Taiwanese Politician: Beijing Is Tough on the U.S., But Soft on Taiwanese Separatists

This is the reality we are facing: Taiwan is essentially divided between pro-separation and anti-separation camps.
American support for Taiwan separation has been overt—just look at U.S. officials like Secretary of State Marco Rubio and various members of Congress. Washington is playing the “Taiwan card” to pressure Beijing, and it wields significant influence over Taiwanese society. Meanwhile, Beijing’s Taiwan policy over the past 20 years has, frankly, been a complete failure.
So under these conditions, we Taiwanese who oppose Taiwan’s separation naturally find ourselves isolated. But we believe we must persist. As for Lai Ching-te, he built his career on promoting separation and treats it like a safety net—almost a personal religion. Even if he stops talking about it under temporary U.S. pressure, he will push it forward again in the future. Taiwan’s politics, society, and military are all gradually becoming more pro-separation and increasingly de-Sinicized—an undeniable trend.
As long as Lai doesn’t see military reunification as a real possibility, he’ll double down on pushing for separation. Lai and other Taiwanese separatists reject a Chinese identity and deny Chinese culture. We cannot accept this. Still, I have to admit: people like me—those who believe Chinese culture remains mainstream in Taiwan and that Taiwanese are descended from Chinese ancestors—are becoming fewer and fewer. And because the mainland lacks both the will and the capacity to address these issues, we’re left to fend for ourselves.
Let me offer an example of my deep frustration:
Before 2016, the mainland publicly stated that without the 1992 Consensus—under which both sides acknowledged One China—cross-Strait relations would be shaken to their core. Even top mainland leaders made this claim. Then in 2016, Tsai Ing-wen came to power and openly rejected the 1992 Consensus. Did the mainland cause a political earthquake in Taiwan? No. Instead, it ramped up purchases from Taiwan.
During Ma Ying-jeou’s leadership, Taiwan’s trade surplus with the mainland was modest. But after Tsai came to power, it soared to 150 billion USD. So during her presidency, Taiwan’s stock market not only passed 10,000 points—it broke 20,000. Tax revenues surged so much she could hardly spend it all. And this was largely thanks to massive procurement from the mainland.
Why did the mainland rewarded Tsai with economic windfalls and essentially gave her a glowing report card? The mainland’s Taiwan policy—even if some of the measures to support Taiwan are well-intentioned—is fundamentally flawed. It fails to prioritize the political stance and guiding principles that should come first.Mainland China is tough on the United States, but soft on Taiwan separatists.
People in the mainland seem to think that issuing statements or publishing documents is enough to count as “doing the job.” Is that really the case? Beijing’s Taiwan policy is uninspiring and totally ineffective.
Will Mainland China Use Force to Reunify Taiwan?
Even within Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party, some are afraid of this possibility. But I say: absolutely not.
China’s foreign exchange reserves totalled roughly $2–3 trillion. Even though it has recently sold some U.S. government bonds, it still holds a huge amount of U.S. dollars there. If China were to attack Taiwan, the U.S. would simply freeze those reserves. Wouldn’t that instantly collapse the RMB? So with all that money in the U.S., do you really think Beijing would dare start a war? Of course not. Absolutely not.
If I can see this clearly, don’t you think the Taiwan separatists and the Americans can see it too? Military exercises around Taiwan may help assert sovereignty on the international stage, but they do absolutely nothing to deter separatists.
Editor: Zhiyu Wang
Anonymous
我也很憂慮,我是中國人,但我小孩讀的書是民進黨編的親日仇中教育
Anonymous
是我小孩讀的書