On April 8, Trump launched an extra 50% tariffs on China, causing global stock markets to plummet further. In contrast, China’s agricultural sector surged against the trend, with over 20 agricultural stocks hitting the daily limit-up and 8 soaring by more than 20%. By April 9, many companies maintained gains exceeding 10%.  

The performance of China’s agricultural stocks demonstrates the effectiveness of Beijing’s countermeasures against Trump’s tariffs. On April 4, China’s Ministry of Commerce swiftly imposed retaliatory 34% tariffs on U.S. products, with American agricultural goods bearing the brunt. The New York Times acknowledged this would hit hard, because according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 14% of U.S. agricultural exports in 2024 went to China, totalling over $27 billion.

Take soybean as an example, a February 2025 report by the USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service noted that China imports 60% of the world’s soybeans. China’s dominance in soybean trade continues to grow: Reuters reported that in 2024, China’s soybean imports hit a record 105 million tons, up 6.5% year-on-year.  

China’s massive soybean imports stem from its position as the world’s largest livestock producer. Soybean typically accounts for 20% of animal feed due to its high protein content, which enhances meat quality and yield. However, with limited arable land per capita, China prioritizes staple crops like rice and wheat, that’s why China historically relying on U.S. soybean imports.

However, now, two developments are reducing this dependency and even turning the tables on the U.S.

The first is a breakthroughs in China’s agricultural technology.  

CCTV reported on March 13 that China is developing high-protein corn varieties. Ordinary corn has about 8% protein content, but China’s new varieties reach 10%. This 2% increase is significant: China produces nearly 300 million tons of corn annually, 70% of which is used for feed. Each percentage point increase in corn protein can help China to reduce annual soybean imports by 8 million tons.

Currently, China’s high-protein corn has already been planted across 10 million mu, about 1.6 million acres. Professor Zhan Junpeng from Huazhong Agricultural University explained that this corn could replace soybeans in feed.  

10% is not the ceiling. A Chinese Academy of Sciences report reveals that the breakthrough stems from genes of teosinte, corn’s ancestor, which boasts 30% protein content. Over time, Western agricultural firms prioritized starch accumulation, causing corn to lose its high-protein genes. Now, Chinese scientists are reviving these traits, aiming for 12% and 15% protein levels.

Additionally, China is promoting alfalfa cultivation. Though lower in protein than soybeans, alfalfa grows faster. The purple alfalfa matures in just 25 days, allowing it to be planted after wheat or rice harvests without compromising staple crop security. Research by Professor Shi Yinghua of Henan Agricultural University shows alfalfa not only serves as a protein source but also improves swine reproductive performance, boosting livestock profitability. Other major livestock producers, like Spain, are also exploring alfalfa as a soybean alternative.  

Secondly, Brazil Emerges as a More Reliable Supplier

After China’s retaliatory tariffs were announced, Carlos Mera, head of Agricultural Market Research at Rabobank, told Reuters “Brazil will be by far the main beneficiary, the biggest supplier that can replace U.S. soybeans to China. But others could benefit too, including Argentina and Paraguay. On wheat Australia and Argentina should benefit,”

Crucially, China’s investment in Peru’s Chancay Port has slashed shipping times between South America and China by at least 10 days. Supporting tunnels and highways further streamline the transport of Brazilian soybeans, timber, and minerals to China. The port reduces preservation and fuel costs, making Brazilian soybeans more price-competitive in China.  

As fellow BRICS members, Brazil and China also enjoy greater political stability in trade. Reuters notes that since 2016, China’s soybean imports from the U.S. have plummeted from 40% to 18%, while Brazil’s share surged from 46% to 74%. With Trump doubling down on tariffs, this shift will accelerate.  

In conclusion, through domestic innovation and cooperation with other global south countries, China is steadily reducing reliance on U.S. soybeans. Meanwhile, Trump’s tariff wars once again leave American farmers paying the price. Investigate Midwest observes this echoes the fallout from Trump’s last trade war.

