Nissan President Makoto Uchida and his counterpart at Honda, Toshihiro Mibe, hold a joint news conference on their merger plans.

Beyond Japan, Volkswagen also stumbles in China as Germany’s auto giants struggle to compete in the EV race. The company planed to close plants in Germany, lay off tens of thousands of staff and downsize remaining plants in the country

Volkswagen workers protested potential plant closures and pay cuts as the company struggles with declining market share in China

In the era of renewable energy and electrification, it’s clear that German and Japanese automakers are trailing behind. How is it that new Chinese players—companies barely established—are excelling in EV production, while century-old German and Japanese firms are struggling?

The traditional industry model in Japan and Germany relies on a system where a few large companies support an entire domestic supply chain. These large companies sell products globally, feeding the domestic supply chain, where many of the companies are small in scale—often referred to as “hidden champions.” Though relatively small, they hold significant market share and form the backbone of the country’s economy.

Japan’s premiere clutch manufacturer, FCC has steadily expanded its business alongside the development of the auto industry.

China’s EV players, on the other hand, rely on a fully integrated and developed domestic supply chain, something those large Japanese and German automakers lack. This creates a dilemma:

First, relying on China’s supply chain allows them to produce competitive products, but it would lead to the bankruptcy of their own small domestic suppliers, shaking the national economy and causing a sharp decline in GDP.

Second, not relying on China’s supply chain would also lead these small companies to the same outcome, as the large companies experience a decline in sales and can no longer provide enough financial support for them.

Now, Japanese and German automakers face a critical choice: ensure their own survival or protect the national economy. When forced to decide, they would probably choose the former. However, the government is unlikely to allow such a choice, which is why we see a series of trade protection policies from the EU.

When forced to make a decision, self-preservation is likely to take precedence. However, governments are unlikely to allow companies to make such a choice, which is why we see a series of trade protection measures from the European Union.

While technology is certainly important, China’s dominance in the EV market is not just due to technological advantages, but also its supply chain. This is not merely about scale or, as some argue, labor cost. Let me give you an example: As a German company, if you have a new technology, product, or feature in an emerging industry, wouldn’t you need to go through a cycle of validation, application, feedback, and improvement? Where would you validate it? Where would you apply it? The answer is clear: the largest current and future market—China. You can’t exactly validate it in a small German town with fewer than 100,000 people, can you? Even if you consider the entire EU market, it may be large, but it is mature and lacks the vitality needed to foster a emerging industry.

In fact, since the third industrial revolution, no major industrial wave has originated from Europe. This is because Europe’s dominant industries have all been built upon the achievements of the second industrial revolution. These century-old companies largely rely on the advantage they established in the 19th century, along with their technological monopolies. As a result, they have little interest in investing in emerging industries.

Moreover, from a broader trend perspective, there is a shifting dynamic between China and the EU markets, with former gradually surpassing the latter in scale. When you come to China, you quickly realize how rapidly the market is evolving. If your R&D team is based in a small town in Germany, they will struggle to keep up with these fast-paced changes. Naturally, you would move your team to a more dynamic and expansive market—China. Moreover, China has well-developed infrastructure, a stable policy and economic environment, and a highly efficient supply chain. So, why not move all production to China? Why stay in a small German town, relying on outdated market analysis, working in isolation, and incurring high R&D and production costs to produce expensive products, only to be easily outpaced by competitors in China?

Some might ask, why not move production to Vietnam or India? Here is catch: even if you produce in Vietnam or India, you would still rely on China’s supply chain. Meanwhile, both Vietnam and India struggle just to maintain a stable power supply, let alone develop a significant EV market. Even if production is set up there, most of the products will still end up being sold in China. So why bother? This is why China’s supply chain advantage is not just a matter of technology—it’s an inevitable historical trend. It can’t be curbed by a few technologies, labor cost points, or a certain percentage of tariffs. China’s advantage stems from its scale and size, as well as the hardworking, innovative, and resilient spirit of its people.

In November, BYD became the first automaker to produce 10 million EVs.

Let me give you another example: Take high-speed rail. Over the past six decades, Japan has built only about 3,000 kilometers of high-speed rail. In contrast, China has constructed 46,000 kilometers in just over a decade, stretching from temperate to tropical regions, from plateaus and frozen soils to karst landscapes.

It is clear that which country has more experience and technology in construction. China’s high-speed rail system handles over 3 billion passengers annually, which is equivalent to 20 years of operations for Japan’s Shinkansen. So, it’s equally clear which country has gained more experience in operation and management. Here’s the thing: Compared to the EU countries, Japan has the largest economy, the largest population, and the second-largest land area.

In China, an emerging industry with around 5,000 companies competing fiercely for just one year may develop at a pace that would take an industry with only 50 companies in other countries two decades to reach. This is why, in the future, the only country that could challenge China is the United States. However, it would be the United States of the 20th century—the one that shaped the global industrial landscape—rather than the deindustrialized, protectionist, and isolationist version of the U.S. we see today.

The post Why Are Century-old German Automakers Failing at EVs? first appeared on China Academy.

The post Northvolt Bankruptcy: How Europe’s Battery Ambition Failed Against China? first appeared on China Academy.

Whether through television screens or by personally experiencing BYD’s electric cars, the power source behind viewing world landmarks relies on electricity. Before electric cars, from telegraphs, telephones, wireless radios to electronic computers, electricity has repeatedly changed the world, often unnoticed.

However, the most significant impact of applying electricity to the production process was the transformation of factory operations.

In 1835, Andrew Ure described early British factories as follows: “The term Factory, in technology, designates the combined operation of many orders of work-people, adult and young, in tending with assiduous skill a system of productive manchines continuously impelled by a central power.”

The use of central power allowed for increased efficiency and coordinated operations. To Ure, this was a major breakthrough, regardless of whether the power source was wind, water, or steam. However, this meant that machines could only be placed near the central power source, limiting the division of labor. If certain machines required more power, the entire production process could come to a halt. In early factories, machines driven by overhead driveshafts lacked power if placed too far from the central power source. Machines were scattered throughout the factory, with various semi-finished products constantly shuttling between machines.

Around 1889, only about 1% of factory power came from electricity, but by 1919, this figure had exceeded 50%. With electricity, factory production efficiency significantly increased. It was not just due to better lighting but also because machine placement could be flexible, leading to the restructuring of factory layouts. An engineering manager at Westinghouse Electric at the time remarked, the greatest advantage of electrically driven machines lies in their flexibility, allowing for freer planning of the factory layout and tool placement.

This marked the beginning of the American automobile manufacturing industry. Ford Motor Company was founded in 1903, with Henry Ford aiming to increase production and lower prices to penetrate the mass market. Electric power plants quickly enabled Ford to surpass an annual production of 200,000 vehicles, a staggering number at the time.

