Trump Against Trump: The Pathology of Late-Stage American Hegemony

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Peacemaker and warmonger, dealmaker and saboteur: Trumpism is the riddle of the age. This essay argues that its three strategies—geo-economic nationalism, neo-imperial geo-security, post-truth spectacle—collide by design, that domestic politics dominates, and that this late-stage imperial pathology now destabilizes world order.
November 20, 2026
Kang Jie
Associate Research Fellow, Institute of American Studies, China Institute of International Studies
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I. The Three Faces of Trumpism

The foreign policy of Trump’s second term is the most conspicuous variable in the evolution of the current world order. The core idea of the Trump administration’s foreign policy — or “Trumpism” — has transcended Trump’s individual traits: it is an ideological system that is internally heterogeneous and fragmented yet possesses a clear intellectual lineage [1]; a grand-strategy transformation and a reshaping of the form of hegemony under new circumstances [2]; and a spillover of dramatic domestic political change [3]. But the greatest difficulty in defining Trumpism is that, from 2025 to the present, it has assumed utterly different and mutually contradictory forms at different times and in different directions — it is the riddle of the Sphinx of our age. Explaining this contradictoriness is precisely the key entry point for understanding the content and trajectory of Trumpism.

Trump is both a “president of peace” and a president of war; both a non-interventionist and an imperialist; both a dealmaker and a deal-breaker; both an ideological cynic and an ideology-builder; both an aggressive bully and a compromiser who beats a retreat at the critical moment. The Trump administration came to office on the slogan of “ending wars,” styling itself the “peacemaker” that had brokered peace in eight wars and conflicts, yet within its first year in office it used military force against seven countries. It repudiates the post–Cold War American practice of regime change through “democracy promotion” and “nation-building,” yet is equally eager to install proxy regimes of every kind. It seeks to assemble a “de-Chinaization” geo-economic alliance network, yet erects predatory tariffs and discriminatory market barriers against important partners within that very network. It is enamored of settling conflicts through bilateral deals, yet treats negotiation as the prelude to and the camouflage for war. It concocts the “Board of Peace” as a global conflict-resolution mechanism to replace the United Nations, yet it bombs Iran and spreads the flames of war across the entire Persian Gulf. It appears at times pragmatic, shrewd, and far-sighted, and at other times short-sighted, reckless, and anti-intellectual.

This contradictoriness stems in part from the motley, faction-symbiotic character of the Trump 2.0 power system itself. Over the past decade, the highly homogeneous American elite community and consensus formed during the era of Cold War bipolarity and post–Cold War unipolar hegemony have disintegrated [4]. Those who hold power in the Trump 2.0 era are a collection of the various frustrated and voiceless figures who were obscured and suppressed during the era of globalist hegemony. Among them are strategic thinkers who reflect, from a historical and geopolitical perspective, on the relative decline of American hegemony and on strategic sequencing; right-wing imperialists who advocate building Western Hemisphere hegemony and helping Europe “return to civilization”; Silicon Valley right-wing tech elites who believe in “Dark Enlightenment” thought and eschatology; unorthodox economists who copy the prescriptions of state capitalism and mercantilism; grassroots politicians committed to fixing America’s deteriorating domestic order, hollowed-out industry, and degraded governance; and power brokers and careerists seizing the chance for private gain.

If one approaches the foreign policy of Trump 2.0 through the dimension of factions and interest groups, one finds that Trumpism is composed of three principal strategies.

The first is a nationalist geo-economic strategy aimed at promoting domestic reindustrialization, restructuring global critical-mineral supply chains, and the artificial-intelligence revolution. This is the most long-term and foundational branch of Trumpism. The 2025 National Security Strategy makes clear that economic security is the foundation of national security and the cornerstone of America’s global position, and that technological innovation is the core of great-power competition.

The Trump administration has launched an indiscriminate tariff war, built high tariff walls, bound trade policy to national security, and coerced and cajoled foreign companies into investing and producing in the United States in order to drive manufacturing back home. To build critical-mineral supply chains that exclude China, it has rolled out a critical minerals ministerial, a US–EU–Japan critical-minerals price-floor mechanism, and a national strategic reserve program; it has signed bilateral minerals framework agreements and memoranda of cooperation with 21 countries, requiring partner countries to sell minerals to the United States on a priority basis and to share intelligence on Chinese mining investments. The United States has joined forces with Gulf sovereign wealth funds to finance mining projects in African and Central Asian countries, and has brought in Japan, South Korea, and others for technological cooperation, forming a “de-Chinaization” minerals ecosystem in which America sets policy, the Gulf states put up the money, and Western allies supply the technology. On artificial intelligence, Trump has explicitly demanded that American tech giants invest on a large scale at home and create jobs; the federal government has taken direct equity stakes in key companies and actively pushed to relocate semiconductor manufacturing back to the United States; it has imposed a “revenue-for-access” export-control policy on advanced AI chips; and it has promoted the global expansion of American AI infrastructure through the Stargate program, working with “democratic allies” to jointly dominate global AI standard-setting.

