Introduction: Concerns for Regime Survival and International Implications: China’s Official Stances and Influencer Perspectives on the Iran Crisis
In the weeks since U.S. and Israeli forces launched strikes against Iran on February 28, 2026, China has engaged in intensive diplomatic maneuvering while maintaining a calibrated public posture. Official statements emphasize immediate ceasefires and diplomatic solutions, while a parallel discourse among prominent Chinese scholars and commentators explores the war’s strategic implications—particularly regarding America’s deepening Middle East entanglement and what it means for global power dynamics.
I. The Official Line: Cessation, Sovereignty, and Opposition to the “Law of the Jungle”
China’s official position has been articulated primarily through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi leading a series of high-level phone calls. In a March 3, 2026 readout, the Foreign Ministry summarized Wang Yi’s core argument:

“It is unacceptable for the U.S. and Israel to launch attacks against Iran in the process of the ongoing Iran-U.S. negotiations, still less to blatantly attack and kill the leader of a sovereign country and instigate government change.” [1]
“美方、以色列方面对伊朗正在进行的伊美谈判进程中发动对伊朗的袭击，甚至公然对一个主权国家的领导人实施打击并试图进行政权更迭，这是不可接受的。” [1]

The statement emphasized three immediate demands:
“First, immediately stop the military operations; second, return to dialogue and negotiation as soon as possible; third, jointly oppose unilateral actions.” [1]
“一是立即停止军事行动，二是尽快重返对话谈判，三是共同反对单边行动。” [1]

At a regular press briefing the same day, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning elaborated on the broader stakes, warning that:
“Major countries should not make use of their military advantages to arbitrarily attack other countries, and the world must not slip back to the law of the jungle.” [1]
“大国不能凭借军事优势任意攻击他国，世界不应倒回弱肉强食的丛林法则。” [1]

She also expressed deep concern over civilian casualties, stating that:
“Protection of civilians in armed conflicts is a red line and must not be violated.” [1]
“武装冲突中保护平民是红线，不容触碰。” [1]

On March 19, 2026, following reports that Iranian Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani had been killed in Israeli strikes, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian delivered an unusually stark condemnation:
“China is shocked by that remark. China is always against the use of force in international relations. The killing of Iranian leaders and attacks on civilian targets are by no means acceptable. As the conflict rages on in the Middle East and tensions continue to escalate and spill over, the international community is widely calling for an early ceasefire and end to hostilities. China calls on parties to the conflict to immediately stop military operations and prevent plunging the region into chaos.” [2]
“中方对有关言论感到震惊。中国一贯反对在国际关系中使用武力。杀害伊朗领导人、袭击平民目标，这是绝对不能接受的。当前中东战火持续，紧张局势不断升级蔓延，国际社会普遍呼吁早日停火止战。中方呼吁冲突各方立即停止军事行动，避免把地区局势推向完全失控的局面。” [2]

In a March 2, 2026 press conference, Mao Ning noted that the U.S.-Israeli strikes:
“Have no UN Security Council authorization and violate international law.” [3]
“没有得到联合国安理会授权，违反国际法。” [3]

She also confirmed that China was not notified of the military operations beforehand. By that date, China had already evacuated over 3,000 Chinese citizens from Iran. [3]

Chinese diplomatic missions have reinforced these themes. On March 19, 2026, Special Envoy of the Chinese Government on the Middle East Issue Zhai Jun concluded a tour of regional countries, meeting with foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Egypt, as well as the Secretaries General of the GCC and the League of Arab States. According to the Foreign Ministry readout:
“During the visit, Special Envoy Zhai Jun elaborated on China’s position regarding the current situation, and stressed that a ceasefire and an end to the hostilities provide the fundamental solution, and urged parties to the conflict to immediately cease military operations and prevent the situation from becoming a complete chaos. He called for dialogue and negotiation and resolving differences through political and diplomatic means. He pointed out that the purposes and principles of the UN Charter should be upheld, the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of GCC countries should be fully respected, non-military targets should not be attacked and the safety of shipping lanes should not be interrupted.”[2]
“访问期间，翟隽特使阐述了中方对当前局势的立场，强调停火止战是解决问题的根本出路，敦促冲突各方立即停止军事行动，避免把地区局势推向完全失控的局面。他呼吁通过对话谈判、以政治外交手段解决分歧。他指出，应维护联合国宪章宗旨和原则，充分尊重海湾阿拉伯国家合作委员会国家的主权、安全和领土完整，不攻击非军事目标，不中断航道安全。” [2]
II. Deepening the Analysis: Official Theoretical Perspectives
In a comprehensive analysis published on March 30, 2026 in Qiushi Journal—the flagship theoretical publication of the Communist Party of China Central Committee—scholar Tang Zhichao provided an authoritative framework for understanding the conflict’s underlying drivers. The piece, titled “The Deep-Seated Causes Behind the U.S.-Israel-Iran Conflict,” offers what can be read as the conceptual scaffolding underpinning China’s official posture. [4]