Ford summarized, With the new electric system, each tool could finally have its own electric motor, freeing industry from constraints of belts and driveshafts… Under conditions using pulleys and belts, it was impossible to develop high-speed tools, and without high-speed tools bringing superior steel, it would be impossible to develop what we now call modern industry.

Perhaps Ford did not realize at the time that electricity would liberate factories from the restrictions of a central power source. Not only could products manufactured in factories reach the world, but the factories themselves could expand beyond borders, unrestricted by brand or the nationality of workers, with a wider horizon.

Ford automobile production line

Modern automobile production line

In economics and international trade, Greenfield investment refers to multinational companies or enterprises establishing new production facilities or businesses from scratch in foreign countries. The term Greenfield is used because it vividly expresses the concept of building new facilities from the ground up on a green field, symbolizing a fresh start. In contrast, Brownfield investment refers to expanding or renovating existing facilities.

Greenfield investments typically involve constructing new factories, office buildings, and other infrastructure, representing the establishment of entirely new businesses or production lines, thus requiring significant capital and resource investment. The term highlights the characteristic of companies building from the ground up, much like embarking on new development activities on undeveloped land.

Tesla’s Gigafactory in the Lingang New Area in Shanghai, established as its production base in China starting from scratch, is an example of a Greenfield investment. With globalization and the rise of multinational corporations, companies from developed countries are establishing factories in target markets in developing countries to avoid import barriers and tariffs, thereby reducing costs and enhancing market responsiveness.

Globalization is currently facing challenges, with advocates of comprehensive tariffs like Trump being re-elected as President of the United States. The U.S. and the EU are also imposing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, and the hopes of international trade order and emission reduction agreements are akin to activities on these “green fields.”

In the second quarter of 2024, the EU’s Greenfield investment in China reached €3.6 billion, the highest quarterly level in history. In recent years, Germany has been the largest investor in China, with German automakers leading the way, accounting for half of the EU’s total investment in China since 2022. With intensifying competition in the domestic electric vehicle market, BMW and Volkswagen have increased their stakes in their joint ventures with Huachen and Jianghuai from 50% to 75%. German OEMs are also upgrading existing production facilities to adapt to China’s rapid shift towards electric vehicles. If industries like chemicals, information and communication technology, and machinery providing products for the automotive supply chain are included, the overall contribution to the automotive sector is even more significant.

In the early October vote on EU tariffs on Chinese cars, countries like Germany, Hungary, and Slovakia cast dissenting votes, considering the mutual Greenfield investments between China and these countries, which is not surprising. This also reflects differing views among European companies regarding the Chinese market. Some German automakers, in a more challenging competitive environment, are choosing to double down on investments in China, leveraging localization and self-sufficiency to reduce the risks of trade frictions.

In the automotive sector, significant investments in greenfield projects in China do not imply a threat posed by Chinese electric vehicles. It is a distortion to equate Chinese manufacturing with Chinese brands. The market share of Chinese brand electric vehicles in Europe should not be selectively exaggerated. In the pure electric vehicle market in Europe, European brands hold over half of the market share, American brands occupy 20%, and Chinese domestic brands are less than 10%. Chinese companies are relatively newcomers in the European market and do not pose the threat as artificially portrayed.

Among the Chinese electric vehicles exported to Europe, the majority are Western brands manufactured in China, with less than half being local Chinese brands. Tesla’s Shanghai factory exported 340,000 electric vehicles in 2023, with half of them going to Europe. Alongside international brands like Renault and BMW, Western brands constitute close to 60% of the market share.

Conversely, European manufacturing does not equate to European brands anymore. With Chinese companies venturing into greenfield investments, this is no longer the exclusive domain of multinational corporations from developed countries.

Chinese companies accelerated their internationalization efforts post-2000. Companies like Great Wall Motors and Chery began preliminary market development and export trials in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. By around 2010, these companies shifted towards a greenfield investment model, setting up overseas factories directly to reduce transportation costs and enhance product localization. Geely expanded its international business footprint through a combination of acquisitions and greenfield investments, not only constructing new facilities in Sweden and the UK but also expanding its global production network through the acquisition of Volvo Cars. BYD actively established electric vehicle and battery manufacturing plants overseas, particularly focusing on production facilities in Europe. In recent years, Great Wall Motors accelerated its global market production capacity layout by constructing factories in countries like Russia and Thailand.

Overall, the entry mode for Chinese investors has shifted from acquisitions to greenfield projects. From 2005 to 2022, mergers and acquisitions accounted for 70% of the announced outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) transaction value by Chinese companies. Since 2016, Chinese companies’ M&A activities have significantly decreased, with the relative share of mergers dropping from 85% in 2016 to 50% in 2021, and further declining to only 15% in the first half of 2024.

The reasons for this shift include increased regulatory barriers both domestically and internationally, leading to significant slowdown in M&A activities as Chinese companies face pressure. The announced transaction value of Chinese M&A deals has decreased from $240 billion in 2016 to $20 billion in 2023. Additionally, Chinese companies have mainly served overseas markets through exports. With the rise in overseas trade barriers, pressures for supply chain diversification, and intensified competition in industries like electric vehicles and batteries, capital-intensive sectors have seen a surge in greenfield investments. Since 2022, the value of greenfield projects has reached 80% of total outbound foreign direct investment.

In recent years, China’s outbound direct investment has shifted from developed economies to Asia and emerging economies. Since 2017, Asia has become the largest recipient of Chinese outbound direct investment. Investments in countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore have all exceeded $1 billion in 2023 and 2024. Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East have also become significant recipients of Chinese capital over the past five years.

However, Europe remains a crucial destination for Chinese capital, especially in the realm of new energy investments. There has been a fundamental change in Chinese investments in Europe. While the share of China’s greenfield investments in Europe was only 2% in 2017 and averaged 9% from 2012 to 2021, it surged to 51% in 2022 and skyrocketed to 78% by 2023. Hungary has taken the lead in attracting investments related to electric vehicles, followed by the traditional powerhouses of the UK, France, and Germany, with countries like Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia also securing some projects.

Over the past two years, Chinese companies’ investments in the European electric vehicle supply chain have been more prominent than ever before. Last year, investments related to Chinese electric vehicles reached €4.7 billion, accounting for approximately 70% of China’s total direct investment in the EU. The largest investments included significant ventures by CATL and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt Co. in constructing battery factories. It has been reported that more than ten Chinese power battery companies have announced plans to establish manufacturing facilities in Europe, including CATL, AESC Technology, EVE Energy, Gotion High-Tech, SVOLT, Pykib Technology, CALB Group, and Sunwoda Electronic.