The second is a neo-imperial geo-security strategy aimed at building a concentric-circle hegemony of nested “center–vassal–periphery” layers, with differentiated policies for each layer. The Trump administration has thoroughly overturned the form of American hegemony since the Second World War, seeking to build a new form of hegemony that relies more on raw power than on institutions.

The postwar American form of hegemony was grafted onto and inherited from the Viking–British tradition in the history of world empires. That hegemony was rooted in widely dispersed military bases and alliance systems, relied on a monopoly over the financial system and trade networks, and grew strong through the construction of a multiracial ideological community. It depended heavily on “soft power” networks of international institutions and culture, collected hidden tribute through financial power and market advantages, and exercised indirect control over other countries under a formally equal guise. After the Second World War, relying on the military occupation of Europe and Japan and on its overwhelming industrial advantage, the United States built a complete set of international institutions and an ideological hegemony system within the Western camp. After the Cold War ended, through the expansion of globalization and the neoliberal economy, ideological export, and a series of regime-change wars, the United States extended this networked hegemony across the globe.

Trumpism has abandoned this tradition and turned toward the tradition of the Roman Empire in its middle-to-late period. It places greater emphasis on sovereign, absolutely exclusive control over contiguous rather than point-like spheres of influence; on the forcible exaction of resources and tribute; on bullying and dictating to vassal states; and on combining strikes with deals toward non-vassals.

The shape of Trump’s neo-imperial geo-security strategy is a set of concentric circles centered on the homeland, extending from near to far, with layered control and diminishing intensity of control at each remove. In this strategic conception, the Western Hemisphere is the backyard. The United States cultivates pro-American party proxies in Western Hemisphere countries to take direct control of their governments, builds a new regional military alliance, establishes exclusive control over the Western Hemisphere’s strategic resources, strategic chokepoints, and markets, and excludes the influence of “non–Western Hemisphere competitors.” Europe is a vassal in urgent need of transformation. In the Trump administration’s view, European Christian civilization faces threats from transnational institutions, low birthrates, non-Western immigrants, and “woke” policies, and Europe’s left-wing governments cannot reform themselves to escape the crisis. The United States must support the “healthy nations” of Central and Eastern Europe and help Europe “correct its trajectory.” Correspondingly, Europe must shoulder its own defense responsibilities and cooperate with the United States in countering “hostile economic practices” [5].

Beyond the Western Hemisphere and Europe — toward the vast majority of countries in the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia — the United States no longer applies policies of democracy promotion, ideological penetration, soft-power building, and regime change indiscriminately; it has no intention of establishing comprehensive control over them, and instead adopts a more pragmatic, transactional policy. In the Trumpist conception, these regions lie in the “middle zone” between the United States, China, and Russia. America’s interest is to accept and exploit, to a certain degree, the autonomy and diversity of the countries of the “middle zone,” and to prevent “hostile forces” from dominating these regions. To that end, it must pursue pragmatic cooperation with non-Western-system governments in these regions, focusing on security, investment, critical minerals, and strategic corridors, and actively encourage them to pursue “diversified development,” using cooperation with the United States to hedge and balance their cooperation with China and Russia. The most typical cases are American cooperation with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo on critical minerals, and with Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Angola on critical-mineral transport corridors.

Toward near-peer countries such as China and Russia, Trumpism acknowledges that both possess “extraordinary influence” and avoids direct conflict with them, but its attitude toward the two differs markedly. In the course of easing relations with Russia and mediating the Ukraine crisis, Trump is more inclined to tacitly accept Russia’s special influence and “sphere of influence” in eastern Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Central Asian countries, and stresses the common interests of the United States and Russia in developing resources in Russia and the Eurasian region [6].

The third is a “post-truth” domestic-politics shaping strategy aimed at using sensational and low-cost diplomatic achievements to shape Trump’s image of “unique historical stature.”

