Boston Roundface:
Mr. Poletaev, hello. First, I’d like to ask you about the meeting between President Putin and President Trump in Anchorage. I saw on RT that you published a very important article in which you suggested that this meeting actually advanced many achievements for Russia and the U.S., while Ukraine and Europe suffered significant setbacks. Yet many commentators argue that the meeting produced no concrete results. Could you explain in more detail what we should focus on in the Anchorage talks?

Sergei Poletaev:
Hello, and thank you for the invitation. It’s a great honor for me. To answer directly: the pomp and ceremony we saw may be a first in history—correct me if I’m wrong. A leader welcoming another leader in such a dramatic fashion, broadcast live to hundreds of millions, perhaps billions, of viewers, requires immense preparation. I think this moment should be recorded in history textbooks as one of the symbols of the end of the Western unipolar world. The old order, where the West and Washington decided right and wrong, who is legitimate and who is a criminal, is collapsing. Six months ago, the West called Putin a criminal, and now this meeting has taken place. Europe and the U.S. are realizing they are no longer the masters of the world. In my view, they have become a global minority, merely one pole in a multipolar world, internally full of contradictions. That is the historical significance of this meeting.

Boston Roundface:
Just three days after the Anchorage meeting, Zelensky, surrounded by European leaders, went to the White House to meet with U.S. President Trump. I imagine Russia was closely following this. We also understand that during the meeting, Trump called Putin. Furthermore, the AP reported that an open microphone picked up a whisper between Trump and French President Macron, thought to be related to a potential deal with Putin. Do you have any particular analysis of this whisper between Trump and Macron?

Sergei Poletaev:
Europe has become a secondary power, as we discussed earlier. In Russia, we often call them “globalists.” They are unwilling to solve conflicts substantively and only dream of defeating Russia and forcing it to yield. Trump, from my observation and the interpretation of our leadership, is seeking compromise—not because he is pro-Russia, but because he realizes the old model no longer works. They cannot defeat Russia; although they still harbor illusions, they know the reality and merely refuse to accept it while continuing to fight. What else can they do?

Boston Roundface:
There is a major divergence regarding Germany’s position. German leaders have said Ukraine should have a ceasefire first, while Trump suggested achieving peace directly, citing that in previous conflicts, peace was reached straight from war, not via ceasefire. How do you view Germany’s proposal of a ceasefire first? And why, in your opinion, does the U.S. reject this? What is Russia’s basic stance?

Sergei Poletaev:
The key for Russia is to eliminate the root cause of the conflict. This cause can be discussed now or later. The root is the West’s effort to turn Ukraine into a force hostile to Russia, a tool against Russia. Eliminating this problem is the goal of the special military operation. The conflict didn’t start in 2022—it started in 2013, or fundamentally, since the post-Soviet era from the 1990s. Peaceful means have failed for 32 years, so now it can only be stopped militarily. Second, Ukraine is retreating on the battlefield. A ceasefire now would interrupt this process, delaying a real solution indefinitely, and the West would rearm Ukraine—leading to an even bloodier war. Our leadership and we have no intention of allowing that. They are not negotiating for peace; if they were, it would have been done long ago. The West uses a ceasefire to catch their breath. Imagine two people fighting: one is on top, almost winning. The one on the ground shouts stop. Once separated, he would recover and attack again. His will hasn’t gone, and our task is to make it disappear permanently. Only then can true peace exist.

Boston Roundface:
I’d like to go deeper on this point. Before our conversation, I read your RT interview and statements from Russian officials, including Russia’s Ambassador to the UN Nebenzya and Foreign Minister Lavrov, emphasizing that de-Nazification in Ukraine is crucial. You previously mentioned: first, Ukraine should not join NATO; second, no foreign troops on Ukrainian soil. These are clear conditions. But how, in practical terms, does Russia define de-Nazification, and how do you assess whether anti-Russian forces remain, possibly justifying a second or third military operation?

Sergei Poletaev:
In Ukraine, Russian is now banned, even though it is the native language for most Ukrainians. This is like banning Chinese in China. First, this must be resolved. Official statistics are misleading—I have friends and relatives there. Nearly everyone speaks Russian in daily life, especially in major cities. Second, the Russian Orthodox Church is almost entirely banned, violating UN conventions on religious freedom. Russia demands this ban be lifted. Third, all political party activities must be restored; currently, only pro-Western anti-Russian activities are allowed. These three points are core demands. Eliminating Nazi armed groups in Donbas is secondary. These three points are clear and globally recognizable. Understanding Ukraine and Russia, historically united for three centuries, is essential. Every Russian family has relatives in Ukraine and vice versa.

Boston Roundface:
Typically, wars end at a stalemate or negotiated ceasefire. But in Donbas, Russia hasn’t yet occupied key positions, and Ukraine has heavily fortified them. Zelensky faces constraints: Ukrainian law requires a referendum for territorial concessions, he is unwilling to reach such an agreement, and Ukrainian troops may not follow any deal. So, do these fortified zones represent necessary conditions for a peace agreement?