Not only battery manufacturers but also automotive companies are accelerating their overseas expansion. Chery announced plans to revamp a factory in Barcelona, Spain, previously abandoned by Nissan. Chery will operate the Spanish plant in collaboration with Spanish automotive brand Ebro Motors, which has been defunct for 36 years and stands to benefit from Chery’s manufacturing expertise and electric vehicle technology. BYD’s estimated investment in Hungary is in the billions of euros, with an annual production capacity exceeding 150,000 vehicles. BYD has partnered with France’s Forvia for local supply agreements, established a joint venture, and attracted Austrian suppliers. However, BYD also announced that initially, it would import batteries from China and use Chinese steel for building the Hungarian plant.

In summary, Chinese companies are maturing and utilizing outbound direct investments to truly internationalize their businesses, rather than solely focusing on strategic or hedging asset acquisitions.

In the early waves of outbound investments, Chinese companies often targeted stakes in upstream natural resource assets such as oil, gas, or trophy assets like the Waldorf Astoria hotel. Today, Chinese companies are increasingly shifting their focus from strategic asset acquisitions and leveraging their own assets and advantages to establish a foothold in new markets. This is evident in the investment patterns within the electric vehicle industry. In the past, Chinese investments were relatively small, primarily concentrating on acquiring stakes in upstream resources like lithium mines. Now, companies like BYD have established technological and scale advantages and are utilizing foreign direct investment to capitalize on these advantages, localize production in key markets, and gain more market share in overseas electric vehicle markets, similar to how foreign automotive manufacturers entered China three decades ago.

The benefits of greenfield investments are well-known, including knowledge spillovers, job creation, and economic growth. European countries welcome Chinese investments in the electric vehicle industry, partly to revitalize their manufacturing sector. Additionally, China can transform the European new energy vehicle market, providing more choices for European consumers while reducing carbon emissions. Through equipment and technological support, Chinese enterprises are deeply involved in Europe’s zero-emission transition, accelerating the development of a green transportation system. BYD’s electric buses are now operational in over 100 major cities across 20 European countries.

Welcome Chinese investments also help ensure that European manufacturers face a certain level of competitive pressure. Without this competition, the drive for innovation and efficiency improvement among European companies may decrease. Chinese companies can also increase employment of local European staff. As reported, by 2023, the proportion of Chinese employees in CATL’s German factory was 40%, which, even though relatively high, still means that the majority of employees are local Europeans. The CATL project in Hungary, producing battery cells and modules, is expected to create 9,000 new jobs.

Lastly, a mention of the situation in the United States. In May 2024, the Biden administration raised tariffs on Chinese electric cars to 102.5%, essentially shutting them out. While the U.S. formally remains open to Chinese investments in electric vehicles, some projects have faced intense political backlash, such as Chinese battery manufacturer Gotion High-tech’s plans to build factories in Michigan and Illinois. Investments that are less obviously “Chinese,” such as the battery factories built by AESC and Volvo in South Carolina, have faced relatively less resistance.

Today, Trump has returned to office. While he hopes to block the import of Chinese cars, he remains open to Chinese companies hiring American workers through greenfield investments. Recently, Zeng Yuqun also indicated that if Trump opens the door for Chinese companies to invest in the electric vehicle supply chain in the U.S., CATL will consider building a factory there.

Trump has previously stated that in order to compel car manufacturers to relocate production lines to the U.S., he will impose high tariffs on imported cars, including those from Europe. He specifically called out Mercedes-Benz for conducting mere assembly work in the U.S., a production model he deemed unfair to American workers. High tariffs could force European car manufacturers to reassess their production and supply chain layouts. For car manufacturers relying on parts and raw materials from low-cost countries like China, this poses a difficult choice. Additionally, despite Musk’s moderation, Trump may still overturn Biden’s new vehicle emission standards and cut electric vehicle subsidy policies.

The response of the Chinese automotive industry will undoubtedly involve greater openness to the outside world. In European Union Chamber of Commerce in China’s latest European Business in China Position Paper 2024-2025 by the Automotive Working Group, the primary recommendations include comprehensive opening of the automotive industry, specifying market access requirements and approval processes for automotive manufacturing investments. Other key recommendations include: constructing a feasible cross-border data transfer regulatory framework for car companies, creating a legislative environment conducive to the sustainable development of new energy vehicles that is predictable, non-discriminatory, and balanced, ensuring transparent development of policies for intelligent connected vehicle driving for foreign companies, and allowing imported cars to participate in intelligent connected vehicle access and on-road pilot runs. These policy recommendations are likely under consideration.

Over a hundred years ago, as electricity began to drive factories, the reorganization of machinery locations fundamentally changed factory efficiency. Over fifty years ago, as multinational giants emerged, the geographical dispersion of production significantly reduced costs, mitigated risks, and made the global supply chain a major advantage.

Factories relying on equipment centralized in a central power source could not have given birth to Ford cars, nor could they have given birth to what Ford referred to as the “modern industry.” Forcing companies to centralize supply chains through policies and tariff measures will only significantly increase the fragility and uncertainty of the supply chain. Any problem in any part could lead to severe supply chain disruptions. During Trump’s first term, especially during the pandemic, people have already seen the consequences of this.

It is precisely because of this objective law that in Trump’s second term, no matter what means are used, Chinese companies cannot ultimately be stopped from going abroad, nor can overseas companies be stopped from continuing to invest in China.

The post Trump Cannot Stop Chinese Electric Cars from Going Global first appeared on China Academy.

A Japanese attendee was seen lying on the ground photographing the car’s chassis at an expo held in Tokyo.

Learning Through Disassembly

In 2021, NHK, Japan’s renowned public broadcaster, aired a program showcasing the disassembly of a Chinese Wuling Hongguang MINI EV. By the end of the show, the host and a correspondent looked visibly concerned, admitting, “If this enters the Japanese market, it would pose a serious threat to domestic brands”

In the NHK program, a Wuling Hongguang MINI EV was sent to Nagoya University for disassembly.

Recently, Japanese trading firm Sanyo Trading purchased 16 Chinese EV models, including BYD’s ATTO 3 and NIO’s ET5, for disassembly. They plan to expand this effort by disassembling more models from brands like Li Auto, AITO, and even Xiaomi to uncover the reasons behind the success of Chinese EVs.

Disassembled BYD’s Atto 3 EV on display

Nikkei BP, Japan’s largest publisher, has also joined the disassembly frenzy. They published a 350-page book documenting the entire process of disassembling BYD’s Seal, complete with a DVD featuring teardown footage. Priced at $5,700, a package with additional services costs up to $8,600. In September, Nikkei BP bought a Zeekr 007 from China for similar scrutiny.