Tang traces the conflict to three fundamental dimensions:
On geopolitical competition:
“Geopolitically, Iran and the U.S.-Israel alliance are engaged in a struggle for dominance over the Middle East order. Iran is a Middle Eastern power with strong national pride and self-esteem. Its foreign policy strongly opposes U.S. hegemony in the Middle East and Israeli aggression against the Islamic world. To counter the U.S. and Israel, Iran has actively built a sphere of influence using political issues and religious identity, forming a ‘Shiite Crescent’ under its leadership—stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean—composed primarily of regional anti-U.S. and anti-Israel organizations, challenging U.S. and Israeli hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East.” [4]
“在地缘政治上，伊朗与美以存在中东秩序主导权之争。伊朗是中东强国，有着强烈的民族自豪感和自尊心，对外政策上强烈反对美国的中东霸权和以色列对伊斯兰世界的侵略。为了对抗美以，伊朗利用政治议题和宗教身份积极打造势力范围，组建以自身为主导、以地区反美反以组织为主要成员，从波斯湾一直延伸到东地中海的‘什叶派新月地带’，挑战美以对中东的霸权图谋。” [4]

On geoeconomics and energy chokepoints:
“Geoeconomically, Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, the ‘jugular’ of global energy trade, while its regional ally, the Houthis in Yemen, controls another international strategic artery—the Red Sea shipping route and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The U.S. has long regarded ensuring the stable flow of Middle Eastern oil to the Western world as its core interest in the Middle East. The current U.S. administration places even greater emphasis on controlling and seizing Middle Eastern strategic corridors and Gulf energy resources.” [4]
“在地缘经济上，伊朗扼守霍尔木兹海峡，控制全球能源贸易的‘咽喉要道’，其区域盟友也门胡塞武装则把守另一条国际战略要道——红海航线和曼德海峡。而美国历来将确保中东石油安全稳定流入西方世界作为其在中东的核心利益，现任美国政府更加强调对中东战略通道和海湾能源资源的控制与攫取。” [4]

On ideological incompatibility:
“In terms of political systems and ideology, the two sides are irreconcilable. Iran has established a theocratic Islamic Republic, with the Quran as the nation’s highest law, public and private life bound by religious norms, and power concentrated in the hands of the religious leader—fundamentally different from the political systems of the U.S. and other Western countries that emphasize separation of religion and state and the separation of powers. Ideologically, Iran adheres to Khomeinism, believing that the U.S. promotion of American-style liberal democracy in the Islamic world constitutes a serious erosion of Islamic social systems, culture, and values, and advocates resisting ‘decadent Western culture.’” [4]
“在政治体制与意识形态上，双方水火不容。在政治体制上，伊朗创建了政教合一的伊斯兰共和国，以《古兰经》为国家最高法律，公私生活受宗教规范约束，权力集中于宗教领袖，这与美国等西方国家强调政教分离、三权分立的政治制度有着根本不同。在意识形态上，伊朗奉行霍梅尼主义，认为美国在伊斯兰世界推行美式自由民主对伊斯兰社会制度、文化和价值观构成严重侵蚀，主张抵制‘西方腐朽文化’。” [4]

Tang’s analysis concludes that the U.S. and Israel view Iran’s nuclear program and its “resistance axis” alliance structure as existential threats, framing the conflict as a structural confrontation that predates the current crisis by decades.

III. Academic and Think-Tank Voices: Decoding the War’s Logic
Beyond official channels, a robust conversation has unfolded among China’s international relations scholars, often providing sharper analysis of U.S. strategy and regional consequences.

