During the Indo-Pakistani air conflict, Pakistan deployed the Chinese-made J-10 fighter jet to shoot down multiple Indian Rafale fighters, marking the first combat victory for Chinese fighter aircraft and sparking a global sensation.

In recent years, China’s military equipment has made remarkable advancements. China is accelerating the testing of two sixth-generation stealth fighters, which some Americans believe “could beat us to the punch.” The Fujian aircraft carrier is equipped with catapult-assisted take-off capabilities, and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has stated that China’s hypersonic missiles could destroy U.S. aircraft carriers in just 20 minutes.

Despite these technological breakthroughs, the Chinese military, having had no large-scale combat experience since the 1979 war with Vietnam, still requires real-world combat to prove that its effectiveness. The J-10 fighter jets exported to Pakistan, though classified as third-generation aircraft, did not disappoint and successfully demonstrated that China’s military power has undergone a transformative change.

To some, China’s growing military strength is seen as a threat, leading them to label China a military hegemon. However, anyone with a solid understanding of history would recognize that China’s military development has always been a response to hegemony, not a pursuit of it.

Deng Xiaoping’s Bold Gamble

In the late 1970s, as relations between China and the United States began to ease, Chinese leaders, particularly Deng Xiaoping, made an essential judgment: a new world war could likely be avoided; development was the central issue, and peace could only be maintained through economic growth.

Despite the ongoing U.S.-Soviet confrontation and the persistent shadow of war over the world, Deng Xiaoping, with his immense political courage and authority, pushed for disarmament, personnel downsizing, and military budget cuts, redirecting limited financial resources to economic development.

At the expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission in 1985, Deng Xiaoping reiterated: “The true modernization of military equipment can only be achieved if the national economy is built on a solid foundation. Therefore, we must endure for a few more years.”

From that point forward, national defense construction began to take a backseat to economic development.

Between 1985 and 1987, the People’s Liberation Army underwent a massive downsizing, cutting one million troops. The proportion of defense spending in the national budget dropped from 19.4% in 1979 to 9.47% in 1986. If the annual inflation rate of 6% at the time is taken into account, the reduction was even more significant.

In the 1980s, China’s annual military expenditure was roughly 20 billion RMB（approximately $6 billion USD）, whereas during the same period, the United States’ annual military expenditure averaged over $200 billion.

Entering the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strategic foundation for Sino-American cooperation against the USSR disappeared, and containment became a more prominent element of U.S. policy toward China. The Chinese people were once again reminded of the harsh reality that “backwardness invites aggression.”

U.S. Provocations

The 1993 “Yinhe Incident”: In 1993, the United States, claiming to have solid intelligence, accused the Chinese cargo ship Yinhe of transporting materials to Iran for the production of chemical weapons. U.S. warships and helicopters surrounded the Yinhe and demanded to board the vessel for inspection.

After all 628 containers on board were thoroughly checked, no traces of the alleged chemical materials were found. Yet the United States dismissed the matter by blaming “faulty intelligence” and refused to issue a formal apology to China. Reflecting on this event, Sha Zukang, the Chinese official responsible for handling the incident, expressed his frustration in an interview, repeating the word “humiliating” 17 times.

The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: In 1995, then-Taiwanese leader Lee Teng-hui visited the United States and promoted the “Two Chinas” concept, a move that violated the principles of the three Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqués. In response, China conducted military exercises in the Taiwan Strait to demonstrate its stance. The United States, however, deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups—USS Independence and USS Nimitz—to the Taiwan Strait in a show of support for the Taiwanese leadership.

In the face of overwhelming U.S. naval power, China’s navy, far weaker at the time, urgently mobilized 2,000 fishing boats, strapping army cannons and tanks onto these vessels to confront the U.S. carrier groups. Knowing they were at a significant disadvantage, Chinese personnel were prepared to sacrifice their lives if necessary.

The 1999 Bombing of China’s Embassy in Yugoslavia: On May 7, 1999, during the Kosovo War, NATO forces led by the United States bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, resulting in the deaths of three Chinese citizens and injuring over 20 others. The Clinton administration attempted to justify this deliberate attack as a “mistake,” citing poor intelligence.

Each of these incidents sparked widespread outrage among the Chinese people, forming a collective memory of diplomatic humiliation in the 1990s. There is a Chinese saying that captures this sentiment: “Swallowing broken teeth in silence.”

China’s Strategy of “Hide your strength, bide your time”

China’s wisdom lay in its restraint. Despite repeated provocations, China did not respond by significantly increasing its military spending. From 1986 to 1997, China’s military expenditure as a percentage of GDP actually decreased, from 1.9% to 1.03%.

In the 1990s, Deng Xiaoping’s successor, Jiang Zemin, fully implemented the ” Hide your strength, bide your time ” strategy. Despite facing frequent military provocations from the United States, China deliberately avoided engaging in a military arms race and focused all its efforts on economic development.

Double-digit economic growth exceeding 10% provided a strong foundation for increased military spending, with China’s defense budget surpassing 100 billion RMB for the first time in 1999. That same year, the J-10 fighter jet underwent its flight tests, demonstrating its impressive capabilities on the India-Pakistan battlefield.

While Chinese military enthusiasts were ecstatic about the J-10’s success, they also nostalgically remembered President Jiang Zemin, who was in office at the time. On the internet, they shared photos of Jiang along with his self-deprecating evaluation of his work: “I feel ashamed—I’ve only done a little bit of work. Thank you, everyone.” This humorous and modest remark was a hallmark of his unique leadership style.

Behind this strategy of ” Hide your strength, bide your time ” lay the broader vision of national rejuvenation. A strong military was seen as a means to protect the fruits of development, not as an end in itself.

China’s military spending has always been remarkably restrained, consistently staying between 1.3% and 1.9% of GDP over the past 20 years. By comparison, the United States spends over twice that proportion. On a per-capita basis, in 2022, China’s military expenditure was only $207 per person—less than one-tenth of that of the United States. It is difficult to accuse a country with such modest spending of harboring ambitions for global military dominance.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi once quoted a line to describe China’s approach to US: ” “No matter how strong others may be, we remain as steady as the mountain caressed by the gentle breeze; No matter how aggressive others may act, we stand as serene as the moon illuminating the vast river.”

Having once walked a tightrope between the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union, China—facing the reality of its once-weak national strength—placed its bets entirely on the path of peaceful development. Such a country could only ever be the staunchest opponent of hegemony, not its seeker.

Editor: huyueyue