Toyota, one of Japan’s “Big Three” automakers, has reportedly torn apart several BYD models, including the Han EV, Tang DM, Dolphin, and Yuan PLUS, for detailed study.

But what exactly have the Japanese uncovered?

Low Cost, High Performance

First, Japanese analysts concluded that “Chinese automakers excel at low-cost production,” thanks to two key factors:

Highly Integrated Components: Chinese EVs integrate multiple key components into single units. For instance, their “E-Axle” system combines eight critical parts—including the motor, inverter, reducer, onboard charger, and DC-DC converter—reducing production costs, vehicle weight, and failure rates while simplifying maintenance.

E-Axle electric drive system integrates eight components into a single unit.

Localized Supply Chains and Shared Components: Many Chinese automakers source components domestically or produce them in-house, allowing for greater parts standardization across models. BYD, for instance, slashes costs by producing components in-house and sharing them across its lineup.

BYD Battery Production Line

NHK’s teardown of the Wuling Hongguang MINI EV revealed that its key electrical components—such as batteries, semiconductors, and capacitors—were entirely sourced from Chinese suppliers, with no parts from Japanese firms.

Masayoshi Yamamoto, a former professor at Nagoya University who participated in the teardown, remarked that the MINI EV’s cost control and precise design target were unmatched. “With Japan’s current supply chain, it’s impossible to produce an EV of the same quality and price,” he admitted.

Second, Chinese automakers excel in software and algorithm development. Nikkei BP’s teardown of the Zeekr 007 highlighted its cutting-edge integrated die-casting technology and 800V high-voltage drivetrain. The vehicle’s high-performance ECU (Electronic Control Unit) features NVIDIA’s in-car SoC (System on Chip), supporting advanced driver-assistance systems (ADAS) with sensors like LiDAR.

While Japanese automakers excel in precision manufacturing, their struggles in software and algorithms underscore their lag in EV technology.

The Unreplicable Chinese Model

After tearing down the cars, Japanese automakers realized that even if they reassembled an identical vehicle using the same components, they might not match China’s cost or performance. This situation is reminiscent of DJI, the Chinese drone giant. While many of DJI’s components are sourced from the global supply chain, the U.S. has failed five times to sanction the company effectively. The reason? Products with comparable configurations in the U.S. market are typically 3-4 times more expensive and fall short in performance.

DJI MAVIC 3

Banning DJI would drastically increase the cost of drone procurement, creating challenges for various public service sectors and industries in the U.S. Similarly, the core competitive advantage of Chinese EVs and DJI drones lies in their ability to deliver low cost and high performance.

Japanese Automakers’ Ongoing Anxiety

Despite the competition, Japanese automakers retain certain advantages. As the world’s third-largest auto producer, Japanese cars are celebrated for their fuel efficiency, durability, and high resale value. Some engines from brands like Toyota and Honda have operated flawlessly for decades. Japan also dominates the global power semiconductor market, with five of the top ten players hailing from the country. Companies like Mitsubishi Electric, Fuji Electric, Toshiba, Renesas, and ROHM collectively hold over 20% of the global market share. ROHM alone controls more than 10% of the silicon carbide (SiC) power semiconductor market and 15-20% of the SiC wafer market.

While the global automobile market is still dominated by gas-power from brands like Toyota, Volkswagen, and Honda, Japan’s frantic effort to dissect Chinese EVs signals the mounting pressure Chinese automakers are placing on their Japanese counterparts. According to data from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers, Japanese cars held a 23.1% market share in China in 2020. By the first four months of 2024, that figure had plummeted to just 12.2%. In contrast, the market share of Chinese brands surged from 38.4% to 60.7% over the same period.

Clearly, relying on teardown strategies alone won’t solve the challenges Japanese automakers face. In the end, they may be left grappling with the anxiety of being fully outpaced by their Chinese competitors.

Masayoshi Yamamoto and his team at Nagoya University has begun disassembling Xiaomi’s SU7

The post To Uncover the Secret, the Japanese Tear Down Chinese EVs first appeared on China Academy.

China’s EV manufacturers, however, had already been eyeing Europe for production. SAIC, China’s second-largest auto exporter, is scouting European sites for an EV factory and plans to open a second European parts center in France this year to support growing demand for its MG brand. Italy is negotiating with China’s largest exporter, Chery, along with other Chinese automakers like Dongfeng, for potential investments.

SAIC Motor’s new EV model, MG4 ELECTRIC, departed from Haitong port in Shanghai and handed to Europe

Yet, Chinese companies are cautious about investing in countries that have backed the EU’s tariffs, wary of potential future obstacles even after establishing factories on European soil. This caution could make France and Italy’s hopes of attracting Chinese investment little more than wishful thinking.

France’s EV industry has struggled from the outset, hampered by a fragile supply chain. President Emmanuel Macron’s plan to stimulate the French market with Chinese EVs and accelerate the green transition may now be at risk. Not only has the EV industry failed to thrive, but the ripple effects have unsettled other sectors.

This isn’t an exaggeration.

French cognac producers are already on edge. Over these months, as a countermeasure to dumping, China planned to slap additional tariffs on European spirits. On September 17, French cognac makers took to the streets in protest, unwilling to let their industry pay the price for EU-China tensions over EVs. According to AFP, this was the first protest by French cognac producers since 1998, drawing around 800 people accompanied by 100 tractors in the southwestern French town of Cognac.

Cognac winegrowers hold up banners reading “the cognac sector sacrificed” during a demonstration in Cognac

The French cognac industry fears it could “disappear from the Chinese market,” which accounts for a quarter of its exports. For some producers, China represents up to 60% of their sales. Any countermeasures by China could be devastating.

After China’s Ministry of Commerce announced on October 8 that it would impose temporary anti-dumping measures on EU brandy imports, shares of French spirits companies fell sharply, with Rémy Cointreau dropping 9.3% and Pernod Ricard down 4.6%.

A cellar at the Hennessy cognac factory in France, storing aged spirits and samples.

Noting the cognac industry’s growing concerns, the French government has promised support. Benjamin Haddad, Minister Delegate for European Affairs, recently stated that the EU and France will support cognac makers impacted by the China-EU trade tensions and may even consider providing financial aid.

Haddad’s assurances rely heavily on the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, which offers various support mechanisms in exceptional cases, including a crisis reserve fund. But with European agriculture already hit by the Russia-Ukraine war—rising fuel costs and an influx of cheap Ukrainian products straining farmers—EU agricultural funds now require at least €450 million in allocations. This doesn’t even account for the emergency support the EU has provided to member states affected by frost damage this year. In recent years, Europe has seen an increase in natural disasters, raising doubts about how long this fund can hold out. There’s hardly any extra left to support France’s cognac industry—when people are struggling to put food on the table, who’s thinking about drinking brandy?