Zhou Bo (周波) , a retired PLA senior colonel and researcher at Tsinghua University’s Center for Strategic and Security Studies, offered a stark assessment of America’s predicament. Writing in the South China Morning Post on March 7, 2026, he argued that President Trump had made a grave miscalculation:
“Trump now has almost no choice: even if he declares victory and wants to withdraw, Iran will not let go. Tehran has nothing left to lose.” [5]
“特朗普现在几乎没有选择：即使他宣布胜利想要撤出，伊朗也不会放手。德黑兰已经没有退路了。” [5]

Zhou characterized the U.S. as trapped by its alliance with Israel, noting that:
“Israel is America’s Achilles’ heel.” [5]
“以色列是美国的阿喀琉斯之踵。” [5]

He argued that the conflict exposes the absence of a coherent U.S. national strategy.
In a separate forum on March 12, 2026, Zhou addressed international expectations for China to fill a leadership vacuum in the Middle East. He urged restraint, stating that:
“China will not blindly fill the vacuum due to external expectations.” [6]
“中国不会因为外界的期待而盲目填补真空。” [6]

Instead, Beijing should act based on:
“Its own history, traditions, culture, and foreign policy.” [6]
“自身的历史、传统、文化和外交政策。” [6]

Di Dongsheng (翟东升) , a professor at Renmin University’s School of International Studies, offered a more geopolitical-economic lens. In a widely circulated analysis published on March 27, 2026, Di argued that the war is not merely a regional conflict but a strategic move aimed at China’s energy lifeline. He wrote that the U.S. objective is to:
“Target China’s dependence on overseas fossil fuels and global shipping routes, attempting to exploit China’s vulnerabilities.” [7]
“瞄准中国对海外化石能源和全球航运路线的依赖，试图利用中国的弱点。” [7]

Di warned of severe economic spillovers, predicting that:
“Oil prices will likely approach $150 per barrel.” [7]
“油价很可能逼近每桶150美元。” [7]

He cautioned that a prolonged Strait of Hormuz blockade could trigger a global food crisis due to disrupted fertilizer exports and a cost of living crisis due to rising crude oil prices.

Tu Zhuxi (兔主席) , a prominent political commentator, focused on the domestic U.S. dynamics driving the conflict. In a detailed analysis published on March 8, 2026, he dismissed theories that the war is about oil or containing China, arguing instead that Israel manipulated the Trump administration:
“The U.S. truly is Israel’s pawn.” [8]
“美国真正是以色列的棋子。” [8]
Tu wrote, pointing to the influence of pro-Israel lobbies and raising the specter of the Epstein case as a source of leverage. He noted that:
“The last U.S. president who dared to say ‘no’ to Israel was Kennedy.” [8]
“最后一个敢于对以色列说‘不’的美国总统是肯尼迪。” [8]

This implies a structural constraint on American decision-making that will make withdrawal nearly impossible.

Li Shaoxian (李绍先) , a veteran Middle East scholar and frequent commentator on Phoenix Television, offered a sober assessment of the strategic costs for Washington. In a March 13, 2026 analysis, he argued:
“This war has already become a strategic miscalculation for Trump. Not only has it failed to achieve its stated objectives, but it has also revealed the limits of American power in the region. Iran’s announcement of an ‘upgraded’ approach to the conflict suggests that the U.S. is now facing an adversary that has learned to adapt and endure.” [9]
“这场战争已经成为特朗普的战略误判。它不仅未能实现其宣称的目标，还暴露了美国在该地区力量的局限。伊朗宣布‘升级打法’，表明美国现在面对的是一个学会了适应和忍耐的对手。” [9]

Li noted that Iran’s decision to continue closing the Strait of Hormuz and its commitment to retaliation suggest the conflict will not conclude quickly, imposing sustained costs on global energy markets and U.S. strategic resources.

Sun Degang (孙德刚) , Director of the Middle East Studies Center at Fudan University, provided one of the most detailed academic assessments in a March 2, 2026 interview with Jiemian News. He laid out a tripartite framework for understanding U.S.-Israeli objectives:
“The short-term goal is to strike Iran’s supreme leader and core decision-making echelon, paralyzing Iran’s military forces. The medium-term goal is to establish an anti-Iran united front in the Middle East. The long-term goal is to replicate the Venezuela model in Iran—regime change. But achieving that goal is highly difficult.” [10]
“短期是打击伊朗最高领袖以及核心决策层，让伊朗的武装力量处于瘫痪状态；中期是在中东建立反伊朗统一战线；长期是计划在伊朗复制委内瑞拉模式、更迭伊朗政权，但是要实现这一目标，难度较大。” [10]

