Edited transcript of China Now, a top-rateed political commentary show broadcast weekly in China.

In early February this year, at the invitation of former Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić, we visited Serbia—China’s staunch friend in Europe. During our visit, we met with several political leaders, including the current Foreign Minister, and held in-depth discussions with multiple think tanks, as well as broad dialogues with figures from the political, intellectual, and media communities.

One of the highlights of the trip took place on the evening of February 5, when our hosts organized a high-level dialogue event in a beautifully decorated and elegant club in Belgrade. The theme was “Year of the Snake: Conflict or Harmony?” Nearly 200 guests attended, including former senior Serbian officials, the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, prominent intellectuals and media figures, ambassadors from various countries stationed in Serbia, and representatives of international organizations.

The dialogue lasted nearly two hours. Former Foreign Minister Jeremić remarked, “As you predicted four years ago, Trump has indeed returned to the political stage, and world history has now entered a new and exceptional phase. The entire international order is facing serious challenges. If we compare the three major powers—China, Russia, and the United States—we could say that Russia never truly integrated into the current order, China has integrated quite successfully, and the United States is now withdrawing from it.”

He then asked me, “How does China view all of this today?”

I replied, “I see Russia as a revolutionary. Through its controversial ‘special military operation,’ it aims to overthrow the liberal, unipolar order led by the West. China, on the other hand, is a reformer. We seek to maximize gains and minimize risks—making use of the reasonable aspects of the current order while striving to reform its unreasonable parts. Both the revolutionary and the reformist approaches are forward-looking; both aim to build a more just and balanced multipolar world order.”

I also mentioned something Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov once said to us, he admired how the Chinese could beat their opponents on their own turf. He cited the WTO as an example—an institution created by the U.S., but which the U.S. now wants to withdraw from. As for President Trump, he showed little interest in maintaining the current order, believing it overburdens the United States and has led to deindustrialization. Under the slogan of ‘America First,’ he began discarding the existing order. But his vision looks backward—returning to the pre-WWII era marked by unilateralism and mercantilism.

In other words, we now see a complex interplay of three forces: revolutionary, reformist, and abandoning forces. Together, they are objectively accelerating the arrival of a multipolar world. However, there is still no consensus on how to build this new world order. Or, to be more precise, there is a basic consensus between China and Russia, but not between China-Russia and the United States.

Jeremić asked me: “In this chaotic world, how is China preparing to respond to the challenges posed by Trump—especially the trade war and tech war? Is China planning to retaliate tit for tat, or something else?”

I replied, “Precisely because we anticipated four years ago that Trump was highly likely to return, we made full preparations. So now, it’s not just tit for tat—it’s a punitive counterattack. When Trump announced increased tariffs on Chinese goods, we responded with equivalent tariffs on U.S. goods.”

Jeremić remarked, “Chinese people are known for being thoughtful and deliberate.”
He then asked: “What kind of characteristics do you think the Year of the Snake will bring?”

I said, “The snake symbolizes wisdom and resilience, and from the very start of this year, China has already demonstrated both. Take DeepSeek, for example—it’s had a sweeping impact. In the U.S., from Silicon Valley to the stock market, anxiety and unease are palpable. It’s as if everything changed starting in January this year. Some are even saying that the strategic roles between China and the U.S. have reversed.”

We reached this conclusion long ago: the U.S. is more economically dependent on China than China is on the U.S. That’s one of the main reasons we believe the U.S. is destined to lose the trade and tariff war against China.

China’s approach is fundamentally different from that of the U.S. Americans like making presentations, promoting their latest technologies or weapons before they even exist. We, on the other hand, just get to work. Once we succeed, we might make a brief announcement—or not announce it at all.

But since the beginning of this year, China has already acquired high-tech products that the U.S. doesn’t yet have—like DeepSeek, BYD’s new energy vehicles, sixth-generation fighter jets, and Huawei’s HarmonyOS. This signals a profound transformation in the global landscape. I added, “when we publicly talk about a Chinese technological breakthrough, it usually means many more achievements are already in the pipeline.”

