Q: One noticeable change at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue is the absence of China’s Minister of National Defense. As a regular attendee of the Dialogue, how do you interpret this shift? Is it, as some speculate, a form of “cold shoulder” diplomacy?

Zhou Bo:

To put it simply, they’re overthinking it.

Although China has participated in the Shangri-La Dialogue since 2007, the level of participation has varied over the years. Our defense ministers have attended five times in total, but in many other instances, it was a deputy chief of the General Staff in charge of foreign affairs who represented China. Scholars—such as representatives from the Academy of Military Sciences—have also frequently taken part. This year, the Chinese delegation was led by a vice president of the National Defense University.

In the West, the Shangri-La Dialogue is widely seen as a major platform for security dialogue. Their defense ministers attend every year, so naturally, they hope China’s defense minister will do the same. When that expectation wasn’t met this year, they began to speculate about the reasons—linking it to the state of U.S.-China relations, or even framing it through the lens of the trade war. But again, they’re simply reading too much into it.

I joked with some of them: if you’re so eager to meet China’s defense minister, why not come to the Xiangshan Forum in Beijing? You’ll definitely see him there.

Q: In addition to the Chinese delegation, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s appearance and his remarks surrounding the U.S. “Indo-Pacific Strategy” also drew considerable attention. What’s your assessment of this defense secretary chosen by President Trump after returning to the White House? From his speech, what adjustments or changes can we observe in the current U.S. administration’s military posture toward China?

Zhou Bo:

Hegseth’s first impression is that he speaks loudly and forcefully—perhaps a result of his background as a Fox News host. But after all, that’s what he is: a former TV presenter. Faced with an audience of military experts, his responses came across as rather unprofessional. While his language was fluent and punchy, much of what he said didn’t quite hold up under closer scrutiny. His overall tone of toughness and ideological assertiveness, in fact, betrays a sense of insecurity and anxiety—particularly in the face of China’s rise and the increasing frequency of Chinese military exercises around Taiwan.

One consistent theme between Hegseth and his predecessor is the emphasis on the importance of allies. But this message, when delivered this year, felt particularly ironic. At the Munich Security Conference, the prevailing takeaway was that today’s United States barely considers the feelings or concerns of its allies. Vice President J.D. Vance has repeatedly undercut allied positions behind their backs. Within such a short timeframe, we’ve seen two sharply conflicting attitudes from senior U.S. officials toward allies—so which one should America’s partners believe? I discussed this issue with many Southeast Asian representatives on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue, and most of them were quite puzzled. The general conclusion was that few truly believed what the U.S. defense secretary was saying.

Comparing Hegseth’s speech to those of his predecessor reveals a fundamental shift in the U.S. assessment of the security landscape.
When Lloyd Austin, the previous Secretary of Defense, attended the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2023, he said that conflict is neither imminent nor inevitable. He reiterated that message again in 2024. That reflected the Pentagon’s official judgment at the time—even though some U.S. generals were claiming that China was preparing for war. By contrast, Austin’s statements at the Dialogue carried weight and conveyed a clear message from the U.S. government to the international community.

But what did Hegseth say this year? He said that “it could be imminent. We hope not but certainly could be.”—which is almost a 180-degree reversal from Austin’s position. He even used the platform of the Shangri-La Dialogue to revive the theory originally proposed by the CIA director—that China is preparing to be militarily ready for an attack on Taiwan by 2027. In contrast to previous years, I can clearly sense a heightened nervousness—or perhaps urgency—on the American side.

Q: You mentioned Secretary Hegseth’s lack of professionalism. Indeed, the Trump administration is widely known for its “amateur team,” as seen in the trade war. Is there a risk they might repeat the same playbook in the military realm—rallying allies for reckless actions against China, aiming for sky-high bargaining and extreme pressure tactics?

Zhou Bo:

The United States is indeed preparing seriously for a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. At this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, Secretary Hegseth explicitly stated that the U.S. would reinforce its forward deployment along the first and second island chains. While the Secretary himself may not be particularly knowledgeable about military matters, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Commander of INDOPACOM certainly are—they have highly professional expertise.

But the real problems the U.S. faces are twofold: first, its own limitations—especially in terms of industrial capacity; and second, whether its allies will actually follow its lead.

China has never asked any country to pick sides. The U.S., on the other hand, goes out of its way to pressure everyone to stand with them. But no country is naïve enough to blindly take sides. Most adopt a “neutral, fence-sitting” approach—particularly smaller nations, which tend to make decisions based on specific events and timing. Even America’s traditional close allies can’t be counted on to offer unconditional support.

Take Japan, for instance—America’s most loyal ally in East Asia. According to opinion polls, only 11% of the Japanese public supports intervening on behalf of the U.S. in a conflict with China. The reason is simple: it’s unsettling to have a major nuclear power as your neighbor. I read a RAND Corporation report on whether Japan would enter a war. Their conclusion? Unless it’s absolutely the last resort, Japanese leaders would be extremely hesitant to make that call.

Then Australia, under pressure from its deal to purchase eight nuclear-powered submarines, Australia is doing all it can to distance itself from tensions over the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. When I was interviewed by Australia’s 60 Minutes, I could clearly sense the host’s anxiety and unease when it came to the question of whether Australia and China could end up in a military conflict.

