According to reports, the armed forces of the Taiwan region recently conducted a drill at the Jiupeng base in Pingtung, during which they carried out the first live-fire test of the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). While some Taiwanese media outlets exaggerated the system’s capabilities, military experts from the mainland pointed out that based on actual combat experience from the Ukraine war, such rocket systems face serious survivability challenges under the People’s Liberation Army’s comprehensive suppression during wartime.
The armed forces on Taiwan are conducting a test firing of the HIMARS rocket launcher.

During the live-fire verification, 11 HIMARS launch vehicles from the Taiwan region collectively fired 33 short-range training rockets, with each vehicle launching three rounds. However, the test encountered technical problems. The HIMARS system experienced two instances of “signal anomalies,” which led to temporary suspension of the firing process. In the first volley, only one vehicle successfully completed its launch. A similar issue occurred during the second round, prompting subsequent supplementary firing.

Given the high-profile performance of HIMARS in the Ukraine war, the Taiwan region’s initial live-fire test has also sparked discussion about how to effectively neutralize such rocket systems.

A Key Weapon in the Ukraine War

The M142 HIMARS primarily consists of a firepower module derived from the M270 rocket launcher, an M1083A1 5-ton class medium (6×6) tactical vehicle chassis, and an upgraded fire control system. Its fire control, electronics, and communication equipment are compatible with those of the concurrently developed new M270A1 multiple rocket launcher system.

Because HIMARS uses a 5-ton class medium tactical truck chassis and carries half the missile load, its overall weight is significantly reduced. Equipped with a six-pack rocket launcher pod, the HIMARS weighs approximately 10.9 tons, nearly half the weight of the M270, which carries 12 rockets. This not only provides stronger off-road mobility but also greatly increases highway speed while reducing production, operational, and maintenance costs. Additionally, HIMARS can be airlifted by a C-130 transport aircraft and can be combat-ready within 15 minutes after the plane lands, giving it considerable strategic mobility.
With its strong mobility, effectively countering the HIMARS system demands very high reconnaissance capabilities.

Regarding ammunition, the HIMARS system is fully compatible with that of the M270 tracked multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) and can fire all munitions used by the M270, including the MGM-140 Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM). Each launch pod carries either six rockets or one MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile. The rockets, whether guided or unguided, have a range of up to 42 kilometers; guided rockets extend the range to about 80 kilometers, while the ATACMS missile can reach up to 300 kilometers.

In terms of firepower, although HIMARS carries half the number of rockets compared to the M270, the combined salvo of a nine-launcher HIMARS battery firing M26 dual-purpose submunitions is still equivalent to 27 salvos fired by an 18-gun 155mm howitzer battalion loaded with the same submunitions (a total of 72 submunitions).

During the Ukraine war, HIMARS has performed notably, causing significant challenges for Russian forces and becoming a primary target for Russian strikes. Shortly after its deployment in June 2022, HIMARS accurately struck the headquarters of the 22nd Army Corps in the Kherson region. Ukrainian forces later used HIMARS to destroy key transport hubs such as the Dnipro River Bridge and Antonov Highway Bridge in Kherson, aiming to sever Russian logistical supply lines. On New Year’s Eve 2023, a HIMARS strike on a Russian military barracks in Makiivka resulted in over 80 fatalities, marking one of the deadliest single attacks on Russian forces during the conflict. Additionally, in May of this year, HIMARS targeted the command post of Russia’s 40th Naval Infantry Brigade in the Kursk region.

“Moving Targets” Are Doomed to Fail

In 2020, the authorities on Taiwan island ordered 11 HIMARS rocket launcher systems from the United States, followed by an additional 18 last year, totaling 29 units. The first batch of 11 systems arrived on the island in September last year and were handed over to the “58th Artillery Command of the 10th Army Corps” of the island’s forces, which have since begun training.

The Taiwan authorities place great expectations on HIMARS. In the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwanese military may exploit the complex terrain of the eastern mountainous regions and offshore islands (such as Orchid Island and Green Island) to integrate HIMARS with The Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles. They plan to adopt a “shoot-and-scoot” tactic, conducting multi-layered strikes against landing fleets. Furthermore, there is hope that if the Taiwanese forces obtain weapons like the ATACMS, they could be used to target critical facilities such as command centers, radar stations, ports, and logistics hubs, aiming to disrupt the rhythm of mainland military operations.
Long-endurance armed reconnaissance drones are among the key assets for effectively suppressing HIMARS rocket launcher systems.

How to Suppress the HIMARS Rocket Launcher?

In combat, Russian forces have deployed large numbers of reconnaissance drones—such as the Orion and Sea Hawk-10 to conduct sector-based searches in areas where HIMARS may operate, with a focus on concealed locations like roadsides and forest edges. Through prolonged surveillance, these drones detect the heat signatures or movement trajectories of HIMARS after firing. Once a target is located, the Russians use the Iskander-M ballistic missile for precision strikes. The Iskander-M has a range of up to 500 kilometers and can rapidly respond to coordinates provided by drones. At the same time, command authority is partially delegated to frontline units to shorten the decision-making chain. For example, drone operators can directly call missile units, avoiding delays caused by hierarchical approvals, enabling the entire “reconnaissance–localization–strike” cycle to be completed within minutes.

Military experts believe that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) possesses superior battlefield reconnaissance capabilities and a wider array of kill methods in the Taiwan Strait theater. The island’s terrain severely limits HIMARS’ ability to conceal its movements, rendering its survivability extremely vulnerable.

Taiwan Island is small—about 36,000 square kilometers—and lacks strategic depth, further restricting the mobility and concealment space for HIMARS units. Once conflict erupts, the PLA can rapidly gain air superiority over the Taiwan Strait and surrounding areas. Control of the airspace allows for the construction of a three-dimensional reconnaissance network using low-orbit satellite constellations, drones, and reconnaissance aircraft, enabling real-time targeting. In particular, armed reconnaissance drones such as the Rainbow and Wing Loong series feature long endurance and can continuously track and precisely strike HIMARS units moving or entering firing positions, effectively achieving “find and destroy” capability.

Furthermore, integrated strike systems composed of long-range rocket artillery, cruise missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, and manned fighter jets make it nearly impossible for HIMARS to operate freely. For example, long-range rocket artillery delivers high-precision strikes with ranges covering the entire island, and can receive real-time coordinates via satellite or drones to conduct “pressure-point” strikes at costs lower than ballistic missiles. Additionally, since HIMARS depends on rapid road mobility, striking critical transportation nodes along Taiwan’s west coast—such as bridges and tunnels—can limit its operational area, forcing it to expose itself in pre-set strike zones, turning it into a “moving target.”

Incoming rockets, due to their relatively fixed trajectories, can also be intercepted by multilayered air defense and missile defense systems, minimizing damage from “leak-through” strikes (with Russian forces having repeatedly achieved successful interceptions). In electronic warfare, Russian forces have frequently reduced HIMARS’ hit rate through jamming and interference. Therefore, targeted electronic warfare measures—combining both soft and hard kill methods—can be employed to degrade HIMARS’ combat effectiveness.

Earlier, the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council made stern statements regarding the arrival of the first batch of HIMARS rocket systems in the Taiwan region. The Ministry of National Defense solemnly warned the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities that no matter what weapons they buy, they are doomed to be futile and will only lead to their own destruction. The Taiwan Affairs Office also emphasized that relying on the United States will only bring harm to Taiwan, and that seeking “Taiwan independence” by military means is a dead end.

Editor: LQQ