The moderator then asked me, “From an ideological perspective, do these achievements have any special significance?”

I answered, “China is a socialist country, and our socialist system has succeeded. We learned a great deal from both the successes and failures of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. We witnessed the breakup of Yugoslavia with deep sorrow, but we were not discouraged. We continued to explore the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics—until we succeeded.”

There was another related exchange during the visit. Ms. Smajilović, the Balkan regional editor of RT (Russia Today), conducted an in-depth interview with me. We spoke at length about my visit to Yugoslavia in 1986. At that time, I accompanied a Chinese leader on an official visit. We were astonished—it was the first time we saw five-star hotels, massive shopping malls, spacious residential buildings, and private cars in ordinary people’s homes in a socialist country. We thought to ourselves, when will China be this developed?

But as our visit deepened, we realized that Yugoslavia was already mired in severe economic and political crises. President Tito passed away on May 4, 1980. After his death, the federal government adopted a rotating collective presidency, which failed to provide strong leadership. As a result, the six republics each went their own way.

Even more troubling was that the political and intellectual elites in Yugoslavia had been deeply influenced—one might say brainwashed—by Western ideology. They believed that adopting Western political systems would solve all of Yugoslavia’s problems. The result? Civil war and national disintegration.

As I recounted this experience, Ms. Smajilović was visibly moved—she almost shed tears. She said, “Do you know how painful it is for us Serbians to look back on all of this?”

I told her I completely understood. In 2006, I personally visited all the republics that emerged from the former Yugoslavia. It left a deep impression on me. At the time, I wrote,
“A nation’s fate can hinge on just a few critical steps, one misstep could lead to eternal regret, and history is littered with such examples.
” Yugoslavia is a textbook example of that.

The moderator then asked, “For a small country like Serbia, caught between major powers, what is the best course of action?”

I responded, “From the perspective of a civilizational state, Serbia—like Ukraine—is located at the intersection of different civilizations. Serbia’s choice to become a bridge connecting these civilizations is, in my view, a very wise one. By contrast, Ukraine chose to become a fortress of confrontation between civilizations, and that has proven to be a grave mistake.”

“I understand and support Serbia’s so-called ‘four-pillar’ foreign policy—that is, maintaining friendly relations with China, Russia, the United States, and the European Union simultaneously. But I’d also like to share a piece of Chinese wisdom with you, a saying from one of our leaders: ‘Make friends with everyone, but always keep a clear mind.’”

She acknowledged that this was indeed a wise approach. She then asked,
“When you mention ‘keeping a clear mind,’ the heart, or intent, behind it is important. So I must ask a question that seems to weigh on the heart of every Chinese person—the Taiwan question. Chinese people are known for their strategic patience, but that patience now seems to be wearing thin. Is that the case?”

I replied “The People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, and we have waited patiently for over 75 years. Now, the conditions for reunification are becoming increasingly mature. From a military standpoint, reunification is already within reach. Of course, we still hope for peaceful reunification. But we’ve made it very clear to the Americans: we hope you support China’s peaceful reunification. And the implication is—if you don’t support peaceful reunification, then we will achieve reunification by other means. That could be peaceful, non-peaceful, or somewhere in between. But the goal of reunification must and will be achieved.”

The moderator followed up,
“What if the U.S. intervenes militarily?”

I said:, “We have repeatedly warned the United States: do not play with fire on the Taiwan issue. We are absolutely serious. China is a country that values face and respect. We show the U.S. the respect it deserves—we call it a superpower, the world’s largest economy. But if the U.S. were to engage in military conflict with China over Taiwan or the South China Sea, I sincerely hope such a conflict never occurs. However, if it does, my prediction is that the very next day, the world will realize the U.S. is no longer a superpower. So I advise the U.S. to act wisely.”