Mediating conflicts at the White House, signing multiple agreements, establishing the “Board of Peace,” launching a surprise attack on Venezuela and capturing President Maduro, and carrying out a decapitation strike against Iran’s top leadership — all are designed to manufacture exaggerated headlines, sensational dramatic effects, and an unprecedented “sense of winning.” Whether these achievements can subsequently be implemented is not the most important thing.

Trump uses these immediately effective diplomatic achievements to shape his personal IP. First, unpredictability: because he is unpredictable, he can always seize the initiative and a dominant position. Trump tends to choose radical or even crazy policies, using “madman theory” as an important weapon to extract concessions from opponents or to induce hesitation in them [7]. Second, “uniqueness”: Trump tends to choose policies that demonstrate that he “surpasses his predecessors”; he and his confidants repeatedly proclaim that his achievements “surpass those of Washington and Lincoln” and that he is “the greatest president in American history.” Especially on decisions such as the Iran war, Trump, Rubio, Hegseth, and others have repeatedly declared that they have “done what no previous president could do.” Third, “the great dealmaker”: Trump tends to choose policies he considers low-cost and short-cycle. Trump is not opposed to war; he is only opposed to wars that drag on or cost too much. His military actions against Venezuela and Iran have all used airstrikes or special-forces raids, avoiding significant American casualties; and once he has obtained results he can proclaim as victory, he “stops while ahead,” avoiding long-term entanglement. In addition, Trump wants to display America’s military might and tends to choose policies with a powerful deterrent effect, carrying out “cognitive implantation” on American, target-country, and global audiences, peddling the false narrative that “the U.S. military is still strong” and “the U.S. military is invincible.”

Trumpism’s domestic-politics shaping strategy also fits the characteristics of audiences in the “post-truth era”: instant gratification, indifference to detail, and detachment from their own interests. Research has found that, compared with accurate, professional, and complex information, information that readily provokes anger, curiosity, and identity-defensive reactions more easily attracts the attention of social media audiences. Audiences are more inclined to choose information that arouses emotion rather than information grounded in experience, information that is easy to understand rather than information carefully interpreted by experts, and information that flatters identity rather than challenges the self [8].

Trump’s political communication, first, is good at manufacturing pleasure. A Trump rally or a single Truth Social post simultaneously delivers the pleasure of humiliating enemies, the pleasure of MAGA group belonging, the pleasure of breaking social norms, and the pleasure of simplifying complex reality. Second, it uses a flood of lies to manufacture “post-truth,” inducing a cognitive habit of not verifying and believing whatever one sees. Third, it uses emotional incitement to obscure audiences’ concern for their real material interests. Although the Iran war sent oil prices soaring and tariffs pushed up food prices, harming the interests of ordinary American audiences; although MAGA opinion leaders such as Tucker Carlson kept sounding warnings, a considerable share of ordinary Americans still supported Trump’s war decisions.

II. The Internal Contradictions of Trumpism

Objectively speaking, of Trumpism’s three strategies, the first two embody the deep thinking of American strategic elites about domestic and international realities and offer concrete methods for prolonging American hegemony.

The geo-economic strategy, building on the Biden-era multilateral alliance approach, uses tariff threats and bilateral pressure to maximize other countries’ market-access and procurement commitments to the United States. The Trump administration has also borrowed from the industrial-policy and state-capitalism toolbox of East Asian late-developing countries in the twentieth century, absorbed investment from the sovereign funds of Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and exploited the expectations of some emerging economies and Global South countries for American investment and markets in order to draw them into US-led industrial alliances and technology ecosystems. If these strategies can be sustained, they will drive American reindustrialization and the “de-Chinaization” of some supply chains, strengthening America’s confidence in economic and technological competition with China.

The geo-security strategy has, to a certain extent, leveraged America’s comparative advantage in projecting military power and applying political and economic coercion in the Western Hemisphere and Europe, strengthening its extraction and control over both. The abundant human, mineral, and energy resources and the vast markets of the Western Hemisphere and Europe can provide the necessary material conditions for restructuring America’s home-base industries, helping consolidate the homeland and build up momentum for a “comeback.” The policy toward emerging economies, meanwhile, accommodates the reality of growing autonomy among non-Western middle powers in the current process of multipolarization. Reducing regime intervention and ideological export helps strengthen America’s influence in the “middle zone” [9], helps ease great-power relations, and saves costs and buys time for the United States to consolidate its domestic base and its “backyard.”