As China’s Ministry of Commerce stated on April 9: “History repeatedly proves that protectionism fails to improve a nation’s economy,” “No country will abandon its legitimate development interests to appease unreasonable demands, but this does not preclude resolving differences through equal dialogue.”

The post Trump’s Tariffs Make Chinese Agriculture Great Again first appeared on China Academy.

Primary Schools launched the New Football Season

On March 26, 2025, The First Xinjiang Primary School Football Season for the entire Xinjiang region kicked off in Urumqi. This year, the program will support 30 rural primary schools in forming football teams and dispatch university volunteers for a two-month on-site coaching program. Starting in April, county-level and regional leagues will take place, followed by the provincial finals and football exchange camps in August. Outstanding teams will have the opportunity to travel to Beijing and Shanghai for specialized training.

The program is organized by the Xinjiang Youth Development Foundation, a local nonprofit organization. Meanwhile, China National Petroleum Corporation’s Xinjiang Oilfield Company has pledged to donate 10 million RMB annually over the next three years to support children’s football activities.

This primary school football league represents only a small fraction of Xinjiang’s growing football strength. In recent years, Xinjiang players have gained popularity among Chinese football clubs for their exceptional physical fitness and speed. According to the Xinjiang Sports Bureau, by 2024, over 350 players from Xinjiang had joined professional leagues across China. Xinjiang players can be found in football teams from Guangdong, Chengdu, and Shanghai.

Xinjiang Professional Football Players Compete in Match

Xinjiang’s youth football training system is also well-regarded nationwide, with young players delivering impressive performances in national youth competitions.

Football culture is deeply ingrained in Xinjiang’s primary schools. In Kashgar, students from 22 specialized football schools gather at training centers every weekend, with nearly 1,000 primary and middle school students participating. Many of them travel over ten kilometers just to play a match.

Beyond passionate young players, the presence of experienced coaches and top-tier training facilities makes the football centers highly appealing to aspiring athletes.

Primary Students Engage in Football Training

Construction of the football training base began in September 2022, funded by a 100 million RMB investment from Shenzhen’s aid program for Xinjiang. The facility covers 14,300 square meters with a land area of 9 hectares. It features two five-a-side and two eight-a-side football fields, three eleven-a-side fields, one indoor five-a-side field, and one beach football field, along with two basketball and two volleyball courts. The high-quality turf not only enhances safety for young players but also meets FIFA standards for top-level competitions.

To further enhance training quality, the base has recruited over 30 professional coaches, all holding at least a D-level coaching certificate and with experience in university-level football competitions. Head coach Lichun Hou stated, “In addition to our regular coaching staff, we have also invited three foreign coaches to introduce advanced international training methods and tactical strategies.”

The Peking Opera Zuo Zongtang Reclaims Xinjiang Comes to Life on Stage

On March 21, 2025, the National Peking Opera Company and the Xinjiang Peking Opera Troupe officially began rehearsals for the historical Peking opera Returning to the Homeland. The play is based on the story of Zuo Zongtang, a renowned late-Qing general who made great efforts to reclaim Xinjiang. To ensure historical accuracy, the creative team conducted in-depth research, consulting historical records and making multiple field visits to Urumqi and Ili.

Zuo Zongtang

Returning to the Homeland portrays historical events that took place in 1875. At that time, under the manipulation of Britain and Russia, Mohammad Yaqub Beg, a general of the Khanate of Kokand—located in present-day Uzbekistan—led a decade-long invasion of Xinjiang. Foreign powers competed for control of Xinjiang to serve their own interests, posing a severe threat to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Under difficult circumstances, Zuo Zongtang, a high-ranking official of the Qing dynasty, led a military campaign westward with a firm resolve to reclaim lost territory. He carefully selected elite soldiers, ensured smooth supply lines to maintain combat readiness, and advanced swiftly to avoid a prolonged war of attrition. Within three years, he successfully reclaimed nearly all of Xinjiang, with the exception of Ili.

