According to a June 4 report by Reuters, Indonesia is currently conducting a feasibility assessment for purchasing China’s J-10 fighter jets. At the same time, French President Emmanuel Macron visited Indonesia in May to promote the sale of France’s Rafale fighters. Many analysts argue that the air skirmish between India and Pakistan on May 7 proved the J-10C to be a more capable fighter than the Rafale.

Chinese military strategist Professor Wang Xiangsui noted that Indonesia’s strong interest in the J-10 reflects growing global acceptance of China’s emerging military philosophy: “systems over platforms.” Furthermore, China provides two often-overlooked advantages that make the J-10C a more strategic fit for Indonesia than its Western counterparts.

Firstly, to build a modern air force, acquiring the weapon is only the first step. True combat capability comes from long-term training and integration of the fighter jets into its defence system. That’s why quickly fielding a new aircraft at scale is critical—only then can pilots and commanders fully understand its capabilities and determine how it fits into their broader defence systems. In this regard, Chinese manufacturers hold a clear edge due to their superior production capacity.

According to Military Watch Magazine, the J-10C is currently being produced at a rate higher than any other fourth-generation fighter globally—estimated at 50 units per year. In contrast, Defense News reported that France’s Dassault Aviation faced severe supply chain issues during the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to a slowdown in production. In 2024, only 21 Rafales were delivered.

This massive gap in production translates into radically different delivery timelines. Pakistan signed a deal for J-10Cs in December 2021 and received the first batch just three months later. By contrast, Indonesia signed an $8.1 billion contract in 2022 to acquire 42 Rafales but has yet to receive a single aircraft.

As reported by the Eurasian Times, as of December 2024, Dassault had a backlog of 220 undelivered Rafales, including 164 for export. Can Indonesia realistically expect to receive its Rafales before Pakistan begins fielding its J-35 stealth fighters? In an era where stealth aircraft are increasingly common, how much deterrent value will even new Rafales still offer? These are questions worth serious consideration.

Secondly, even the most advanced aircraft can be lost in combat. Without the ability to quickly replenish supplies, even the best pilots are left empty-handed. But reliable resupply isn’t just about manufacturing capacity—it also depends on a supplier’s political independence. Indonesian defence analyst Karl Gading Sayudha has argued that too much dependence on the U.S. could compromise Indonesia’s strategic autonomy. In that regard, relying on France may carry even greater risks.

Consider the 1982 Falklands War. Argentina’s air force used French-made Super Étendard jets and Exocet missiles to sink the British destroyer HMS Sheffield. Yet, former UK Defence Secretary Sir John Nott describes France as Britain’s “greatest ally.” That’s because as soon as the war began, France imposed an arms embargo on Argentina, allowed the British Navy access to French ports in West Africa, and provided the UK with detailed information about Argentine purchases of French equipment. Paris even worked closely with London to prevent Argentina from acquiring additional Exocet missiles through third parties. Some Exocet missiles ordered by Peru were withheld over concerns they might be rerouted to Argentina—only being delivered after the war had ended.

This shows that, as a core member of NATO and the EU, France can be highly flexible when it comes to interpreting contract obligations. Given Indonesia’s ongoing maritime disputes with Australia over fishing and offshore energy rights, can Paris truly be counted on to uphold commercial neutrality in all scenarios? This is a serious question Jakarta must consider.
In contrast, Chinese defence suppliers have shown a consistent commitment to delivery—even under challenging conditions.

In 2019, Serbia signed a contract for China’s FK-3 air defence system, a platform similar to Russia’s S-400. According to President Aleksandar Vučić, the equipment was originally scheduled for delivery via Ukraine’s An-124 cargo planes on February 25, 2022—but the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war a day earlier disrupted those plans. Despite the conflict and widespread protests in Serbia following the April 2022 elections, China still delivered the FK-3 system to Belgrade.

Over the course of three consecutive days, China used its Y-20 military transport aircraft to fly the systems directly through NATO airspace, including over Turkey and Bulgaria, fulfilling the contract in full. That level of logistical commitment underscores the reliability of Chinese military suppliers.

On 9 April 2022, six Y-20 transports owned by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force called in at Belgrade’s Nikola Tesla Airport, Serbia.

Choosing a defence supplier is never just a matter of specs and cost-efficiency. It’s a high-stakes strategic decision shaped by national interests and international dynamics. Indonesia is China’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching nearly $150 billion in 2024. ASEAN as a whole is China’s most significant regional economic partner, with total trade approaching $1 trillion. In this context, peace and long-term stability in the Asia-Pacific are far more valuable than marginally increased weapons sales. A stable, cooperative Indonesia is in China’s long-term interest. That’s why the J-10C will be a better choice for Indonesia, the China–Indonesia defense relationship is not merely transactional. It offers a win-win dynamic that no other arms supplier can replicate—one built not just on hardware, but on shared national interests and mutual respect.

Editor: Charriot Zhai