between Russia and Ukraine.
From 2010 to 2021, I worked in Hamburg on the history desk at “Der Spiegel” and edited several books on historical topics, including “The Russia of the Czars” and “The Power of Secret Services” (in German). At the end of December 2021, I left my post at “Der Spiegel”. Since then, I have been working as a freelance writer, including as a partner for information exchange and analytical work at the German-Russian Chamber of Foreign Trade in Moscow. In October 2025, I visited the People’s Republic of China at the invitation of the Chongyang Institute of Financial Studies at Renmin University and have since been an honorary professor at Wenzhou Business College in Wenzhou.
Nelson Wong: What an interesting and exciting life you have had so far, Mr. Klußmann! I am sure you have a lot more stories to share when meet we next time. Given your academic background and your longtime working experience as a German correspondent in Russia, I am sure you have been following the development of the war in Ukraine and are not only aware of the conflicting narratives of both Russia and Europe but the reasons behind as well. Here are my questions: Do you see the war in Ukraine end anytime soon? Some pundits say that the recent meeting in the UAE by Ukrainian, Russian, and American delegates failed to reach any concrete result. Do you believe there will be a real peace deal among the three countries without the participation of other NATO countries, such as Germany, France, and the UK? Others claim that without a solution to the European security architecture first, and even if the war gets frozen with a ceasefire, it is still temporary and more problems including military confrontations will follow. What is your take on these topics?
Uwe Klußmann: As for the war in Ukraine, I fear that it will not end any time soon. There are several reasons why this war is dragging on for so long and leading to such tragic consequences. More interesting than the narratives put forward by both sides are their mistakes, which accumulate in a dialectical manner. At the start of the ‘special military operation’, the Russian leadership lacked a realistic analysis of the changes in Ukrainian society since the end of the Soviet Union. This led to an underestimation of the alienation that had developed over three decades between large sections of Ukraine and Russia. This led to the assessment that military intervention would not meet with resistance and would bring about a change of regime within few days. After all, the Russians and Ukrainians are, as it were, ‘one people’. In eastern Ukraine – I was there in March 2014 at the start of the pro-Russian insurgency in the Donbas, where the affinity with Russia was strongly felt – this picture largely corresponded to reality, but not across the whole of Ukraine.
This misjudgement was matched on the Western side by two errors that were no less far-reaching. Political actors from London to Berlin to Warsaw assumed that the whole of Ukraine was a unified entity that stood entirely against Russia. Even more out of touch with reality was the prevailing view in the West that Russia would collapse within a short space of time under the pressure of sanctions. A statement made on 25 February 2022 by the then German Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, was characteristic of this view: “The financial sanctions we have decided upon will ruin Russia”. Clearly, the decision to impose sanctions on Russia was not based on sound analysis but was taken under massive pressure from the administration in Washington, which was able to rely on willing accomplices in Brussels and Berlin.The fact that the analytical calibre of Germany’s political leadership has not improved since then is demonstrated by an interview with Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul in the “Frankfurter Allgemeine” on 27 October 2026: “The Soviet Union ultimately failed due to its dwindling economic power. It will be similar now.” Both statements by respective German foreign ministers are rooted in the same error: they fail to recognize fundamental differences between the late Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. The latter is a market economy—one that is, moreover, so closely integrated with China’s economy and the growth markets of Asia that such a connection would have been inconceivable in the time of the Soviet Union.The persistent, delusory hope for an imminent Russian defeat in the conflict in Ukraine is leading policymakers in European NATO countries to raise the stakes in a dangerous manner—much like a reckless gambler in a casino. In addition to economic misjudgements, there are political ones. In every capital of the European NATO countries, there has been a complete underestimation of the historically rooted Russian perception regarding plans to extend the Western military bloc into Ukraine. One need not share this perception to acknowledge that it is a part of reality.
Under these circumstances, it is extremely difficult to reach a peace settlement through a meeting involving only the United States, Russia, and Ukraine—excluding the European NATO member states. Likewise, a meeting between the presidents of the United States, Russia, and China cannot, under these conditions, enforce a binding peace settlement. Without the involvement of the European NATO states, a comprehensive peace settlement—including the recognition of borders—in the Ukraine conflict is not possible for the near future.