The editor-in-chief of Politika, Serbia’s largest newspaper, also conducted a special interview with me. He asked a very interesting question, “Last year, during Xi’s visit to Serbia, he published a signed article in Politika, in which he mentioned that although China and Serbia are geographically far apart, the two peoples have always been closely connected. He wrote that during the fiery years of the anti-fascist war and the subsequent period of national reconstruction, our peoples forged a deep friendship that transcends time and space. As China is a global power and Serbia is a small Balkan country, is there any special meaning behind the Chinese leader choosing to describe China-Serbia relations in this way?”

I replied, “China has always upheld the principle that all countries, big or small, are equal. At the same time, we Chinese have a strong sense of history—we never forget old friends. Our two peoples fought side by side during World War II, shedding blood together in the fight against fascism, and forged a deep bond of friendship.

Even today, names like Tito, and Yugoslav films such as The Bridge and Walter Defends Sarajevo, remain familiar even to younger generations in China. The song Bella Ciao (‘Ah, Friend, Goodbye’) still brings tears to the eyes of many Chinese people.

This year marks the 80th anniversary of the victory in the global anti-fascist war. So let me end today’s talk with this timeless song of resistance. It goes like this:

Bella Ciao
One morning I awakened,
And I found the invader.
Oh, partisans take me with you,
Because I feel death approaching.
And if I die as a partisan,
Then you must bury me.
Bury me up in the mountain
Under the shade of a beautiful flower.
Oh bella ciao, bella ciao, bella ciao ciao ciao.

Round table and Q&A

He Jie: I remember in a previous discussion about Ukraine, I asked Professor Zhang a question: “For a small country like Ukraine, how should it find its place in the world?” Just now in your speech, you also mentioned that a country shouldn’t become a frontline of civilizational conflict, but rather a bridge for civilizational exchange. So now I’d like to ask a follow-up: When a country wants to be a bridge, what kind of pressure does it face—from the Western world or from other camps?

Zhang Weiwei: It’s fair to say that Serbia is under tremendous pressure. When we visited this time, we arrived right in the middle of the “Colour Revolution”—the largest protest to date, with over 300,000 people taking to the streets.
We had just come from France, where we were attending a conference in Paris, and we saw the reports there. As someone who studies politics, I had a gut feeling that this was the moment we should go—especially since Serbia is a friend of ours. We needed to show understanding and support.

When we arrived, the scale of the demonstrations was indeed significant. But from what I observed on the surface, the protesters didn’t appear angry—in fact, they looked rather relaxed. So based on our field research, at least as of February, the government remained stable.

That said, some of the measures taken to handle the crisis were not timely or appropriate, which allowed the protests to escalate. After we arrived, I had a conversation with them. I said: A country’s development inevitably goes through ups and downs, but it’s precisely through these cycles that a nation matures. I shared this perspective with them.

He Jie:
It’s clear that even when a country has a clear head and rational understanding—and wants to serve as a bridge between civilizations—it’s not easy. External forces will keep applying pressure, because many actors don’t want it to play that role.

Wang Zhen: This isn’t just true for Serbia—many small countries face the same dilemma. The most rational or ideal strategy is to balance between major powers. We sometimes call this “small countries leveraging big powers.” But in practice, this is extremely difficult.
Serbia has had both successes and setbacks in this regard, largely due to its unique environment. Historically, it has had a close relationship with Russia—due to historical, cultural, and ethnic ties. At the same time, it borders Central and Western European powers and seeks support from them.

However, even though the Cold War is over, relations between the U.S. and post-Soviet Russia have not improved. Especially after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, ties between Russia and many European countries have deteriorated further.
So in this context, for Serbia to try to maneuver between these powers—there’s a great deal of resistance.

He Jie:
I think the significance of holding this session of the International Dialogue in Serbia lies in the country’s unique position. It gives us a chance to observe its development.

