I. The End of the Old Model and a New Strategic Question

The old model of globalisation has come to an end. This is no longer a prediction, but an unfolding reality.

For decades, energy was taken for granted as a tool of geopolitics, technology as a passive source of fragmentation, and finance as a weapon in interstate rivalries. Yet continuing to cling to these old models is no longer a matter of path dependency — it is a strategic act of self-sabotage. The Ukraine crisis, conflicts in the Middle East, semiconductor embargoes, the weaponisation of SWIFT — each successive shock has declared the same message: the world in which energy could be secured through territorial control, technology would automatically diffuse across borders, and finance remained neutral, is gone forever.

The real frontier of growth is not to be found in new territories, nor in the traditional scramble for resources. It lies at the intersection of sectors — the convergence of energy, technology, and finance. This is not a technical observation, but a fundamental judgement about the restructuring of global order and the strategic choices facing major powers.

II. The Cost of Fragmentation and the Value of Integration

To understand this judgement, one must first acknowledge a basic fact: the most hidden source of inefficiency in today’s global economy is not resource scarcity, but systemic fragmentation. Energy, technology, and financial systems each operate along their own distinct logics, and the interfaces between them are riddled with friction and loss. The greatest opportunity, in turn, lies precisely in these gaps.

The value that can be unlocked by breaking down sectoral barriers is at least twofold. The first is the efficiency dividend — reducing institutional friction between energy, technology, and finance to significantly lower the costs of investment, production, and trade. The second is the green premium — transforming clean energy from a moral proposition into an economic choice that can be priced, traded, and financed. These are not technical details. They are strategic imperatives for national competitiveness and global stability.

The old model failed because its three underlying assumptions have completely collapsed. First, the assumption that energy could be secured through territorial control — the wars in Ukraine, conflicts in the Middle East, and upheavals in Africa have repeatedly demonstrated that military control cannot guarantee long-term energy security, let alone address the structural changes brought by the energy transition. Second, the assumption that technology would automatically diffuse across borders — chip bans, AI export controls, and the “de-risking” of critical mineral supply chains have become the new normal. Techno-nationalism is replacing techno-globalism. Third, the assumption that finance was a neutral tool — when SWIFT can be weaponised, foreign reserves frozen, and secondary sanctions extended indefinitely, the illusion of financial neutrality has been shattered.

The collapse of these three pillars has produced a world of high friction and low trust. Retreating into siloed development is nothing less than economic self-destruction. We already see the hidden costs of fragmentation: renewable energy stranded due to mismatched grids, energy storage technologies stalled between laboratories and demonstration projects because of financing difficulties, and carbon pricing unable to take root due to a lack of international coordination. None of these problems can be solved within the closed system of a single sector.

III. A Unique Window of Opportunity for China and Russia

It is precisely at this intersection that China and Russia possess a unique and unmissable strategic opportunity.

In terms of endowment structures, Russia possesses abundant energy resources, mature natural gas pipeline networks, critical mineral reserves, and vast land space. China possesses world-leading photovoltaic manufacturing capacity, mature grid technologies, digital infrastructure systems, and unparalleled economies of scale in manufacturing. One basic fact stands out: neither country can complete the global energy transition on its own. Without China’s manufacturing capacity and technological iteration speed, transition costs will remain prohibitive, and large-scale deployment of clean energy will remain a distant prospect. Without Russia’s energy resources and geostrategic connectivity, energy security across the Eurasian continent will remain fragmented, and regional energy prices will remain trapped in persistent volatility.

Thus, the goal of China-Russia cooperation on this issue should not be a simple buyer-seller relationship, but joint construction. This is not a political slogan, but a realistic judgement grounded in economic logic and technical feasibility.

IV. The Convergence of Energy and Technology: From Volatility to Asset

At the intersection of energy and technology, the most fundamental question is how to manage the volatility of renewable energy. The intermittent nature of wind and solar power makes grid stability the single greatest technical bottleneck in the energy transition.

The old model responded with “source follows load” — the generation side passively adapting to changes in electricity demand. This approach was barely workable in the era of fossil fuel dominance, but under a high share of renewable energy, its costs have become unsustainable. The logic of the new model is “source-load interaction” — using AI-based forecasting, intelligent energy storage systems, and real-time price signals to achieve dynamic balance between generation and demand. This is not merely a technological upgrade, but a transformation of systems thinking.

Within this transformation, the potential for China-Russia cooperation is structural. Russian natural gas can serve as a critical transition fuel — not the ultimate solution, but without its stabilising role during the transition, the volatility of renewable energy cannot be effectively absorbed. At the same time, Russia’s largely untapped wind and solar resources offer vast space for future clean electricity production. China provides photovoltaic panels, wind turbines, battery storage systems, smart grid technologies, and the practical experience of large-scale deployment. The combination points toward a more stable, more efficient, and more resilient energy system — not simple energy trade, but a deep integration of technology and resources, a fundamental shift from “selling resources” to “building systems.”