Personally, I am a firm proponent of “freezing” conflicts, having seen on occasions what the overheated “thawing” of such conflicts can lead to. At the same time, however, I share the assessment of those Chinese colleagues who believe that, even if the conflict in Ukraine were to be frozen, it would continue in a manner like the conflict in Kashmir.
What I would like to add is that I visited Ukraine in the first few months after its independence, in early 1992, and later interviewed two Ukrainian presidents, Kuchma and Yushchenko. In my view, one of the most noticeable aspects of this tragic history is that events ultimately defied all planning and demonstrated that the logic of events was stronger than any other logic.That said, I do at least harbour the hope that, elsewhere in the world, we will succeed in learning lessons from this to prevent similar situations. And of course, I am thinking in this context on the historically inevitable processes of the reunification of China.
Nelson Wong: Now that the Trump Administration’s policy towards NATO and the war in Ukraine has obviously shifted and it looks like Selensky has been thrown under the bus, what in your opinion impact it has on the position of the Merz government? Will Germany continue to support Ukraine? As a distant observer, I am not very acquainted with the politics in Germany. What people in China have seen is that AfD has emerged, unexpectedly, and has posed a big challenge to the ruling coalition. Is this true? As the most powerful country in continental Europe, the political reality of Germany and the country’s development trajectory both economically and politically will certainly have a bearing to the overall security of the continent. Rumours that Germany is taking advantage of the unsettled conflict in Ukraine to boost its military might have cast doubts about the real intention of Germany to the extent that Russian analysts are now even predicting an eventual confrontation between Germany and Russia. This is of course more than worrisome. I know my questions might be too many and too big but hope you could use your outstanding talent try to guide me through the mess.
Uwe Klußmann: The electoral successes of the AfD represent the greatest political challenge to the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany since its founding in 1949. Previous far-right parties failed due to a lack of mass appeal, as well as the fact that their leading figures—such as those in the so-called “National Democratic Party of Germany” in the Sixties were tainted by the legacy of the Nazi Party, to which many of them had belonged. However, the AfD is not a modified, latest version of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party led by Adolf Hitler. The AfD is a product of the internal contradictions within German society.
The AfD’s success stems both from the results of a migration policy that at times spiralled out of control, the consequences of internal colonisation in the former GDR due to the dominance of senior officials, professors and judges from West Germany, and the consequences of an ill-advised decision to abandon cheap energy sources from Russia. Recently, external contradictions have also exacerbated by internal ones. The AfD, which was originally founded by professors loyal to the system who wanted to reintroduce the Deutsche Mark, is now benefiting from the consequences of the German elite’s partisanship towards the Ukrainian leadership – a stance that, at the very least, has not led to victory.
The fact that it currently polls at 27 percent nationwide—six percentage points ahead of the governing Christian Democratic Union—primarily highlights the crisis facing this centrist party and its diminishing capacity to integrate different segments of society. The successes of the AfD reflect a twofold paradox. Should this party ever attain power, it would have to contend with a multi-ethnic population—for it cannot expel millions of immigrants, any more than the “Trumpists” were able to do. A further paradox lies in the fact that, contrary to the traditions of German militarism, a form of “national pacifism”—tactically motivated—has emerged within parts of the AfD. This is particularly evident in the party’s East German branches, which oppose German support for “foreign wars.”
This also relates to the waning public support for the Ukrainian government. The AfD’s stance against Zelenskyy has recently contributed to the party’s growing popularity. It is not merely rumour that Germany intends to bolster its military power against the backdrop of the conflict in Ukraine. In a government statement to the German Bundestag on 14 May 2025, Chancellor Merz announced that the Bundeswehr was to become ‘Europe’s strongest conventional army’. Personally, I believe Merz is underestimating the dangers involved because – like most lawyers (Lenin was an exception, but he was no typical lawyer) – he lacks a deep understanding of the dynamics of historical processes.
These rearmament plans by Merz, which the Social Democratic Defence Minister is playing a key role in supporting, harbour two major risks. In France and Poland, plans to make the German army the strongest in Europe are reviving fears stemming from the Second World War. Consequently, particularly following a victory for the nationalists at the presidential Electric in France, Germany could find itself in a political – not directly military – confrontation with its two largest neighbours, France and Poland.