What worries the EU even more is that if it decides to support France’s cognac industry, it will also have to extend support to other sectors affected by China-EU trade tensions.

Take the European dairy and pork industries. Europe’s pig farming industry sees growing concerns over China-EU trade fractions. According to INAPORC (France’s pork industry federation), if China sets tariffs between 30% and 60%, the European pig farming sector could face losses of up to €7 billion, with France alone losing €500 million.

China is Europe’s largest pork export market. Higher tariffs could weaken this trade, flooding domestic markets in France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Denmark with surplus pork.

For France, China is particularly valuable as a market for pork offal, ears, and trotters. Anne Richard, Director of INAPORC, emphasized that only Chinese consumers buy these products in such quantities and at such prices. As Arnaud Rousseau, head of France’s FNSEA (the largest farmers’ union), put it, “We’re very concerned. Certain parts of the pig aren’t eaten here and need a market. China is crucial. If we can’t trade with certain countries, problems will arise quickly.”

The French dairy sector also anticipates trouble. In June, the Chinese dairy industry requested a subsidy investigation into EU imports. Such actions align with China’s laws to ensure fair competition and protect domestic industries. Applications that meet the filing requirements will proceed through the official investigation process and be publicly announced in accordance with the law.

China’s customs data reveals that the EU is China’s second-largest source of dairy imports, accounting for 36% of its total in 2023, following New Zealand. EU data indicates that in 2022, China imported €1.7 billion worth of European dairy products, including whey powder, butter, and fresh milk, with major exporters like the Netherlands, France, Germany, Ireland, and Denmark highly dependent on the Chinese market.

Recently, Les Echos reported on China’s dairy import trends, noting that as the world’s largest dairy importer, China imported €11.13 billion in dairy products last year, primarily including milk powder, infant formula, and whey powder. Although dairy consumption has steadily increased in Chinese diets in recent years, supported by government’s encouragement, per capita dairy consumption in China still falls below the global average. Over the past decade, French cheese exports to China have surged by 286%, reaching 6,306 tons in 2023, as a wide variety of French cheeses continue to attract growing interest and appreciation from Chinese consumers.

Chinese consumers shopping for dairy products in a supermarket.

With such a promising market, no one wants to lose out, and China has plenty of options. In 2022, France ranked as China’s fourth-largest dairy supplier, while China became France’s largest non-EU export market for dairy products. President Macron invested significant effort to get French dairy companies onto the “farm-to-Chinese-table” fast track, but now he himself has derailed that train.

Some analysts suggest that France’s auto industry is weaker than Germany’s, particularly in the EV sector, making it more vulnerable to competition from Chinese electric vehicles. According to French customs data, imports of Chinese cars to France rose by 154% from 2021 to 2022, with the share of EVs increasing from 7% in 2021 to 26% in the first five months of 2023—a proportion that even surpasses Germany’s 20%.

While Chinese electric vehicles still represent a limited share of the overall French auto market, the French government has shown unwavering commitment to its green transition goals, emphasizing market protection and localized supply chains. This naturally led to its firm stance on imposing tariffs on Chinese EVs.

However, it seems President Macron underestimated China’s resolve to protect its interests. He believed that imposing tariffs would pressure China’s EV industry into compliance and encourage companies to set up factories in France, thus localizing the supply chain and allowing France to lead the global green transition—a symbolic move, given that the Paris Agreement was signed in France.

Back in June, Le Monde columnist Stéphane Lauer noted in his column that relying solely on EU tariffs against Chinese EVs wouldn’t be enough; Europe would need to close its industrial and technological gaps as well. Macron took this advice, hoping to leverage Chinese industry to accelerate France’s green ambitions, but his tariff strategy has clearly fallen short.
Now, France’s cognac, pork, and dairy industries are caught in what can only be described as a “collective panic,” realizing that Chinese countermeasures could spell disaster for these sectors.

Macron officially inaugurated the 90th edition of the Paris Motor Show

Other French industries are feeling the strain too, uncertain about which sector might be targeted next. Will France’s luxury goods sector feel the impact? Could cooperation in high-tech pharmaceuticals, communications, or aerospace face cuts?

According to French media, Sophie Primas, Minister Delegate for Foreign Trade and Overseas French Nationals, is set to address China’s planned tariffs on brandy imports, along with new investigations into the dairy and pork sectors, during her visit to the China International Import Expo in Shanghai. This gesture signals a willingness for dialogue, but without genuine concessions, her visit may amount to little more than a symbolic move.

Although the EU has formally approved steep tariffs on Chinese EV imports, internal divisions are evident. And Europe’s troubles are far from over; EU nations are bracing for a potential return of Donald Trump. During Trump’s last term, some trade disputes between Brussels and Washington were left unresolved. Should Trump return, a renewed trade war between the U.S. and the EU seems almost inevitable.

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But this seemingly “boring” video soon gained widespread attention, garnering over 1.78 million views and more than 4,500 comments. The video has sparked such heated debate to the point that the creator felt the need to address the criticisms directly. Here is what he posted in response to all the speculation:

“A few answers to the frequently asked questions I’m seeing:

1. How much did the government pay you? Answer: Nothing, I was paid $0 to make this video. I just took a private trip to China and brought my cameras.

2. Was this a government-sponsored trip? Answer: No, I chose the factories I wanted to visit and a Florida-based bicycle trade group helped me with connections. I’m just a private guy with a few cameras.

3. What if the factories hid the stuff they didn’t want you to see? Answer: They probably did.

4. Why aren’t you eating meat? Answer: Health and environmental reasons. Why does what I eat bother you so much?

5. Why didn’t you go to a labor camp? Answer: Because my channel is about bikes, so that’s what I went to see. When I visit the U.S. for videos, I don’t go film child labor abuses or the lack of affordable healthcare.

6. Why do you support the CCP? Answer: I don’t. I ride bikes.

I hope this helped answer any burning questions!”

The blogger visited the Chinese electric bicycle manufacturer Yadea and took a ride with employees from the company’s PR department.

Admittedly, the video does a fair job of displaying the strength of Chinese manufacturing. Many of these factories supply core components to well-known Western electric bike brands. The workshops in the video are clean and organized, their cafeterias serve a variety of meals, the electric bikes are stylish, and test facilities look pretty cool.

Video screenshot

Video screenshot

Video screenshot

Video screenshot

Video screenshot

However, accusing “EbikeSchool” of doing the CCP’s propaganda work seems quite odd, considering how China’s electric bike industry ranks low on its industrial ladder, dwarfed by all the advancements made in other industries such as electric cars, semiconductors, and even robotics. This YouTube vlogger’s experience has therefore surprised many Chinese viewers.