On the timing of the strikes, Sun offered a sharp analysis of U.S. tactics:
“The so-called negotiations were just a stalling tactic, a way to appease domestic and international audiences. It’s important to see that the U.S. and Israel had already planned the strike against Iran; the plan was already designed—they just hadn’t set the date for execution. This follows the same pattern as last June’s U.S.-Israel strike on Iran: the U.S. negotiated in the open while Israel prepared for war in the shadows.” [10]
“美国所谓的谈判只是缓兵之计，也是对其国内和国际社会的交代。要看到，美以早已计划好打击伊朗，方案早已设计完成，只是尚未确定动手时间。这与去年6月美以打击伊朗的套路如出一辙——美国在明处谈判，以色列在暗处备战。” [10]

Sun was particularly pointed about the long-term consequences for the United States:
“If the U.S. cannot deliver a decisive blow to Iran, it may find itself dragged into a protracted entanglement by Israel. Iran is a large country with 90 million people and 1.6 million square kilometers of territory. Without deploying ground forces, it will be very difficult for the U.S. to achieve control over Iran’s regime. But deploying ground forces could trap the U.S. in a quagmire.” [10]
“如果美国无法对伊朗‘一锤定音’，那么可能导致美国被以色列拉下水，陷入与伊朗长期纠缠的泥潭。伊朗是一个大国，拥有9000万人口、160万平方公里土地。不派遣地面部队很难实现对伊朗政权的掌控，而派遣地面部队，美国可能会陷入困境。” [10]

Sun also identified a significant gap between U.S. and Israeli preferences:
“Israel most wants the U.S. to take over Iran’s regime and, after a period of time, produce a pro-U.S., pro-Israel government through elections. For the U.S., without sending ground forces, it is very difficult to gain control over Iran’s regime.” [10]
“以色列最希望美国接管伊朗政权，经过一段时间后通过民选产生亲美、亲以政权。对美国而言，不派遣地面部队很难实现对伊朗政权的掌控。” [10]
IV. Institutional Analysis: Depth from the Shanghai International Studies University
The Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University (SISU) has provided some of the most sustained academic commentary. In the 20 days following the outbreak of conflict, its researchers published over 100 analyses across multiple languages.

Ding Long (丁隆) , a professor at the institute, framed the attacks as a fundamental challenge to international order. In a March 8, 2026 interview with China Daily, he stated that:
“The military actions by the U.S. and Israel constitute a grave violation of international law and a total disregard for global norms.” [11]

He added that:
“The killing of a sovereign state’s legal supreme leader sets a malicious and dangerous precedent.” [11]

On energy security, Ding called for global cooperation to prevent a “Hormuz moment.”

Liu Zhongmin (刘中民) , another senior researcher, emphasized the resilience of Iran’s political system and the conflict’s potential to backfire on U.S. interests. In a March 10, 2026 analysis, he noted that the crisis places:
“U.S. strategic management capabilities are under severe test.” [15]
“美国的战略管理能力受到严峻考验。” [15]

He also explored how Gulf states are grappling with the “soul-searching” question of whether U.S. military bases on their soil represent protection or a liability. [15]

Pan Guang (潘光) , senior advisor of the Chinese Association of Middle East Studies, highlighted the sectarian risks. In a March 6, 2026 interview with Xinhua News Agency, he warned that:
“Military actions against Iran could exacerbate sectarian tensions.” [12]

He also stated that the attacks constitute:
“A severe shock to the post-World War II international order.” [12]
V. Ground-Level Observations: Fan Hongda’s Fieldwork in Iran
While many analysts focus on strategic calculations, Fan Hongda (范鸿达), Director of the China-Middle East Center at Shaoxing University, brought a different perspective through fieldwork conducted in Iran immediately before the war. Fan returned to China on February 13, 2026, just 15 days before the strikes began, after 17 days of intensive research in the country. [13]