Zhang Weiwei:
Also, Serbia is surrounded by NATO countries. That’s important. Yet, we have a staunch friend there, which makes NATO and the West very unhappy—and us, very pleased. In particular, we supported Serbia in acquiring the Chinese HQ-22 air defense system. That’s a big deal. If they had had such a missile system back then, the NATO airstrikes might not have happened. It’s a comprehensive system, including 24-hour surveillance and monitoring.

He Jie:
Many young people today may not know much about the historical details. So, Professor Zhang, if you were to introduce Serbia to a younger audience, how would you help them quickly understand and connect with the country?

Zhang Weiwei:
Young people are actually very interested in the history of the socialist bloc. You can see it on Bilibili—there’s a lot of content about Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, Tito, Soviet-Yugoslav relations, Sino-Soviet relations. These are rich knowledge points, and there’s a large, engaged audience.
Whether it’s Yugoslavia, Serbia, or today’s Russia, there’s a strong sense of nostalgia. For example, if you go to Moscow, you’ll find many restaurants styled after the Soviet era. Tour guides will tell you stories from Soviet times. At a certain point, people start to feel nostalgic.

China’s relationship with Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was special—many of our systems were once aligned: five-year plans, the dictatorship of the proletariat, people’s democratic dictatorship, democratic centralism, Leninism. So when young people see these ideas again, they find them engaging. And with Yugoslavia, we also had a lot of military cooperation back then.

Wang Zhen: Yes, in 2023, our delegation from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences visited the Balkans. We traveled through countries like Montenegro, Albania, and Serbia. The local people were very friendly toward Chinese visitors.

I remember in Montenegro—once part of the former Yugoslavia—we were on the road when someone in our group needed a restroom break. We stopped at a remote spot deep in a valley, where there was just a solitary house. The woman there didn’t speak English, so she called her daughter down to talk to us.
After we used the restroom, and just as we were about to leave, the woman—who had a garden full of flowers—picked a bouquet and gave it to us as a gift. She only knew we were from China, didn’t know us personally at all, but was incredibly warm and welcoming. That really showed how friendly people there are toward China.

Zhang Weiwei:
I visited Yugoslavia before its breakup, in 1986. At that time, it was still one country. After its dissolution, I went back purely out of academic interest—I wanted to see how the six republics were doing. I even visited Kosovo, if we count it as a separate entity. It left me with a lot of mixed feelings.

I remember we were in Slovenia, which was the wealthiest republic. At our hotel, we got to know one of the staff members fairly well after spending several days there. We asked him, “Which republic are you from?”—essentially, where are you from, like asking which province someone is from. And he said, “I’m Yugoslav.”

He Jie:
So at that time, there was still a strong sense of national identity.

Zhang Weiwei: Yes, the communist party’s ideological education was still in place. But even that couldn’t withstand the rise of nationalism and populism. When people started shouting slogans like “Montenegro belongs to Montenegrins,” “Kosovo belongs to Kosovars,” and began using elections to push those ideas, the country eventually fell apart.

Thinking back on it is quite saddening. For many people, that period is painful to remember. After all, the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II happened in that region.

He Jie:
Exactly. So now, for these former Yugoslav republics to gradually find their own paths and directions—it’s no small feat, especially after going through such prolonged turmoil.

Coming back to today, in your many conversations with local political and media figures, we see that they do have a global perspective. When it comes to the current world order—especially the one the U.S. seems to want to withdraw from—how do they understand it?

Zhang Weiwei:
On that point, there’s actually a broad consensus. We’ve discussed this on our program many times. While the war in Ukraine is highly controversial, there’s widespread understanding—and even support—for what Putin said about dismantling the old order, the U.S.-led hegemonic, unipolar world order.

We once said: Russia has been isolated by the West, but the West has been isolated by the non-Western world. That’s very real. Russia is a revolutionary force seeking to overthrow the current order; China is a reformist force aiming to reform it.

