On June 1, Ukraine launched “Operation Spiderweb,” resulting in the destruction of multiple Russian strategic bombers. In the aftermath, Taiwanese hacker groups infiltrated Russian websites to celebrate, prominently displaying their so-called “national flag.” Akio Yaita, CEO of the Indo-Pacific Strategy Think Tank, even suggested that Taiwan should emulate this tactic to strike mainland China.

Chinese strategist and former Air Force Senior Colonel Professor Wang Xiangsui points out that such notions are mere fantasies. These ideas ignore the fundamental differences between Taiwan region and Ukraine, as well as between China and Russia, but lead to a similar fatal misjudgment.

Firstly, Ukraine is a vast country with extensive, uninhabited land borders with Russia, facilitating infiltration and the reception of foreign aid. In contrast, the Taiwan region is a small island, and Taiwan separatists underestimate the complexity of maritime infiltration.

How challenging is maritime infiltration? In July 1964, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched 51 spies disguised as fishermen to land in Jiangsu Province, but they were annihilated upon arrival. A few months later, he sent another group of 172 spies via sea and airdrop, all of whom were eliminated. These infiltrations were thwarted not by any sophisticated counterintelligence agency but by coast guards, militias, and fishermen.

In May 1964, militia members from Wenling County, Zhejiang Province, captured a vessel belonging to Kuomintang agents from Taiwan island and eliminated five spies. This photo shows the militia members who took part in the battle. The photo is now preserved in the Zhejiang Provincial Archives.

Mainland China’s coastline stretches 18,000 kilometres and is patrolled by 5.06 million fishermen, averaging 280 pairs of eyes per kilometre, making infiltration exceedingly difficult. Even today, when the U.S. attempts to deploy sonar buoys to track Chinese nuclear submarines, they must first consider the response of Chinese fishermen.

Some Taiwan separatists might argue that Chiang Kai-shek’s troops lacked professionalism. However, in 1961, the US orchestrated the Bay of Pigs invasion, deploying 1,400 well-trained exiles into Cuba with U.S. Navy and Air Force support, only for the entire force to be decimated within three days. This failure was partly due to floodlights used by Cuban fishermen, which illuminated the beachhead, allowing Cuban militias to spot the initial frogmen for a counterattack.

This April 1961 file photo shows members of Assault Brigade 2506 after their capture in the Bay of Pigs.

Moreover, since 2013, all trucks in China, especially those over 12 tons, are required to integrate with the Beidou navigation system, posing technical challenges for hostile forces attempting to replicate “Operation Spiderweb” which uses commercial trucks as drone carriers.

Secondly, the success of “Operation Spiderweb” largely stemmed from Russia’s indecisiveness and insufficient strikes on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, allowing Ukraine to receive foreign weapons and intelligence support continually. Beijing would not make the same mistake.

For instance, the differing railway gauges between Ukraine and Europe necessitate the changing of bogies for all Western-supplied weapons at Lviv. Aleksandr Vladimirovich Rutskoy, former Major General of the Russian Air Force, specifically recommended targeting six railway bridges and two tunnels in Lviv. Yet, to this day, the Russian military has only conducted sporadic cruise missile strikes, never fully paralyzing Lviv’s transportation network.

This dilemma stems largely from Russia’s lack of precision munitions and missiles at the start of the conflict. In contrast, a 2022 Pentagon report estimated that the People’s Liberation Army  possesses over 3,000 missiles. Taiwan island encompasses only about 340 ports and 40 airports, both active and inactive. Western media outlets have expressed concerns that many of these missiles could be deployed against Taiwan. In fact, this would be akin to using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. The vertical launching cells on just four Type 055 destroyers exceed these numbers. Additionally, China’s long-range rocket artillery can paralyze such targets with just a few volleys.

Currently, Western media are largely engrossed in celebrating this underdog victory, but they fail to highlight that Ukraine’s willingness to serve as the West’s bridgehead against Russia has forced it into a tragic scenario where it must rely on such asymmetric tactics. Ancient Chinese philosopher Mencius pointed out 2,500 years ago that direct confrontation with stronger adversaries should be fundamentally avoided—the so-called “great powers should be benevolent, and small states should be wise.” Ukraine can repeatedly sting Russia, but Russia still retains the option to decapitate it.

In 2013, U.S. Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland offered food to pro-European Union activists as she and U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt, right, walked through Independence Square in Kiev

According to multiple Western media reports, the planning for “Operation Spiderweb” spanned over a year. Professor Wang noted that Ukraine chose this timing precisely because it coincided with a new round of negotiations, as U.S. and European confidence waned. Given Ukraine’s overall disadvantage on the front lines, a dramatic behind-enemy-lines operation was needed to bolster its resistance morale and persuade the U.S. and Europe to continue providing aid. This serves as a textbook example of propaganda, but from a practical standpoint, the loss of a dozen aircraft is far from sufficient to tip the balance on the front lines.

An obsession with tactical cleverness, coupled with a lack of strategic wisdom, maybe the most dangerous form of folly.

Editor: Charriot Zhai