His observations captured the pre-war mood and long-term structural conditions that shape Iran’s stability and external posture:
“In Iran, I deeply felt how the continuous devaluation of the currency has had an enormous impact on ordinary people’s lives. The rial is worthless, but many goods are priced in dollars and then converted into rials for sale. The shrinking of wealth is visible to the naked eye: savings that once could buy a house now barely buy a bathroom; ordinary people’s monthly salaries are often in the hundreds of millions [of rials], but when converted to renminbi, they amount to less than a thousand yuan.” [13]
“在伊朗，我深刻感受到该国货币的不断贬值，对普通人生活的影响是何等巨大。里亚尔不值钱了，但大量商品却以美元定价，再换算成里亚尔进行销售，财富的缩水肉眼可见：曾经足以购置一套房产的积蓄，如今只能买一个卫生间；普通民众月薪动辄一两亿，折合成人民币却不足千元。” [13]

Despite these hardships, Fan observed a society that outwardly appeared calm while inwardly seething:
“My first impression upon arriving in Tehran was calm. People were going about their lives as usual. But beneath the calm surface, I could also faintly detect undercurrents. When I chatted with locals, I could clearly feel their anger and dissatisfaction. In Fan’s words, there is a peculiar sense of fragmentation: the streets are calm, but people’s hearts are turbulent.”[13]
“我的第一感受是平静。人们如常生活。平静的表象之下，我也隐隐察觉到了涌动的暗流。我和当地民众聊天，也能明显感受到他们的气愤和不满。用范鸿达的话说，这是一种奇特的割裂感：街上是平静的，人心是涌动的。” [13]

Fan noted that many Iranians are engaged in deep self-reflection about their country’s trajectory:
“Many Iranian scholars are reflecting on past foreign policies, including whether policies toward China were appropriate, and even reflecting on whether previous administrations missed opportunities to deepen relations with China.” [13]
“很多伊朗国内的学者都在反思以往的外交政策，包括对华政策是否恰当，甚至反思前任政府是否错失了与中国深化关系的机会。” [13]

Crucially, Fan documented an intense desire among Iranian elites and institutions to engage with China:
“In Tehran, I visited many places—government departments, enterprises—and everywhere I felt tremendous enthusiasm from the locals. They urgently seek cooperation with China, repeatedly asking whether there are investment and cooperation opportunities.” [13]
“在德黑兰，我去了不少地方。不管是政府部门，还是企业，我都感受到了当地人的巨大热情。他们迫切地希望寻求与中国的合作，或是反复询问有没有投资和合作机会。” [13]

He added that Iranian institutions have proposed institutionalizing academic exchanges with China:
“Senior Iranian research institutions have proactively proposed to the Chinese side that they hope to establish normalized exchange mechanisms between the two countries, such as holding annual forums, to bring together elites from various fields from both countries to jointly discuss development issues.” [13]
“伊朗的高层研究机构已经主动向中方提议，希望能在两国之间建立常态化的交流机制，例如举办年度论坛等，借此汇聚两国各界精英，共同探讨发展问题。” [13]

Fan concluded his reflections with a stark assessment:
“Although there is much uncertainty about the future, for Iran, one thing is almost certain: 2026 will be a year or a starting point of major national change.” [13]
“虽然未来有很多不确定，但对伊朗而言，几乎可以确定的是，2026年将是国家发生重大变化的年份或起点。” [13]

VI. Divergence and Consensus
While official statements focus on procedural calls for ceasefire and respect for sovereignty, the commentary from influential voices reveals a more complex conversation. There is broad consensus that the U.S. has overextended itself and that Israel played a decisive role in provoking the conflict. However, views diverge on the implications for China.

Zhou Bo and Zhu Feng of Nanjing University explicitly reject the notion that the war represents a “strategic opportunity” for Beijing. Zhu cautioned against seeing U.S. troubles as China’s asset:
“This will absolutely not naturally translate into China’s strategic assets. On the contrary, this will also cause damage to China’s development.” [14]
“这绝对不会自动转化为中国的战略资产，相反，这也会给中国的发展带来损害。” [14]

Di Dongsheng, while also highlighting risks, focuses more on the economic vulnerabilities the conflict exposes—particularly for China’s energy imports. Tu Zhuxi, by contrast, offers a more structural critique of U.S. political capture, suggesting that America’s inability to extricate itself from Israeli interests will accelerate its relative decline.

Sun Degang’s analysis adds a critical layer by emphasizing the divergence between U.S. and Israeli interests, suggesting that the alliance may itself become a liability for Washington. He notes that while Israel desires full U.S. military commitment to regime change in Iran, the Pentagon remains wary of a ground invasion that could replicate the Iraq and Afghanistan quagmires.