Sergei Poletaev:
Personally, this is my view—not official policy. Russia is not fighting for territory but to ensure Ukraine no longer opposes Russia. Zelensky is caught in a dilemma: retain power and keep Ukraine as a Western anti-Russian bridge, or comply with de-Nazification and demilitarization, losing authority. If he could trade Donbas, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk for Putin abandoning demilitarization and allowing NATO troops, he would do it—and interpret it as a huge “victory” for Ukraine. But Putin, in turn, set a trap for him. As you said, at this moment, Zelensky can neither hand over these territories willingly nor retreat without a fight, because the front lines are still holding to some extent; any withdrawal would be a domestic political disaster for him. Putin’s conditions anticipate Zelensky’s refusal. Frankly, a ceasefire is disadvantageous to Russia, as we are winning. Today’s gains lead to greater tomorrow. Opinions claiming Russian forces can’t take Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in months are mistaken. Western experts and others see the Ukrainian army near collapse—a sudden total collapse is possible in days. Once this happens, Moscow can impose conditions on Ukraine and the West. Hence, these cities are secondary; the priority is to exhaust the Ukrainian army, making it powerless to resist our demands. Regarding referendums, I agree with Trump: Zelensky has repeatedly violated the constitution, and future presidents would sign easily.

Boston Roundface:
Before our talk, I saw Lavrov’s remarks suggesting Russia is willing to “upgrade” peace talks with Ukraine. Previously, TASS suggested uncertainty, but Lavrov indicated willingness. Meanwhile, Putin described Zelensky as a pure Nazi, lacking equal standing. How does Russia view Lavrov’s statement about upgrading peace talks? Who might attend these talks?

Sergei Poletaev:
Putin said he can talk to anyone, but Ukraine’s legal authorities must ultimately sign. Putin, trained in law, is precise with words and never refuses negotiation. He has met Zelensky before. Honestly, I’m unsure if talks will happen soon. Even if they do, they won’t yield a diplomatic breakthrough: Ukraine is unprepared to accept Russian conditions, and Russia will not concede. In Anchorage, Putin secured Trump’s neutrality; Trump does not oppose Russia’s advance. Therefore, Zelensky lacks motivation to meet Putin—he would gain nothing. If Trump insists, it’s a formality, giving him face.

Boston Roundface:
Returning to your RT article, you defined the Anchorage meeting as more significant than just Europe’s leaders meeting in the U.S. You said it ended the Western war narrative, making the West a global minority, one of many power centers, internally fractured. The Ukraine crisis accelerated the formation of a new world order. During the Biden administration, Secretary Blinken noted there was no authoritative voice on a rules-based international order. In your view, what kind of world order is being accelerated?

Sergei Poletaev:
The situation is changing rapidly. A few months ago, Putin meeting Trump was unimaginable. The old order meant the U.S. dictated terms globally—the “American world empire.” That empire is collapsing. Now, even the U.S. and China engage as equals, which was unthinkable years ago. China is quietly building strength. This marks the arrival of a new world order, where the U.S.-China relationship will shape the order. The Ukraine crisis shows this shift. From the Western viewpoint, Russia acted illegally in Ukraine and should be punished. Sanctions and the largest trade war ensued, aiming to force Russia to surrender. Western companies paused operations, expecting to return after defeating Russia—but it didn’t happen. By 2022, the U.S. realized it had overestimated its influence. This process of accepting reality is slow in the West but is embraced enthusiastically by the rest of the world. Even Trump recognizes the failure of the old rules. The West can no longer dictate terms unilaterally. This process will continue, turbulent and difficult, and future wars are likely. Human history is a chain of wars; we must face that reality.

Boston Roundface:
Lavrov suggested that responsible powers, particularly the P5, should ensure Ukraine’s security. If Turkey or others wish, they could also station troops. How, in your view, can a new order best be established, and what efforts should participating nations make?

Sergei Poletaev:
Lavrov’s idea of the five countries, especially China, was in the 2022 Istanbul Treaty draft. Essentially, the five permanent UN Security Council members guarantee Ukraine’s permanent neutrality and security. China, as a major power, is expected to participate. Coordination between China and Russia’s leadership exists to some degree. But for pro-Western Ukraine, this proposal is currently unacceptable—it implies the end of Ukraine’s current stance. Regarding Turkish troops, it’s premature to speculate. Likely, neutral countries’ UN observers or peacekeepers may be deployed, common in third-world interventions. Not NATO troops, but neutral countries. However, if Chinese troops were deployed in Europe, it would likely not be approved; and if European troops were deployed, Russia would probably not agree. Therefore, the most likely scenario… if we talk about this at all, would involve some completely neutral countries—I’m not certain—which could be, for example, Uruguay from a distant region; or proportionally, perhaps 300 New Zealanders, or say 50 Uruguayans. I’m just hypothesizing here to illustrate the principle. There could also be Turkish personnel, since Turkey has maintained a fairly neutral stance in this conflict. For this reason, part of the negotiations is taking place in Istanbul.

Boston Roundface:
Thank you, Mr. Poletaev, for this informative discussion. We hope that Chinese audiences, eager to understand Russia’s stance, will have more access to Russian perspectives through our media.

Sergei Poletaev:
Thank you for the invitation. I value Russia-China relations and enjoy visiting China. I feel the genuine goodwill at all levels. China is different from Russia but familiar in many ways, and I sense this everywhere—in airports, streets, subways, and shops. I think this is important. I am glad for today’s discussion and look forward to meeting again. Thank you.

Editor: Zhiyu Wang