Wang Zhen:
The current international order was established after World War II, primarily shaped by the United States and the Soviet Union as the two global superpowers. That structure defined the postwar world. But now, things have changed significantly.
For example, in the 1950s and 60s, the U.S. accounted for about 40% of global GDP. Today, it’s down to around 24–25%, roughly one-quarter. In contrast, back in 1949, China’s GDP was just a few billion dollars. Now, it’s close to $18 trillion, making up about 16–17% of the global economy.

So clearly, today’s China and today’s U.S. don’t occupy the same global proportions as before. That’s just a fact. On top of that, many other non-Western countries—like India, Turkey, and Brazil—are also rising. This is what we call the collective rise of the non-Western world.
Previously, it was the West that called the shots—mainly the U.S. and the Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia lost much of its influence. The U.S. and its allies—Japan and Europe—dominated. But now, with the rise of the non-Western world, the old model no longer works.

You can see this in how the G7 expanded to the G20. But even the G20 can’t fully reflect today’s realities. So with the shifting balance of power, the existing world order must undergo major adjustments. If emerging powers can’t gain more voice within the current system, that becomes a very real problem. That’s why the international order is under enormous pressure for change. On the flip side, the U.S. feels its original dominance slipping, and it’s trying—by any means necessary—to maintain its voice within the existing system. But its actual power no longer matches its position. That’s where the contradictions and tensions come from.

He Jie:
So, when we hold these dialogues in European countries like Serbia, it’s really a kind of exchange of perspectives and ideas. It helps them understand how we see the world. At the same time, it’s also valuable for us to hear how they view things.

Have there been any viewpoints from them that you found particularly insightful? Their questions are often very direct. For example, they might say, “We really want to develop relations with China, and the Belt and Road projects are great, but every time we try to launch a project, we come under pressure.”

Zhang Weiwei:
One of the most difficult pressures they face is related to the U.S. dollar payment system. The U.S. can easily say, “We’re warning you—you can’t use SWIFT,” the international financial messaging system.

Of course, now we can offer alternatives, like using the Chinese yuan for settlement through CIPS (the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System) or digital yuan-based mutual payment systems. But in reality, there are still challenges. Some projects are tied to the U.S. dollar by design, or due to past arrangements.

For example, the EU and the U.S. have provided them with aid in the past, and those historical ties are not easy to break. The West has developed a full set of tools for interfering in other countries’ internal affairs—through NGOs, for instance. And as you mentioned, even institutions like the IMF impose political conditions when they offer assistance. It’s not easy for these countries to free themselves from that.

He Jie: Yes, because whether it’s the institutional structure or the broader system, all the supporting mechanisms—like platforms and financial systems—are already in place. Trying to break away from that and build an entirely new system is extremely difficult.

Wang Zhen:
China can do a lot, but it will take time. For instance, if you look at the report from the 20th Party Congress, the assessment of global trends has clearly changed. It no longer states that “peace and development are the themes of our time.” Instead, it clearly says the world has entered a period of turbulence and transformation.
This is what we refer to as “great changes unseen in a century.” Our response is the proposal to build a community with a shared future for mankind. And that’s not just an abstract idea—it includes concrete steps.

For example, it involves building a new type of international relations, promoting a new kind of globalization, pursuing peaceful development, and upholding multilateralism. These are very specific objectives.
Take the Global Security Initiative, for example. It outlines 20 key points, covering global issues, regional issues, and more than a dozen thematic areas—such as maritime security, biosecurity, energy security, information security, and so on.

It’s a targeted and well-thought-out framework. On one hand, it shows the world that China has its own thinking on these matters—we’re willing to contribute our ideas and solutions. And we’re not just talking—we’re taking action.

He Jie:
You just mentioned that Serbia also wants to reduce its reliance on the U.S. dollar for payments. I’ve noticed that China has already achieved RMB settlement with countries like Brazil and Argentina for a wide range of goods. Using the RMB not only facilitates trade, but also helps these countries reduce their heavy burden of dollar-denominated debt. This is a smart and practical approach.