Ning Nanshan, a Chinese industrial vlogger with millions of followers, commented on the vlogger’s experience, stating, “Even today, average Westerners still hold a negative image of China as poor, backward, and closed off.”

On China’s largest political website, Guancha.cn, over 27,000 readers have read about this vlogger’s experience, with more than 400 comments—exceeding the typical engagement rate for 90% of articles on the site.

We’ve gathered some of the most upvoted comments to see how Chinese readers view the situation. Most of the discussions revolved around the power of movies, information cocoon, internet trolling and cognitive inertia. Let’s dive in.

A: The Power of Movies

One group of Chinese readers holds artistic works accountable for perpetuating a false image of China,while others consider these works to have limited influence.

@guan_15926247762244 (871 likes)

“Thanks to Chinese filmmakers! Thanks to them!”

Editor’s note: It’s an ironic comment on the significant portion of Chinese films that win awards abroad which set their stories in poor or chaotic regions of China. This has sparked debates in the Chinese-speaking internet about whether “Chinese directors have purposefully chosen stories that cast Chinese in a negative light to cater to overseas tastes.”

Examples:

• Red Sorghum won the Golden Bear at the 38th Berlin Film Festival in 1988.

• The Story of Qiu Ju won the Golden Lion at the Venice Film Festival in 1992.

• Still Life won the Golden Lion at the 63rd Venice Film Festival in 2006.

• Black Coal, Thin Ice won the Golden Bear at the 64th Berlin Film Festival in 2014.

@快乐生活 raised a different opinion:

“Sure, these are poor areas of China, but showing their survival struggles isn’t inherently wrong.”

“In U.S. movies, politicians are often mocked. Hollywood even made Abraham Lincoln: Vampire Hunter and Abraham Lincoln vs. Zombies in the same year as the movie Lincoln!”

@zheng20 responded:

“The examples you mentioned are of a very different nature than the Chinese movies in quesion. Mocking politicians is part of America’s political show, just as we enjoy bashing officials.

To draw the proper paralel, it would be as if American filmmakers made films about how a homeless person who falls into drug addiction and gang fighting with politicians and governmental officials stand on the sidelines indifferently. The films would conclude by placing the blame for all darkness on capitalism. If such film won awards in Asia, that would be the proper parallel… Of course, no Western director would dare to do so”

@h20j20 (18 likes) doesn’t believe that films hold as much influence:

“Don’t think every foreigner is watching Chinese films. Most of them probably haven’t seen more than two in their lifetime. They just want to see a poor and backward China, and select the films and news that satisfy this expectation.

Google Maps shows street views of the entire world, yet how many Westerners use it to refresh their impression of China?”

B: The Unbreakable “Information Cocoon”

Aside from movies, another term frequently mentioned in the comments is the “information cocoon.” However, users have different interpretations of its cause.

@leeuk(417 likes):

“They choose to live in an information cocoon, what can we do about it?”

@白马菜农(13 likes):

“It’s not entirely the information cocoon. I once spoke with a Chinese person who moved to the U.S. long ago. This person wasn’t anti-China, but when I shared objective facts, they thought I was brainwashed or paid by the government. If that happens with them, imagine how it is for regular Westerners.”

@搞机械的如若(113 likes):

“When it comes to perceptions, no one can do anything about it; they’ll wake up when they get hit hard enough. The Qing Dynasty only woke up after foreign invasions.”

@回笼觉主(13 likes):

“The West’s ‘information cocoon’ is just a fragile shell. Breaking through is simple—send our warships to the Atlantic or participate in military exhibitions in Europe. That will burst the bubble quickly.”

C: Internet Trolling

There are also a significant number of Chinese readers who brush aside the attack on “EbikeSchool” as internet trolling which doesn’t represent how majority of Westerners think of China.

@河豚(19 likes):

“U.S. trolls mainly target China and Russia. Any video reflecting the reality of China would attract this kind of attack.”

@tiger2004:

“This isn’t surprising. Travel vloggers often face comments like ‘How much did the Chinese government pay you?’ or ‘Was your trip sponsored?’ on YouTube.”

@二马姥爺(6 likes):

“No, no, no. It’s not ‘most Westerners,’ just a small group of online bullies, like our own internet trolls. They don’t represent the majority.”

D:Western cognitive inertia

Some Chinese readers believes false report on China from the West stem from a superiority complex that they refuse to shed in the face of China’s rise.

@guan_16479181252471:

“An impoverished noble woud never respect a well-off commoner.”

@黑客行:

“It’s not that Westerners still think of China as poor and backward—they need to believe it, or their sense of superiority collapses.”

@我真是个笨蛋(9 likes):

“Ignorance and prejudice are not the same. For example, most Chinese people don’t have a clear idea of what Iceland is like. That’s simple ignorance, but we don’t hate or reject Iceland.

In contrast, Western views on China are driven by certain media narratives, making them believe China is a backward, authoritarian country. Breaking through ignorance is easy, but overcoming prejudice is hard.”

@如胜7523658 (56 likes):
“It’s like during the Ming Dynasty when Chinese thought of Europe as a barbaric place.”

Among these 400+ comments, some step away from the issue itself and take a look at the bigger picture:

@大白兔面包

“Aren’t there also many Chinese people speculating Western propaganda? Anytime someone mentions something positive about the West, they face all kinds of accusations here too…”

@相见欢:

“The ‘information cocoon’ goes both ways. Strange questions similar to those directed at the youtuber can also be found in this comment sections.”

@陈涉 quoted Joseph Goebbels’ propaganda philosophy:

“The purpose of propaganda is to lead the masses, making them think and act according to our will.”

“As long as we continue to create enemies, the people will support our war.”

“Our propaganda must be simple and clear so that even the most foolish can understand it.”

“A good lie is more powerful than a hundred bad truths.”

“If you tell a lie, make it a big one, so people will believe you.”

“Propaganda is not to persuade people, but to keep them firm in their beliefs.”

“As long as we control the media, we can control the people.”

“Through repetition and persistence, even falsehoods can become truths.”

“War is merely the continuation of propaganda.”

@CloudEastWind:

“This is the result of media and information control. On one hand, China is portrayed as poor and backward; on the other hand, there’s the ‘China threat.’ What a contradiction!”

In conclusion, we must admit the challenges of escaping the “information cocoon” due to the limited personal experience for either Chinese or overseas internet users. But at the end of the day, strength speaks, louder than any videos do,propaganda or not.

The post A YouTuber in the Aftermath of Accusations of Chinese Government Propaganda first appeared on China Academy.