There is an overlap of narrative logic among the geo-economic strategy, the geo-security strategy, and the domestic-politics shaping strategy. For example, Trump’s attack on Venezuela and capture of Maduro can be analyzed from the perspective of cognitive shaping, but can also be interpreted through the goal of strengthening “Donroe Doctrine” hegemony in the Western Hemisphere; the rationale of enhancing America’s energy and mineral dominance and weakening China’s resource access also holds. Likewise, the analysis of the airstrikes on Iran and the assassination operation against Khamenei can be developed from all three perspectives.

However, the enduring tension and contradiction among the three strategies is the normal state of Trumpism. The domestic-politics shaping strategy will increasingly occupy an absolutely dominant position and become the main starting point for decision-making. There are two reasons. First, the first two strategies require policy coordination and implementation by multiple professional bureaucracies and the private sector. The third strategy is single-threaded and entirely determined by Trump personally. Second, the first two strategies are strategic, policy, and industrial events with cycles of at least three to ten years or more; rebuilding rare-earth supply chains, for instance, may take ten to thirty years to show initial results. The third strategy is a purely media event whose time span is the news cycle, measured in hours and days; attacking Venezuela or Iran can produce immediately declarable results, bringing immediate political gains to Trump, the Republican Party, and its supporters.

The destination of Trumpist foreign policy is domestic politics. The core objective of the Trump administration’s foreign policy is to consolidate Trump’s personal power and to reconstruct the political legacy of the American polity and state apparatus. Since 2025, Trump has initially achieved comprehensive control over the executive branch and the marginalization of other power centers, obtaining what is called “monarchical presidential power” [10]. He has bypassed Congress and relevant laws, reorganized and abolished federal executive departments, and hollowed out Congress’s decision-making authority over tariffs, appropriations, and civil rights; he has used military force to intervene forcefully in local affairs, challenging state rights. He has reorganized the bureaucracy, building a core staff team with personal loyalty as the benchmark, strengthening departmental surveillance, purging the “deep state” from defense, diplomatic, and intelligence departments, and stripping career officials of their legal protections so that they become employees who can be fired at any time.

But Trump’s domestic agenda has also met with growing resistance, challenges, and checks. On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled by 6 votes to 3 that the global “reciprocal tariffs” unilaterally imposed by the Trump administration in 2025 by invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act violated federal law. This was the biggest domestic defeat Trump has suffered since his second term began, and the first time a conservative-majority Supreme Court has ruled against Trump on a major issue. After Trump unilaterally launched military action against Venezuela in January 2026, the Senate passed a war powers resolution by 52 votes to 47 to prevent Trump from taking further military action against Venezuela without congressional authorization; five Republican senators joined all Democratic senators in voting in favor.

In addition, the Republican Party faces challenges in the 2026 midterm elections. Trump’s approval rating currently hovers between 37 and 43 percent, and historical data show that when a president’s approval rating is below 50 percent, his party almost certainly loses seats in the midterms. Republicans currently hold only a four-seat advantage in the House of Representatives, and Democrats need a net gain of just three seats to flip it. If Republicans lose the 2026 midterms, it will fundamentally change the power situation of Trump’s second term, turning him from a strong leader with “all three branches unified” into a lame duck, and he may even face impeachment.

This series of domestic challenges is pushing Trump to rely more on the short-term gains brought by the domestic-politics shaping strategy. Whether to win short-term approval, prepare for the midterms, or build a long-term political legacy, all will drive Trump to manufacture and rely more on media events rather than actively planning and implementing the long-term gains of the first two strategies. Two hours after ordering airstrikes on Iran in the early hours of February 28, 2026, Trump posted that “Iran tried to interfere in the 2020 and 2024 elections.” His attempt to establish a link between the two issues of “Iran” and “election interference” was aimed both at boosting his approval rating and at further hyping the “election security” issue before the midterms, laying the groundwork for preemptive mobilization in favor of Republican-favorable measures such as restricting mail-in voting, requiring voter ID, and setting up military checkpoints at polling stations.