Zhang Weiwei: Take Latin America, for example—China’s trade with many of those countries now surpasses their trade with the United States. This makes the U.S. very anxious, but the fact is, it doesn’t have the capacity to carry out the kinds of large-scale projects we do. Look at the port project at Chancay—those are investments on a scale they wouldn’t even dare to attempt. But we’ve made it happen.

He Jie:
The Chancay Port—actually, the U.S. tried to obstruct that project for quite some time. But this time, we’ve pushed through the interference, and once it’s completed, it will significantly reduce both the cost and time of transporting goods from South America to Asia and other parts of the world.

Zhang Weiwei: Serbia’s situation is a bit more complicated. Since Montenegro became independent, Serbia lost access to the sea—it’s now a landlocked country, surrounded on all sides.

He Jie: That’s why it needs the Hungary–Serbia railway.

Zhang Weiwei:
Exactly. On one hand, it needs to build up its railway network. On the other, it has to maintain good relations with its neighboring countries, especially since it relies on Montenegro for access to the sea. Fortunately, China has good relations with all these countries.

He Jie: Right. So Serbia’s cooperation with China can really help it chart an independent development path, even with such a complex geopolitical and historical background. That’s why I think Serbia is a particularly interesting case to observe.

Zhang Weiwei:
With the Belt and Road Initiative, Serbia has become a key hub—especially among Central and Eastern European countries. It plays a very important role. We’ve invested in a range of projects there—railways, highways, copper mining. Our copper mining operations there are quite large.

And the standards we apply are very high. For example, our environmental standards for the copper mine even exceed those of the EU. This sets an example for the EU—showing that cooperation with China can reach world-class levels.

He Jie:
Yes, it shows that top-tier projects can be done right here in the region. Alright, let’s now invite our audience to join the discussion.

Audience: Serbia is set to sign a defense cooperation agreement with Hungary, a NATO member. Does this indicate that NATO’s “backyard” has been breached? And does it suggest that the United States’ control over Europe and NATO is weakening? Thank you.

Zhang Weiwei: Yes, this defense agreement has actually been in the works for some time—it was already signed back in 2024. So this shows that their relationship is quite mature, covering areas like defense, weapons cooperation, joint exercises, and other forms of collaboration.

Historically, you can see that these two peoples share a certain character. Serbia—even going back to the Yugoslav era—had tensions with the Soviet Union and Stalin. That kind of fighting spirit is something we admire. As some of our older generation revolutionaries used to say, the Soviet Union didn’t dare to attack Yugoslavia, just like India didn’t dare to attack Nepal. In evaluating a nation, a big part of it is whether it has the courage to stand up and resist.

Wang Zhen:
Let me give you some background. In March, Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo signed a trilateral defense agreement. Now, as we all know, Kosovo went through a war and later unilaterally declared independence. Some countries recognized it, but many still don’t. Serbia is firmly among those that do not recognize Kosovo’s independence—it considers Kosovo to still be part of Serbia.

So now that Kosovo has signed this agreement with Croatia and Albania, it puts a lot of pressure on Serbia. In response, Serbia needs to take countermeasures. One of those is seeking defense cooperation with Hungary.

The main purpose of this cooperation is to address the Kosovo issue. Serbia is not a NATO member, and even if it were, it would still retain a degree of autonomy in choosing its defense partners. This is not a military alliance—it’s just a defense cooperation agreement. It might seem sensitive, and perhaps the level of cooperation is a bit high, but it’s still far from the level of a formal alliance.

He Jie:
I think the reason people are so concerned about this issue ultimately comes down to the broader relationship between NATO and Europe. When life-and-death decisions aren’t in your own hands, it naturally creates a sense of insecurity.

Audience:
China has provided assistance to Serbia in many areas, including infrastructure, energy, and healthcare. My question is: why does our country choose to help a small Eastern European country like Serbia? Thank you.