V. The Coupling of Technology and Finance: The Necessity of Patient Capital

At the intersection of technology and finance, a profound structural contradiction also exists. Hard technologies — green hydrogen, nuclear fusion, next-generation energy storage, fourth-generation photovoltaics — share common characteristics: long lead times, large upfront capital requirements, and high tolerance for failure. Yet the logic of conventional finance runs directly counter to each of these.

Commercial banks report quarterly returns and cannot accept payback periods of more than a decade. Venture capital favours asset-light software models and struggles with capital-intensive hardware projects. Capital markets lack tolerance for technological uncertainty. The result is that a large number of promising hard technology projects perish in the “valley of death” — the perilous transition period between the laboratory and commercial viability.

Escaping this predicament requires new financial instruments and a new conception of capital. Securitisation of intellectual property can convert technology patents into tradable financial assets, providing liquidity to early-stage technologies. Hybrid debt-equity instruments find middle ground between risk and return, attracting different types of capital. Phased risk-hedging mechanisms allow capital to enter and exit in an orderly manner at different levels of technological maturity, rather than rushing in only after all uncertainties have been resolved.

Behind all this lies the most fundamental shift: from flight capital to patient capital. Not pouring in only when a technology has matured, but committing firmly at the earliest stage when support is most needed. This amounts to a profound internal adjustment for any financial system. For China and Russia, how to design such capital mechanisms within a bilateral framework is a strategic question worthy of serious attention.

VI. Pricing Finance and Energy: Monetising the Green Premium

At the intersection of finance and energy, the central issue is pricing the carbon footprint — or, to put it differently, turning the green premium from an economic concept into a market reality.

The green premium is the additional cost of clean energy relative to fossil fuels. This gap will not disappear on its own. To expect technological progress alone to solve the problem is an overly optimistic simplification. In fact, between technological maturity and large-scale deployment lies a chasm composed of financing costs, policy uncertainty, and market frictions. Bridging this chasm is precisely where financial engineering is needed.

In practical terms, the available instruments include: cross-border green power certification, which makes the environmental value of clean electricity traceable and tradable; blockchain-based carbon asset development, which increases the transparency and liquidity of carbon markets and reduces the risk of fraud and double counting; and transition finance frameworks, which provide structured funding pathways for high-carbon industries to shift toward low-carbon operations. Building on these instruments, a more forward-looking idea is the establishment of a joint China-Russia carbon market — or at least the formation of a regional carbon price signal to hedge against the volatility of global carbon markets.

The significance of this direction goes beyond environmental benefits. A carbon market that can truly price, trade, and hedge risk means that the green premium is no longer a passive cost burden but can become an active source of value. This is the process of transforming constraints into assets, and a key step from passive response to active rule-setting.

VII. From Vision to Implementation: Standards, Risk, and Talent

Any strategy that remains at the level of vision will eventually become a castle in the air. Translating the above directions into reality requires three concrete institutional levers.

The first lever is mutual recognition of standards. In technical areas such as green hydrogen certification, grid interconnection protocols, and carbon accounting methodologies, there is no market without common standards. The battle over standards is, in essence, the battle over markets. If China and Russia can establish bilateral or even regional common standards in these areas, they can take the initiative in the reshaping of global rules, rather than passively accepting rules set by others.

The second lever is risk sharing. The high risk associated with early-stage technology projects is something no single actor can bear alone. Establishing a bilateral technology transition guarantee fund — with an initial focus on early-stage “energy + AI” projects — to use public capital to leverage private capital and spread early-stage technological risk, is a path worth exploring. This is not a subsidy, but a risk layering mechanism.

The third lever is talent mobility. Technology can be imported, institutions can be imitated, but the cross-border and cross-discipline “translators” — those compound talents who understand both Russian energy data and Chinese grid technologies — can only be cultivated domestically. Joint training, joint research, and joint laboratories are not optional additions, but the underlying infrastructure upon which all of the above cooperation depends.

VIII. A Symphony, Not a Solo: Toward the True Frontier of Growth

High-quality development has never been a solo performance by any one country, but a symphony of global value chains.

In this symphony, China’s role is to provide manufacturing capacity, digital infrastructure, and financial resources. Russia’s role is to provide energy endowments, land space, and the bridge connecting Europe and Asia. The common task is to use technology to improve the efficiency of energy and transport, and to use new financial instruments — local currency settlement, digital currencies, green bonds — to open new space for energy trade. Most importantly, stop fighting over the existing pie. Jointly make the pie larger.

Let us return to the proposition with which we began: the old model has come to an end. So what is the new model?

Perhaps an analogy can help. Energy, technology, and finance are like a triangular prism. A single beam of white light may seem unremarkable on its own. But when they converge at the right angle, they can split that light into a brilliant spectrum and ignite the next wave of growth. This is not literary rhetoric, but a substantive statement about the logic of growth — real value is never found within any single sector, but at the boundaries between them.

That is the only frontier worth pursuing.

Note: The above is a summary of author’s talk at the annual China-Russia Dialogue of the Valdai Discussion Club that took place during June 26-27, 2026 in Shanghai, China.

Editor: Zhiyu Wang