As the U.S. presidential election approaches, a new wave of legislative efforts targeting China is sweeping through American politics. Both Democratic and Republican candidates are competing to show their tough stance on China, especially with relentless moves against China’s emerging industries, like EVs.

For example, on September 23, the U.S. Department of Commerce officially announced a proposal to ban the use of key Chinese hardware and software in smart vehicles within the U.S. The final rule is expected to be confirmed by January 20 next year.

It is worth mentioning that the two parties, which have always had opposing ideas, rarely reached a consensus on the issue of imposing tariffs on Chinese imports.

As early as May 14, the White House issued an announcement announcing additional tariffs on $18 billion worth of products imported from China. According to the document published by the FACT SHEET: President Biden Takes Action to Protect American Workers and Businesses from China’s Unfair Trade Practices published by the White House, the United States will impose tariffs ranging from 25% to 100% on the following products from China:

The list of Chinese products subjected the increased tariff imposed by the U.S. (Source: Visual Capitalism)

As of now, since 80% of U.S. port cranes are manufactured by China’s ZPMC, the proposal to impose tariffs has faced strong opposition from American industries. As a result, products like port cranes have been added to a list for delayed implementation, while other measures are still gradually advancing.

Joe Biden addressed in front of Chinese cranes.

Seeing the Biden administration’s bold moves, it’s no surprise that the typically aggressive Donald Trump would not be outdone—he has promised to push for even harsher measures.

In an interview with Time magazine, Trump stated that if re-elected in November, he would impose even more tariffs on China. He plans to levy a 60% tariff on all Chinese goods and a minimum 10% tariff on $3 trillion worth of all U.S. imports. This approach, even more aggressive than his previous trade war with China, is aimed at reducing federal income taxes and replacing that revenue with tariffs.

There seems to be a sense of urgency in U.S. politics, as if America believes that failing to act now will mean losing its grip on global dominance. To counter this, the U.S. is mobilizing all its resources, building a “small yard, high fence” strategy. Beyond imposing tariffs, it is restructuring supply chains through near shoring and friend-shoring, either persuading or pressuring allies and ideologically aligned nations to join in containing China.

For example, Canada, after detaining Meng Wanzhou at the behest of the U.S., once again followed America’s lead by mirroring its punitive tariffs on China. On August 26, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that Canada would impose a 100% tariff on EVs imported from China and a 25% tariff on Chinese steel and aluminum. These tariff rates match those imposed by the U.S.

Another example is the European Union. Shortly after the U.S. announced a new round of tariffs in May, the European Commission followed suit. On June 12, it declared that, starting July 4, the EU would temporarily raise import tariffs on Chinese EVs. However, due to pressure from businesses and markets, the rates were later lowered.

Following the crackdown on Huawei, a new strategic battle to stifle China’s EVs and new energy industries is now unfolding.

Civilians are bearing the costs of politicians’ escalating tough stance on China.

Since Trump initiated the trade war with China under the guise of fair trade and balancing the U.S.-China trade deficit, the U.S. has consistently wielded the sanctions stick worldwide. It has become increasingly addicted to this approach, eager to punish anyone who doesn’t align with its interests.

Actually, trade war is always a double-edged sword, which cannot hurt the opponent without affecting the initiator himself. Indeed, Trump’s trade war, combined with Biden’s tech restrictions, has created significant challenges for China’s economy. However, most of the tariffs imposed by Trump have been passed on to American consumers, burdening U.S. businesses and the public.

As U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris stated at a campaign rally in North Carolina on September 16, Trump’s import tariffs are essentially a “Trump tax” on the American people. During a debate with Trump, Biden also harshly criticized Trump’s tariff policy, claiming it costs each American household an additional $2,500 annually.

It’s worth noting that a recent analysis by the Peterson Institute for International Economics found that if Trump were to impose a 10% tariff on all goods and a 60% tariff on China, a typical family in the middle of the income distribution would see their annual expenses increase by about $2,600.

Distribution of tax increases and reductions under Trump proposals, percent change in after-tax income (Source: PIIE)

Also, an analysis by the American Action Forum estimates that a 10% tariff could add up to $2,350 in extra costs per year for each U.S. household. Additionally, a 60% tariff on Chinese goods would further increase household expenses by an additional $1,950 annually.

Whether it’s a 25% or 60% tariff, the extra costs imposed on U.S. consumers show that the American market needs these products. If decoupling from China were truly feasible, Trump or Biden would have achieved it by now. Bold words aside, both presidents eventually realized the U.S. is too dependent on Chinese goods and resources. Immediate decoupling would be disastrous for the U.S.

Exactly, decoupling would certainly create tough times for China’s export-driven businesses for a while. However, the U.S. market could face severe shortages, with half of its goods unavailable, leaving consumers unable to purchase everyday items, even if they have the money. Life would become unmanageable.

A view of empty shelves at a local Giant supermarket in Alexandria, Virginia.

Para Bellum

“Para bellum” is a Latin phrase meaning, “If you want peace, prepare for war.” Lately, U.S. politicians have been citing this phrase, positioning themselves as innocent peacekeepers forced into conflict for the sake of peace. A striking example is the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh during his visit to Tehran. To prevent Iranian retaliation against Israel, the U.S. deployed two carrier strike groups to protect Israel.

So “para bellum” actually serves as a moral and legal pretext for them to suppress rivals and flaunt their military power. Those who frequently use this phrase are more interested in the spoils of power-driven conflict. The belief that overwhelming strength can crush any opponent is the jungle law Western powers have relied on for centuries.

Take the recent events as an example. During the UN Future Summit, the reformist Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian compromised with Israel and said that he would not retaliate against Israel for Haniyeh’s death, trying to prevent the expansion of the conflict. The result was just the opposite. Iran’s compromise was exchanged for Israel’s further encroachment. The Israeli army successively carried out pager explosions in Lebanon, killed Hezbollah leaders including Nasrallah in the bombing, and launched a ground war against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Therefore, for this kind of enemies, compromise will not bring peace, but will only make them increasingly aggressive and greedy.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell stated before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 18 that China poses the greatest comprehensive challenge in U.S. history, surpassing even the Cold War. “Frankly, the Cold War pales in comparison to the multifaceted challenges that China presents. It’s not just a military challenge; it’s across the board. It is in the Global South. It is in technology. We need to step up our game across the board.”

Both U.S. parties are unprecedentedly united in their hostile stance toward China. Regardless of who takes office next, a new round of U.S.-China trade conflict seems inevitable. Moreover, conflict may not be limited to trade alone.