Zhang Weiwei:
Actually, I think one of the strengths of Chinese diplomacy is that it takes the long view. When we offer support to others, they, in turn, support us as well. If you look just a bit further ahead, you’ll see it’s about mutual consultation, joint development, and shared benefits. The long-term impact is significant. And you can trust that the people working in diplomacy and international economic cooperation are highly capable—they know what they’re doing.

Wang Zhen:
Personally, I tend to avoid using the word “help” when talking about international relations, because at its core, international relations are about reciprocity. There’s rarely such a thing as purely altruistic aid. If we judge everything purely from a moral standpoint, we risk oversimplifying the issue—and that can be dangerous.

What we’re really talking about is mutually beneficial cooperation. So why is China willing to work with Serbia—or why is Serbia willing to work with China? I think there are several reasons.

First, there’s a historical connection. As we mentioned earlier, there’s genuine goodwill between the people of both countries. Second, Serbia imposes relatively few restrictions on Chinese investment compared to other countries. After the Cold War, Serbia experienced two major conflicts—the Bosnian War and the Kosovo War—which left its economy and infrastructure in urgent need of rebuilding. So when China came in with investment, Serbia welcomed it with open arms.

For Chinese companies looking to expand abroad, Serbia presents a good opportunity—it’s relatively low-risk and stable, which is exactly what businesses look for. So in many ways, this cooperation is driven by both market forces and supportive policies.

On a broader strategic level, as Professor Zhang just mentioned, we look at the bigger picture. The Balkan Peninsula is a key corridor linking Russia with Central and Western Europe. It’s a strategic bridge. If you can gain access through this region, it becomes much easier to reach Western Europe, both in terms of logistics and strategic positioning.

So this is really about meeting shared needs. It’s not about one side helping the other, but rather both sides working together for mutual benefit.

Zhang Weiwei:
If you take a close look at the official documents related to the Belt and Road Initiative, you’ll notice they introduce many new concepts. For example, the idea of “pivot countries.” These aren’t just randomly selected—they’re countries with relatively strong foundations across various sectors.

In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, Serbia serves as a model and a gateway. When others see the high-quality railways and infrastructure projects we’ve built there, it opens their eyes to new possibilities. It creates momentum for further cooperation.

Audience:
China–EU relations are influenced by the United States, and smaller countries often feel pressured to pick sides. Serbia, as an EU candidate country, is instead deepening its cooperation with China. Could this lead other European countries to follow suit and shift more actively toward China? Thank you.

Wang Zhen:
Last year, I had a conversation with an expert from a think tank under Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs—not European, but still relevant. He asked whether China could develop a major project in Iran similar to the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor. They understand that only China has the capacity to carry out such flagship infrastructure projects, which can drive broader economic development.

This kind of interest shows how our cooperation with Pakistan has drawn admiration from other countries. They hope China will invest in their regions as well. I think our cooperation with Serbia definitely has a similar demonstration effect—it sets an example that others may want to follow.

Zhang Weiwei:
Let me add one point. Since the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, these successor states are all relatively small and lack strong independence in decision-making. But I agree with your point: if the projects in Serbia are successful, other countries will see that cooperation with China brings benefits at least equal to, if not greater than, what they get from the EU or the United States.

China takes a long-term approach to things. We work steadily over time, and that approach will eventually show its value.

He Jie: Yes, steady and sustained effort. Ultimately though, whether stable cooperation can be achieved depends on how much strategic autonomy certain European countries actually have. Only with that autonomy can they firmly pursue a development path or partnership model that truly suits their own interests.

Large countries are few in number—most of the world is made up of medium-sized or small countries. These nations face many challenges when choosing their development paths.
If a country like Serbia can forge its own way forward, it may become a case study for others. And as both professors have said, China–Serbia cooperation could become a model, showing others what’s possible. That’s the value of today’s discussion.

Editor: yanghanyi