After reclaiming Xinjiang, Zuo Zongtang worked to restore economic production and revive trade along the ancient Silk Road. He encouraged land cultivation, promoted diversified industries such as animal husbandry, cotton weaving, and sericulture, and initiated large-scale water conservancy projects. By the late Qing period, Xinjiang had renovated and constructed over 940 main canals and 2,300 branch canals, irrigating more than 733,000 hectares of farmland. At the same time, he actively developed road networks, establishing key transportation routes that connected southern Xinjiang with northern Xinjiang and the Chinese heartland.

Nowadays, through the collaboration between the National Peking Opera Company and the Xinjiang Peking Opera Troupe, this historical event is brought to life on stage. While revisiting the past, the performance also offers Xinjiang’s opera fans an extraordinary experience.

The new long-staple cotton variety overcomes several technical barriers

Recently, the Xinjiang Academy of Agricultural Sciences announced exciting news. After 10 years of research, the team led by Chief Scientist Xueyuan Li has successfully developed two new cotton varieties GP-01 and GP-02. These new varieties address the previous challenges faced by Xinjiang’s long-staple cotton, such as difficulties in machine harvesting, low yields, and a limited growing range.

In terms of performance, the new varieties feature larger cotton bolls, with each boll weighing 6 grams—twice the weight of the previous variety. Additionally, the lint percentage is higher, with 100 pounds of unprocessed cotton yielding 36-38 pounds of cotton fiber, a 6% increase compared to previous varieties. These improvements significantly boost cotton yield.

Xingjiang long-staple cotton

More importantly, the new varieties have a broader suitable growing range and can be harvested on a large scale by machines. Their textile properties also meet the needs of manufacturers.

Xinjiang long-staple cotton is a premium cotton known for its strength, which is over 20% greater than regular cotton, and its softness and luster, which surpass ordinary cotton. It is one of the key raw materials for high-end shirts and luxury bedding. Due to issues such as limited yield and high costs, this cotton was expensive. According to 2021 data, the export price of Xinjiang long-staple cotton was $17,000 per ton, while U.S. long-staple cotton was priced at $12,000 per ton, making Xinjiang’s cotton 40% more expensive.

The breakthrough from the Xinjiang Academy of Agricultural Sciences may not only increase cotton production but also enhance the market competitiveness of Xinjiang cotton. Xia Liu, a senior executive from the Xinjiang-based textile company ESQUEL GROUP, commented, “For textile enterprises, this new variety is not only of superior quality but also helps lower cotton costs.”

The post The Xinjiang Beyond Your Imagination: Primary Schools launched the New Football Season first appeared on China Academy.

Workers air soybeans in Beian, Northeast China’s Heilongjiang province

China is the world’s largest consumer and stockpiler of soybeans. However, its domestic soybean production is low, and the majority of its supply relies on imports. The country is the trade destination for more than 60% of the world’s soybean imports. But why has China been increasing its soybean reserves and emphasizing self-sufficiency?, Because in the past, it has long suffered at the hands of the U.S.

Before 2001, China made multiple attempts to join the WTO, but each time, the U.S. rejected its application. One of the most difficult conditions in the negotiations was that China had to sign an agricultural cooperation agreement and open its grain market to American products. The U.S. primarily exported wheat and soybeans and demanded full market access. While China attempted to negotiate a compromise, at the very least, it had to open its market to one of these products. If China refused to open either, the U.S. would block its WTO entry, as a single country’s veto could prevent accession—and in this case, that country was the United States.

After careful deliberation, China decided to open its soybean market while keeping wheat protected. The reasoning was that, although soybeans were more expensive, their yield was lower, and they were primarily used for oil production and livestock feed. Even if there were supply issues, the worst outcome would be a shortage of meat. However, wheat was a staple food, and keeping it protected ensured that China’s food security remained intact.