Then there’s the Philippines. The nine bases it has opened to U.S. forces play a key role in America’s first-island-chain posture. But even the Philippines is concerned that if the U.S. launches attacks from these bases, it could become a target of Chinese retaliation. That’s why Manila has imposed restrictions—for example, no offensive missions can be launched from the bases, and no weapons can be stored there. So, when you add it all up, there really aren’t many countries in East Asia that can offer meaningful military help to the U.S.

Some in China worry about an “Indo-Pacific NATO.” Honestly, I think that fear is a bit overblown.

Official U.S. policy relies heavily on “strategic ambiguity.” It’s essentially an attempt to hollow out the “One China” principle without openly abandoning it. In reality, the U.S. is not nearly as confident as it appears in the face of China’s growing military capabilities. But instead of changing its tone, it leans into ambiguity to maintain the appearance of strength and dominance.

Q: You mentioned that the United States is seriously preparing for a potential military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. As the power balance between China and the U.S. shifts rapidly, what steps might Washington take to use the “Taiwan card” to contain mainland China? And how should we respond?

Zhou Bo:

This is a very difficult problem for the United States. When Hegseth said that “Trump respects the Chinese people and civilization and doesn’t want war,” there was actually some truth in it—because the military gap between China and the U.S. has narrowed significantly. In this changing landscape, Washington is well aware of the consequences if a war were to break out.

In fact, the recent India-Pakistan conflict unintentionally served as an advertisement for the capabilities of Chinese weapons. In my view, the future of the global arms market will be dominated by just two systems: American and Chinese. China’s systems have advantages in integration, artificial intelligence, and cost-effectiveness, which will likely squeeze out Russia and France in markets where they previously held an edge.

While it’s still unclear exactly what the U.S. intends to do, one fact is certain: China’s conventional military power is growing stronger, and we are fully capable of defending ourselves in our immediate neighborhood. Against this backdrop, I believe China should also reinforce its nuclear capabilities.
There have been voices in the U.S. suggesting that, due to its declining conventional advantage, it might consider using nuclear weapons first against China. That kind of rhetoric is highly irresponsible—and dangerous. For China, enhancing our nuclear deterrent is neither technically nor economically difficult. What it requires is political resolve.

Both the recent India-Pakistan conflict and the ongoing war in Ukraine underscore the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. By strengthening our own nuclear forces, we can achieve the same kind of deterrence. If we reach a level where the U.S. wouldn’t even dare to contemplate a first nuclear strike, then any conflict would be confined to conventional warfare. And if that conventional war happens near our shores, there’s little doubt China would hold the upper hand.

Q: Just now, you mentioned that at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, Hegseth said Trump “prefers to engage with other countries on the basis of commerce and sovereignty rather than through war.” Is Trump truly a “peace-loving” U.S. president?

Zhou Bo:

There are two widely acknowledged traits of Trump. First, he desires to go down in history—comparable to figures like Washington, Lincoln, or Roosevelt—and even imagines his face carved into Mount Rushmore. But judging from his performance so far in this second term, particularly in the first hundred days, that ambition looks far from realistic.

Second, there’s the notion that he doesn’t like war. That sentiment is somewhat reflected in certain aspects of his past time in office. However, this trait is by no means absolute—for example, when he threatened North Korea, he didn’t exactly come across as a “man of peace.”

So I believe the question of war is far more complex than any single leader’s personality. As Thucydides once summarized, wars are driven by three forces: interest, fear, and honor. How these three elements will shape Trump’s future military decisions remains to be seen.

Q: Apart from the U.S. Secretary of Defense, French President Emmanuel Macron also made a high-profile appearance at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, proposing a “third way” in the strategic rivalry between China and the United States and calling for stronger cooperation with Asian countries. How do you interpret his thinking behind this, and do you think such a strategy is viable?

Zhou Bo:

Macron has expressed a desire to play a mediating role between nations. This aligns with France’s long-standing self-perception: since it doesn’t possess overwhelming power, it positions itself as a potential broker between so-called “superpowers.”

Also, contrary to what many Chinese may think, France does not regard itself as an “external power” in the Indo-Pacific. It has overseas territories in both the Indian Ocean (like Réunion) and the Pacific (such as New Caledonia), which makes it natural for France to see itself as an Indo-Pacific nation.
As for what role France can actually play, I believe it is quite limited. The French are known for their rhetorical flair — in plain terms, they’re good at coining slogans. For example, “NATO is brain-dead” is a phrase coined by Macron. “Strategic autonomy” is another concept that originated in France. But after proposing these ideas, what concrete actions followed? Whether it’s French initiatives or broader European efforts, they had little effect before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

After the war began, however, Europe became more determined than ever to develop its own approach. There’s a broad sense that the NATO era is fading, and it’s likely that Europe’s security landscape will look very different a decade from now.

As for Europe-Asia relations, France will certainly try to link the two regions more closely. But when it comes to “engaging in the Indo-Pacific,” the main motivation is to share in the region’s economic growth. Militarily challenging China is simply beyond their capabilities. Whether it’s Britain, France, or Germany, their occasional operations near the 12-nautical-mile zone in the South China Sea or transits through the Taiwan Strait are purely symbolic. Concerns about an “Asia-Pacific NATO” are overstated — it won’t take shape.

Editor: LQQ