Dependence on the domestic-politics shaping strategy will also affect and undermine the implementation of the first two strategies in several ways, producing a series of chaos and internal contradictions in Trumpist foreign policy. First, decisions made purely out of domestic political need often force the other two strategies to absorb losses. After the U.S. airstrikes on Iran, Iran launched retaliatory strikes against America’s Gulf Arab allies, inflicting heavy damage on the financial, high-end real estate, and digital infrastructure industries of the Gulf Arab states. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar are discussing withdrawing their sovereign investment funds’ investment commitments to the U.S. artificial-intelligence sector. If the war’s damage grows further, will the Gulf states have the U.S. military move its bases out, or even launch their own nuclear weapons programs? The post-oil diversification of the Gulf states has benefited from U.S. security guarantees, which have enabled the Gulf region to attract global capital. The actions of the Trump administration, aimed at shaping his unique personal historical standing and boosting the midterms, have instead destroyed the security foundation of the Gulf states’ economic partnership with the United States.

Second, high-risk, unconventional military actions may continuously raise the threshold for American domestic audiences, thereby spurring the Trump administration to undertake even more reckless and daring adventures. The subtext of the domestic-politics shaping strategy is the need to constantly produce enemies and constantly declare victory. Maduro’s capture set a precedent for achieving regime change by enforcing U.S. domestic law abroad; Khamenei’s assassination set a precedent for decapitating the leadership of a regional great power. Each action raises the bar that the next action must meet. But easy “low-hanging fruit” like Venezuela is becoming scarcer, while voters’ appetites grow larger. As the 2026 midterms approach, the Trump administration must manufacture more media events to counter a Democratic Party that is more focused on livelihood issues.

Finally, disagreements among the different strategies largely correspond to contradictions among different factions within the Trump administration. Inter-factional competition will lead each faction to compete in choosing policies that help Trump consolidate and enhance his power, while neglecting or shelving policies whose results are slow to appear. Since 2026, the military actions against Venezuela and Iran have significantly raised Rubio’s standing in Trump’s camp, making it more likely that he will be nominated as a candidate in the 2028 presidential election. By contrast, the grassroots MAGA movement represented by Vance has long flown the banner of “anti-intervention” and “America First”; although Vance himself expressed support for Trump after the two military operations, his visibility has declined markedly. This potential contest over Trump’s succession will inevitably consume the attention and administrative resources of the Trump administration, thereby affecting the implementation of the longer-term geo-economic and security strategies that require more patience and complex coordination.

The contradictions among Trumpism’s three main strategies, the factional strife among the Trump 2.0 governing elite, and the constraints of America’s domestic political ecology and electoral cycle — these three will reinforce one another, causing Trumpism to gradually trend toward short-sightedness, recklessness, and the pursuit of quick success, making it very difficult for the United States to achieve the more rational, grand, and long-term goals of its geo-economic and geo-security strategies. This is the pathology of the United States as a terminally ill late-stage empire. Without a united and stable leadership group, without the institutional mechanisms that guarantee that strategic planning is “carried through on a single blueprint” and that the whole country “plays one game of chess,” the prescription Trumpism offers to prolong American hegemony is doomed to fail.

III. The International Order Under the Assault of Late-Stage Hegemonic Pathology

The current U.S. military action against Iran affects the international order in three ways. First, the United States has no intention whatsoever of cloaking violence in the garb of legitimacy; it lets violence run naked — a contempt for the authority of the existing international system. Second, the United States abruptly killed Iran’s top leadership while negotiations had not yet broken down, no longer treating diplomacy as a way to avoid war but as a preparatory stage and a smokescreen for war. This will heighten the sense of insecurity of small and medium-sized countries, prompt more countries to consider the nuclear option, and trigger new regional conflicts. Third, the pathology and exhaustion of American hegemony are fully on display, highlighting the urgency of building a new type of international order.

Trump’s surprise attacks on Maduro and Khamenei do not prove that American military power is stronger than in the past, nor can they reverse the trend of declining U.S. military superiority in recent years. The United States of the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, and the Iraq War certainly also possessed “decapitation” capabilities. But at the time, the United States, out of consideration for maintaining the legitimacy of its hegemony, avoided actions such as directly assassinating other countries’ heads of state, which would violate international law and harm long-term interests. It was a matter of not doing so, not of being unable to do so.

During the Gulf War, U.S. forces had already crippled the Iraqi army and were prepared to march on Baghdad. But the administration of George H. W. Bush, after consulting the United Nations and its allies, decided to halt the offensive at the Kuwaiti border. This was not a lack of capability, but a means of preventing Iraq from being weakened too much, so that it could continue to serve as a counterweight to Iran, while preserving the legitimacy of the UN-authorized coalition military operation. A United States at the zenith of its hegemony had no need to prove its status with Saddam’s head. During the Kosovo War, the United States likewise had the technical capability to assassinate Milošević directly, but the Clinton administration ultimately chose to try him before the international tribunal at The Hague — a hegemonic instrument draped in the cloak of legitimacy. Although the George W. Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq is notorious, it still took the trouble to go through the domestic procedures of a declaration of war and congressional authorization, fabricated UN authorization, and tried and executed Saddam in an Iraqi court — posturing by the neoconservatives, to be sure, but at least the full set of formalities was performed, showing that the United States still had scruples about the legitimacy of domestic and international institutions.