Li Shaoxian’s television commentary reinforces the view that the war is becoming a strategic burden for the United States, with Iran demonstrating an ability to absorb initial strikes and continue the conflict through asymmetric means, including continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

The Qiushi analysis, while not official policy, provides a theoretical framework that aligns closely with China’s diplomatic language. It emphasizes structural contradictions between Iran and the U.S.-Israel alliance, framing the conflict as rooted in decades of hegemonic competition and ideological incompatibility rather than a discrete policy dispute. This framing supports China’s consistent call for respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.

Amid these analyses, the official position remains anchored in the principle of non-interference and diplomatic resolution. As the conflict continues and the humanitarian toll mounts—with reports of civilian casualties and damage to facilities including a girls’ school in Iran—China’s dual-track approach of cautious official statements coupled with a vibrant strategic debate among its scholarly class appears likely to persist.

Fan Hongda’s fieldwork adds a ground-level dimension largely absent from other analyses: a portrait of an Iranian society under severe economic strain yet maintaining outward composure, with elites urgently seeking Chinese engagement while grappling with fundamental questions about their country’s direction. His observation that 2026 “will be a year or a starting point of major national change” for Iran resonates with the broader consensus among Chinese analysts that the conflict represents a historic inflection point.

Appendix
[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference.” March 3, 2026. https://gb.china-embassy.gov.cn/chn/lcbt/sgryr/202603/t20260304_11868199.htm
[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference.” March 19, 2026. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/202603/t20260319_11877725.html
[3] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press Conference on March 2, 2026.” https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/202603/t20260302_11867202.html
[4] Tang Zhichao. “The Deep-Seated Causes Behind the U.S.-Israel-Iran Conflict.” Qiushi Journal. March 30, 2026. https://www.qstheory.cn/20260330/40110e48df6549ca962fbab5228b1e8a/c.html
[5] Zhou Bo. “Trump Has No Good Options Left in His War with Iran.” South China Morning Post. March 7, 2026. Republished by Guancha.cn (Observer Network) on March 20, 2026. https://www.guancha.cn/ZhouBo3/2026_03_20_810706.shtml
[6] Zhou Bo. Remarks at “China and the Middle East: Navigating Turbulent Times” Forum. Beijing, March 12, 2026. https://hk.crntt.com/crn-webapp/touch/detail.jsp?coluid=93&kindid=21671&docid=107178771
[7] Di Dongsheng. “The Geoeconomic Risks of the U.S.-Iran Conflict.” WeChat Public Account “Di Dongsheng’s Political Economy Studies” (翟东升的政治经济研究). March 27, 2026. (WeChat public account; no public URL available)
[8] Tu Zhuxi. “Who Truly Made the Decision to Strike Iran?” WeChat Public Account “Tu Zhuxi” (兔主席). March 8, 2026. https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1859054045981473588&wfr=spider&for=pc
[9] Li Shaoxian. “Iran Announces Upgraded Approach: Is Trump’s War a Net Loss?” Phoenix Television. March 13, 2026. http://phtv.ifeng.com/c/8rSuwlRSuC6
[10] Sun Degang. “Without Sending Ground Forces, the U.S. Will Find It Difficult to Control Iran’s Regime.” Interview with Jiemian News. March 2, 2026. https://www.jiemian.com/article/14056427.html
[11] Ding Long. “The Iran Crisis and the Challenge to International Order.” China Daily / SISU. March 8, 2026. https://en.mideast.shisu.edu.cn/1f/7b/c5626a204667/page.htm
[12] Pan Guang. Interview with Xinhua News Agency. “Experts Warn of Sectarian Fallout from Iran Strikes.” March 6, 2026. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202603/1356025.shtml
[13] Fan Hongda. “What Did This Shaoxing Professor Observe After Just Returning from Iran?” Shanghai Observer / Jiefang Daily. March 12, 2026. https://export.shobserver.com/baijiahao/html/1080276.html
[14] Zhu Feng. “The Iran Crisis and Its Strategic Implications for China.” Interview with China News Service. March 15, 2026. https://hk.crntt.com/crn-webapp/touch/detail.jsp?coluid=93&kindid=21671&docid=107178771
[15] Liu Zhongmin. “Gulf States’ Dilemma: U.S. Bases as Protection or Liability?” Middle East Studies Institute, SISU. March 4, 2026. https://mideast.shisu.edu.cn/1f/88/c3991a204680/page.html

Editor: Yunpeng Zhang