Will China allow the “naive but rich” stereotype to repeat itself? Clearly not. In recent years, public discourse has shifted, with the view that “Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle” becoming a widespread consensus. The idea that “Throw out one punch now to avoid a hundred punches in the future.” is gaining acceptance. After all, if a trade war with China proves profitable without significant backfires, other countries might follow the U.S. to “feast” on China’s resources.

The post No Matter Who Wins, They Will be Enemy of the Chinese first appeared on China Academy.

In recent years, there has been a surprising decline in enrollment for civil engineering, with the field losing its former allure. It has become almost routine for civil engineering programs to struggle to attract students.

The Rise of Smart Construction

With the decline of civil engineering, some other civil-related professions have added prefixes like “smart” and “intelligent,” embracing a strong sense of technology, quietly rising in prominence.

For instance, the introduction of the Smart Construction major in 2017 at Tongji University marked the beginning of a trend. Since then, more universities have followed suit, with the number of institutions offering Smart Construction programs increasing steadily each year.

As of now, 153 universities have been approved to add new Smart Construction programs, compared to just 70 universities three years ago. Following this trend, there has been a surge in enrollment. According to a document released by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, in 2022, there were 3,562 students enrolled in Smart Construction programs nationwide, which increased to 5,539 students in 2023. Amidst this trend, there has been confusion about what exactly Smart Construction entails.

While it is categorized under civil engineering, the absence of the term “civil” in its name raises suspicions that it may simply be a rebranding of traditional civil engineering. Some even suggest that it is merely a marketing ploy to capitalize on the popularity of computer-related fields. In reality, after analyzing 55 universities offering Smart Construction programs, it is clear that these programs are often established within existing civil engineering departments, without renaming or discontinuing the original civil engineering programs.

Among them, 96.4% of universities have placed Smart Construction within the colleges of Civil Engineering, with only Jilin University of Architecture categorizing it under the College of Modern Industries, sharing a department with the Geomatics program of Remote Sensing Science and Technology.

Not only are the colleges the same, but the course catalogs of the two programs also intertwine.

We sampled six universities that offer both Smart Construction and Civil Engineering programs, and after comparing their curriculum plans, we found that from prestigious universities to regular institutions, Smart Construction includes traditional civil engineering courses such as Structural Mechanics, Soil Mechanics, and Engineering Materials, but also incorporates content on computing, machinery, and economic management, truly embracing the “smart” aspect.

The Cooling Trend of Once Popular Majors

Despite the current backlash against Civil Engineering, if we turn the clock back to a decade or so ago, the ancestors of Civil Engineering also once flourished.

From 2006 to 2015, it was hailed as the “Golden Decade of Architecture and Civil Engineering.” During that bustling period of infrastructure development, not only did skyscrapers rise from the ground, but it also nurtured the glorious peak of the Civil Engineering profession. The number of colleges offering Civil Engineering programs surged from 392 in 2008 to 572 in 2022.

Civil Engineering was riding high on a wave of success, attracting top talents, with a promising future ahead. However, all good things must come to an end.

The nationwide push for massive construction projects under the slogan “To get rich, build roads first” led to a significant increase in urbanization rates from 36.09% in 2000 to 63.89% in 2020. With the pains of transitioning the national development model and the uncertainties in the real estate sector, the soaring urbanization rate signaled a decline in the Civil Engineering industry.

The past glory of Civil Engineering, like a mirage, was overshadowed by the reality of severe supply-demand imbalances caused by the expansion of enrollment to meet the high demand. The emergence of the “Civil Engineering Exodus” was inevitable.

According to Michael’s “2024 China Undergraduate Employment Report,” the proportion of graduates entering the field of construction engineering has been decreasing year by year, with a 46% decrease in this ratio over the past five years, ranking first among 46 occupational categories.

The enthusiasm of young people for the Civil Engineering industry has been waning, leading to discouragement not only among students but also in university admissions, where cutoff scores have been consistently lowered.

Taking the highly competitive Hebei Province as an example, in recent years, among the influential “Top 8 Architecture Schools,” except for a slight rise in the lowest admission rank of Tsinghua University’s Civil Engineering program, most other schools have experienced a decline in admission rankings.

In contrast to previous years, the lowest admission rank of South China University of Technology in Hebei dropped by nearly 7,000 in 2024, while Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology plummeted by over 10,000.

The newly transformed Smart Construction field also fails to stand out. For instance, the Smart Construction program at Shenyang University of Architecture saw a decrease in the natural science admission rank in Liaoning from 41,461 in 2022 to 43,893 in 2024. Although this drop is not as significant as the three-digit drop in Civil Engineering during the same period, the struggle is evident.

To revive declining enrollments, universities are resorting to various tactics, such as including Civil Engineering in early admissions and admissions for students from impoverished backgrounds, merging it with other disciplines for broad admissions… These bewildering enrollment strategies may not be fraudulent, but they certainly give that impression. As for career choices, whether students succeed in “automation” or fail in “Civil Engineering” depends on individual circumstances.

The once prestigious Civil Engineering field, once filled with high-achieving students who had studied hard for years, is now crowded with disgruntled students looking to change majors. The shift from “entrance for high scorers” to “avoid at all costs” is both brief and glorious: missing out on the industry’s prosperity and instead encountering exorbitant housing prices, property market turbulence, and the challenges of Civil Engineering, tasting the bitter fruits of the times.

（Note：Despite the downturn in the infrastructure industry’s market environment, this is not the complete narrative. There is a young man in China, whom we have previously featured, who has chosen a different path. Cao Fengze, a graduate of China’s top university with a degree in Civil Engineering, faced employment obstacles and a sense of unfulfillment. He made the decision to travel to Tanzania to work on building hydropower plants. Three years later, he shared his experiences on Chinese internet platforms.）

Chinese Universities Adapt Majors to Changing Landscape

Not only Civil Engineering has become awkward, but according to statistics, as of July 31st this year, 19 universities in China have issued announcements to revoke or suspend admissions for a total of 99 majors. Among the disciplines that have been removed, Engineering ranks the highest, with the most number of majors being discontinued, followed by Management and Science.

With the continuous adjustment of social and economic structures, there is a noticeable increase in the number of Engineering majors being withdrawn. Similarly, Management majors are also influenced by changes in market demand. With the rapid development of emerging industries such as artificial intelligence, big data, cloud computing, and the Internet of Things, many traditional engineering majors are being phased out, while the trend of establishing new majors combining “Smart +” with traditional engineering is emerging.

The Chinese Ministry of Education has explicitly stated that by 2025, around 20% of university disciplines will be optimized and adjusted. Meanwhile, a new batch of disciplines that adapt to new technologies, industries, formats, and models will be established, while outdated disciplines that do not align with economic and social development will be eliminated.

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