This brings us to the second risk. The German elite could succumb to the temptation to offset the problems with Paris and Warsaw by engaging in even greater confrontation with Russia. The Russian perception of Germany as having ‘the strongest army in Europe’ is ignored in Germany and dismissed as mere propaganda. Such an attitude increases the risk of a military confrontation with Russia, triggered by accidental incidents involving, for example, drones or at sea. Unfortunately, in Germany, people have forgotten the insight gained by the German Social Democrats in the 1970s, under chancellor Willy Brandt, namely that with Russia – which was then known as the Soviet Union – mutual security can only be achieved through constant dialogue and arms control.
Nelson Wong: Let us all hope that Europe will have peace one way or another, because after all, whenever there is a war, it is always the ordinary people who will suffer the most. Now let us look at the bigger picture. Do you share the growing voice that the world is becoming multipolar and that the days when the U.S. can dictate everything are gone? To me, multipolarity seems more of a phenomenon, not a dreaming future to be taken for granted, because it does not guarantee at all that we will be able to coexist peacefully and happily ever after. I do not expect you to be a prophet, but could you share your thoughts on this topic and your aspirations perhaps? Because after all, we all must move on and want to leave a better world for our children and grandchildren and future generations, and so we always need positive energy. What do you say?
Uwe Klußmann: In my view, there is no cause for naïve enthusiasm about multipolarity. The growing number of centres of political and military power in the world also increases the risk of conflicts that are difficult to contain and even more difficult to defuse. Added to this are the consequences of various military interventions without United Nations approval. One consequence is that countries under attack or under threat are seeking ways to acquire nuclear weapons. This increases the need for mediators who are not involved in a conflict. In this regard, I see a growing role for China and other countries of the Global South. Europe, too, could once again aspire to such a role once the war in Ukraine has ended.
If we are to leave a better world for our children and grandchildren, it would be good to realise that what is new and good is sometimes simply the old that has been forgotten.I am thinking of the Charter of the United Nations and, as far as China is concerned, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence of 1954 formulated by Zhou Enlai: Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignity, mutual non-aggression, non- interference, mutual benefit. When it applies to the Ukraine conflict, I think that the 12-Point Plan for a Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis released by China’s Foreign Ministry on 24 February 2023 have given some important basic ideas like “abandoning the Cold War mentality, ceasing hostilities, reducing strategic risks, and stopping unilateral sanctions”.
I am currently reading the book “All Under One Sky” by the philosopher Zhao Tingyang, who works at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. Among other things, the author puts forward the thesis that the ‘inclusion of the world’ is becoming the ‘ultimate question of politics.’ He also states that ‘any hostile action aimed at destruction’ is ultimately ‘irrational and a mistake.’ Considering the violent conflicts around the world, he warns that these could easily lead, as a ‘future consequence’, to ‘mutual destruction through acts of retaliation’. If the author is right, then his ideas offer an opportunity to pause and break free from the dead end of mutual threats and violence.
At the end of his book, Zhao Tingyang concludes that the path to a ‘safe, peaceful and cooperative world’ lies in ‘reverence for creation.’ This is an intellectual approach that can be accepted by adherents of vastly different political, ideological, and religious persuasions. In this sense, I believe that Europeans today, more than ever, need to engage with Chinese thinking for a peaceful future of mankind.
Nelson Wong: Dear Uwe, thank you so much for sharing your thoughts and opinions. I am sure our readers will all agree that we have learnt a lot from your in-depth analysis and insightful comments on the topics which are quite heavy, I know. It is a real privilege for us Chinese to learn from a German analyst who is willing to share his opinions. I look forward to our next meeting soon either in China or elsewhere when I will have more questions for you and topics that we can discuss further. Thank you once again and I wish you all the best.
Uwe Klußmann: Thank you very much, dear Nelson, for giving me the opportunity to set out my views on various global issues in detail here. The Chinese place immense importance on asking questions thoroughly and getting to the root of problems. And you, dear Nelson, as an expert on the West, can draw on your years of experience in both Hong Kong and the UK. In this way, your work helps to ensure that China today is a place of dialogue and provides platforms for dialogue. Our conversation shows this. Amidst the crises and confrontations of our time, this is a positive sign that offers hope.
Editor: Zhiyu Wang