By contrast, the abduction of Maduro and the assassination of Khamenei cast these scruples aside entirely, even using diplomatic negotiations as a tool for gathering intelligence and increasing the success rate of operations. This proves that Trumpism has no intention whatsoever of adding any halo of legitimacy to violent action; instead, it seeks to use simple, direct, “low-cost,” naked violence shows to stimulate the dopamine of domestic voters, demonstrate its “unique historical achievements,” and implant in target countries and global audiences the perception that “American military power is invincible.”

After the Trump administration abandoned the pretense of the legitimacy of violence, it released the destructive power that legitimized hegemony had always concealed, and this will deal a greater blow to the international order in the short term. When the attempt at “regime change” in Iran fails and the war reaches a stalemate, Trump once again threatens to overthrow the Cuban government, saying that the United States may take action against Cuba after the Iran war ends. This may not be entirely bluster: the strategic logic of Trumpism — using diplomatic achievements to shape a domestic political legacy — will drive it toward more military adventures. Beyond launching wars, the United States will also unscrupulously cash in and unleash other destructive capacities in its hegemonic structure, such as reviving privateering and piracy and forcibly seizing other countries’ assets.

The United States’ use of diplomacy as preparation for and a smokescreen for war is even worse than pre–Second World War Japan’s use of negotiations to mask its surprise attack, because U.S.–Iran negotiations had not yet been declared broken off; this amounts to a declaration that diplomatic engagement with the United States is dangerous and useless. This U.S.–Israeli war against Iran will prompt more and more countries to consider: if international institutions and diplomatic engagement cannot stop violent invasion by the United States or Israel, then the only reliable deterrent is nuclear deterrence — either self-reliance or a nuclear umbrella other than America’s. In the Middle East, Turkey and Saudi Arabia will both think seriously about this question. Saudi Arabia’s use of its nuclear-armed ally Pakistan to pressure Iran proves that it believes in the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence.

The U.S. airstrikes on Iran also expose the pathology and exhaustion of American hegemony. Although Trump claims that the U.S. military has a “nearly unlimited supply of munitions,” within a week of the war’s start, U.S. forces’ precision-guided munitions and the interceptors of the THAAD, Patriot, and Standard-3 air-defense systems were consumed in enormous quantities, stockpiles ran critically low, and resupply was difficult in the short term because of limited missile supply-chain capacity and rare-earth material shortages. The United States was even forced to pull THAAD air-defense systems from South Korea to the Middle East. At the same time, the Iran war has accelerated the crisis of dollar hegemony. The dollar’s long-term reserve-currency status depends on people believing that dollar-denominated assets are safe, liquid, and insulated from geopolitical risk. The Gulf crisis triggered by the Iran war shows that dollar assets located near U.S. military bases instead face catastrophic risk. Together with the Gulf states’ consideration of withdrawing sovereign wealth fund investments from the United States, all this signals that major U.S. military actions are instead weakening the financial system that underpins American hegemony. In addition, the era of NATO as a single strategic actor is ending. Although France, Germany, and the United Kingdom stated that they were ready to take “necessary and proportionate defensive action to destroy the source of Iran’s missile and drone launches,” NATO countries such as Turkey and Spain publicly condemned the U.S. military action and refused to allow U.S. forces to use bases on their territory. This shows that the hegemonic power’s ability to enforce alliance discipline is weakening. In the future, NATO’s collective-security architecture may be confined to part of Europe’s territory and will find it difficult to reproduce the extra-regional intervention of the post–Cold War era.

In the face of the regional and global shocks created by the United States, emerging non-Western economies and Global South countries must, on the one hand, strive to restore the authority of the UN-centered international order, and on the other hand, strive to strengthen new regional and global financial architectures, security architectures, and governance architectures, positioning the United Nations as the coordinating center of emerging regional organizations and building a multicentric consultative network that better reflects multipolar reality.

Editor: zhangyixincq

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Associate Research Fellow, Institute of American Studies, China Institute of International Studies
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