Host:
I’m joined by Richard Haass, former senior U.S. State Department official, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, and author of a widely read Substack, as well as Kishore Mahbubani, a veteran Singaporean diplomat and Distinguished Fellow at the Asia Research Institute of the National University of Singapore. Richard, we are seeing an interesting dynamic among these three major powers. In some ways, relations appear to be improving, yet Russia and China seem to have formed a kind of axis.
Richard Haass:
I would describe it as an alignment rather than a full alliance. China’s assistance to Russia remains limited and carefully calibrated. The relationship is also one between unequals. That was evident during President Putin’s visit, particularly in how Russia is now pressing China to expand energy cooperation through a new pipeline, largely for Russia’s own economic benefit rather than China’s. This underscores the broader imbalance: China is a multifaceted major power, while Russia is far more limited and largely one-dimensional. Moreover, Russia is not succeeding in its chosen war against Ukraine and is paying a significant price for it. As a result, Russia is likely to emerge considerably weaker.
Host:
You’ve made the point, Richard—if I recall correctly on X—that both Russia and the United States are losing wars of choice: Russia in Ukraine and the U.S. in Iran.
Richard Haass:
Despite the many differences between the two conflicts, the fundamental outcome is the same: both countries are likely to emerge worse off. What I find most interesting—and I’m curious to hear Kishore’s view as well—is how China interprets this experience. When Xi Jinping observes these wars, does he conclude that military conflicts are far less straightforward than they may initially appear, and that they often fail to unfold as expected? I would hope this serves as a moment of strategic sobriety for Xi Jinping.
Host:
Kishore, how do you think Xi Jinping views these two wars of choice, in which both Russia and the United States appear to be struggling?
Kishore Mahbubani:
From China’s perspective, the current situation is highly favorable. The United States is deeply entangled in the Middle East, and every war it fights there effectively benefits China by buying Beijing more time to grow its economy and strengthen its position. China consistently plays the long game, focusing on where it will stand ten years from now as a result of present developments.
Host:
But given how difficult these wars have been—despite Russia’s significant advantage over Ukraine and the U.S. being far stronger than Iran—do you think China draws cautionary lessons for Taiwan?
Kishore Mahbubani:
The Western portrayal of Taiwan is fundamentally flawed. There is a widespread assumption that China is preparing to invade Taiwan militarily as soon as possible and that the experiences of Ukraine and Iran provide direct lessons. In reality, Chinese strategists take a comprehensive, long-term view and ask a simple question: on whose side is time? Is time on Taiwan’s side or China’s? If Taiwan were to declare independence tomorrow—the scenario that would trigger a war—how many countries would recognize it? When I visited Taiwan a few months ago, I pointed out that its Republic of China passport currently allows access to more than 180 countries. If it were changed to a “Republic of Taiwan” passport, recognition might come from only five or six countries. From Beijing’s perspective, time clearly favors China. While China will continue to project strength, it is not seriously contemplating a military invasion of Taiwan in the near future.
Host:
Richard, we’ve been discussing whether time favors China or Taiwan. Kishore argues that time is clearly on China’s side, given its economic size and growth trajectory. Do you agree?
Richard Haass:
I do not agree. China’s population currently stands at roughly 1.3 billion, but by the end of the century it is projected to decline to around 800 million. At the same time, the ratio of working-age citizens to the elderly will shift sharply toward an aging population. In addition, advances in defense technology—particularly drones, anti-ship systems, and anti-aircraft capabilities—are increasingly favoring defenders. If Taiwan adapts effectively to these developments, this trend could work in its favor.
The key variable, in my view, is the United States. I agree with Kishore to some extent: China does not want an invasion. No Chinese soldier has participated in a large-scale combined-arms operation since at least the Korean War, excluding Vietnam, which was a brief conflict, and those who did are now retired. China’s preference, consistent with the principles of Sun Tzu, is to subdue its opponent without firing a shot. That approach places significant pressure on the United States. The central question emerging from the summit—and from President Trump’s interview with Brett Baier on Fox—is whether the United States would be willing to trade support for Taiwan in exchange for economic access to China’s market. If it is, then China may ultimately achieve its objective.
Host:
Kishore, I’ve long believed that the primary deterrent against China is not U.S. military power but China’s fear of losing access to the American, European, and Japanese markets. China is deeply integrated into the global economy. That, more than military force, restrains Beijing from acting rashly.
Kishore Mahbubani:
Let me respond with two points. First, consider the lesson from Iran in the Gulf. You do not need superior military capabilities to control a strategic chokepoint. Iran, despite lacking the world’s most advanced military, has managed to disrupt roughly 20 percent of global economic flows. In Taiwan’s case, China would not need to fire a shot. It could simply impose a blockade. No country would realistically attempt to break a determined Chinese blockade of Taiwan. Second, regarding global trade: dependence is mutual. In 2000, China accounted for 6 percent of global manufacturing. Today, that figure is close to 30 percent, and by 2030 it may reach 45 percent. Chinese products are becoming indispensable to the world, and this interdependence was deliberately cultivated to ensure that any attempt to contain China would fail.
Richard Haass:
China is also heavily dependent on exports. Domestic consumption has been constrained, resulting in an export-led economic model. China therefore needs access to global markets just as much as the world relies on Chinese goods. This mutual dependence acts as a constraint on Beijing as well.
Host:
This is precisely why I believe Kishore is right: the relationship is a two-way street for both sides. The most effective deterrent would be a unified stance in which the United States, Europe, Japan, and Australia collectively make clear that an invasion of Taiwan would mean an end to business as usual. In principle, such a position is entirely achievable. In practice, however, it has been undermined by disputes with our closest allies, the imposition of tariffs, and a broader failure to present a united front. As a result, the United States now has worse relations with Canada than it does with China.
Richard Haass:
That was precisely the strategic rationale behind initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership. America’s greatest strategic advantage has always been its network of allies and partners. Yet we have undermined that advantage through our own actions.
Host:
Kishore Mahbubani, Richard Haass, it’s always a pleasure speaking with you both.
Editor: Yangwen
