To What Extent Can the United States Tolerate India?

Under the backdrop of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party’s re-election, whether it’s the Republican or Democratic Party that wins the U.S. presidential election, it will only affect the theoretical ceiling of U.S.-India cooperation, but is unlikely to instantaneously change the actual progress of strategic cooperation between the two countries, let alone the overall direction of bilateral collaboration. Regardless of which party takes office in the U.S., the U.S. and India will continue to advance strategic cooperation in multiple areas centered around the “China factor”:

Firstly, in the military sector, the U.S. will spare no effort to strengthen cooperation with India, especially in intelligence reconnaissance and equipment ammunition sectors. Given the current global geopolitical strategic pattern, the U.S. arguably cares more about the “China-India border” issue than India, because the more tensions escalate between China and India, the greater leverage the U.S. has over India. Therefore, on one hand, the U.S. will increase the intensity of intelligence sharing with India, particularly involving perceptual data and reconnaissance results of Chinese border infrastructure, ensuring that it will not “miss any opportunity to fan the flames.” On the other hand, the U.S. responds to Modi’s government policy of building indigenous defense production capability, even expecting to utilize India’s cost advantages to forge a “democratic armory,” pushing India away from the Russian defense system while seeking a more cost-effective manufacturing, repair, supply, and logistics solution for the democratic world.

Secondly, in the industrial technology sector, the U.S. continues to drive India as a replacement for China’s core position in global supply chains. Although U.S.-India industrial cooperation experience since 2017 shows that India currently lacks the capacity for large-scale Chinese replacement through “friendshoring,” considering India’s population size and market potential, the U.S. still places high hopes on “Make in India.” In the future, the U.S. will primarily support India through encouraging direct corporate investment, guiding investments in Indian stocks and bonds, marketing Indian government bonds, emphasizing improvements in infrastructure, and enhancing technical levels, thereby boosting India’s capabilities to undertake large-scale manufacturing after completing import substitution. Although India desires greater trade concessions from the U.S., due to internal constraints, the U.S. only wishes “Indian manufacturing” to replace existing “Chinese manufacturing” portions under similar conditions rather than granting India special trade advantages. Notably, the U.S. will also promote new technological cooperation with India, covering semiconductors, artificial intelligence, space technology, etc., but given India’s current level, the short-term effects are limited.

Thirdly, in the diplomatic strategy sector, the U.S. continues to grant India ally treatment in terms of rights, but does not make equivalent demands concerning responsibilities. A basic consensus has formed in U.S. policy circles: a stronger India will inevitably squeeze Chinese interests more than it does American interests, hence the U.S. values India’s overall strategic containment of China rather than specific tactical gains. For instance, while the U.S. welcomes India’s increased role in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, especially strengthening cooperation with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, it does not expect India to fulfill “ally obligations.” Similarly, the U.S. will further coordinate with India in the South Asian and Indian Ocean regions to contain China, but does not demand reciprocal returns. In addition, recognizing its shortcomings in global southern influence, the U.S. will continue to support India to offset China’s strong influence towards the global south.

Fourthly, in the realm of values and ideologies, the U.S. will selectively highlight India’s overall “democratic attributes” and Modi’s government’s “authoritarian attributes” as needed. Although Modi’s centralized internal control and external hegemony spark significant controversy in the U.S., the strategic cooperation direction between the U.S. and India is set, and these controversies instead become leverage for the U.S. in strategizing its relations with India — emphasizing “Modi government’s authoritarianism” when a slap on the wrist is needed, and “India’s democracy” when wooing is in order. In specific measures, if even a Democratic government opts to turn a blind eye to “India’s plot to assassinate in the U.S.,” a Republican government, typically disdainful of progressive values, is even less likely to impose substantive sanctions on India. Simultaneously, India’s entry into an era of coalition government objectively reduces the U.S.’s room for using values as a weapon to gang up on India.