In 2001, China joined the WTO and upheld its agreement by opening its soybean market to the U.S. Almost immediately, an influx of American soybeans flooded the Chinese market, decimating the domestic soybean industry. American soybeans, which were genetically modified, benefited from vast black soil farmlands, leading to significantly higher yields and lower costs. On top of that, U.S. farmers received agricultural subsidies from the federal government, giving American soybeans a crushing price advantage. Even after being shipped across the ocean, the landed price of American soybeans was still 50% lower than that of Chinese soybeans.

China joined the WTO in 2021

Faced with such a drastic price gap, Chinese soybean processing companies quickly stopped purchasing domestic soybeans. As domestic prices plummeted, farmers saw no incentive to continue planting, and China’s soybean production began to decline rapidly.、

By 2002, China’s soybean production had fallen drastically. By 2003, it had been reduced to a fraction of what it was before WTO accession, with nearly all domestic soybean processing companies relying on American soybeans. Then, with Chinese soybean production nearly wiped out, American grain traders made their move.

In August 2003, a month before the U.S. soybean harvest, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) suddenly announced that drought conditions would cause a significant reduction in soybean yields. Over the next four months, the USDA continued to revise its forecast downward, further reducing the expected soybean inventory.

Triggered by USDA data, global soybean prices skyrocketed from over $300 per ton to over $600 per ton—surpassing the price of Chinese soybeans. Since it takes time to grow soybeans, China couldn’t rely on domestic production to fill the gap in just a few months. However, the $600-per-ton price tag was prohibitively high, effectively doubling anticipated costs. Chinese soybean processors refused to accept such high prices and instead reduced imports, relying on their existing stockpiles while hoping that prices would eventually stabilize. There were also rumors that the U.S. government might intervene to curb the soaring soybean prices, so many companies chose to wait. However, China’s soybean production was severely insufficient, and the U.S. controlled the global soybean export market. It wasn’t a simple matter of refusing to buy.

By March 2004, the USDA announced that it would not increase soybean production. This sent global soybean prices soaring again, rapidly climbing to over $750 per ton, with no signs of stopping. At this point, panic set in among Chinese soybean companies. After holding out for six months, their reserves had been depleted, and the USDA had made it clear there would be no intervention. Seeing no end to the price increases, Chinese soybean processors scrambled to sign massive long-term procurement contracts with American grain traders. Once China’s soybean companies had locked themselves into these high-priced contracts, U.S. grain traders tightened their grip. Since other countries’ purchases were relatively small, their primary target was China.

After securing these high-value contracts, the USDA suddenly released two major announcements. First, the U.S. government, out of concern for domestic needs, would implement policies to encourage soybean production. Second, previous reports about soybean shortages were inaccurate due to statistical errors. There was actually no significant shortage, and there was no need for panic buying. While the USDA claimed it had penalized staff internally for the errors, the impact of these announcements was immediate—within a month, soybean prices collapsed from $750 per ton to about $300 per ton, returning to pre-crisis levels.

Chinese soybean companies were left in shock. If they followed through with the contracts, they would suffer massive losses. If they defaulted, they would have to pay exorbitant penalties. After weighing their options, many chose to default, as even after paying fines, the losses were still lower than purchasing soybeans at inflated prices.

In response, the four major American grain traders jointly sued Chinese companies for breach of contract, demanding over $5.4 billion in compensation. If China refused to pay, the U.S. threatened a global soybean embargo and a lawsuit in the WTO. The fallout was devastating—within a year, nearly all of China’s soybean processing companies had gone bankrupt. Of the 1,000 soybean processors in China in 2003, only about 90 survived by the end of 2004, 64 of which were controlled by foreign investors. China’s independent soybean processors had been virtually wiped out, with only a handful of state-owned enterprises left standing.

The damage extended beyond processors to farmers. By late 2003, soybean prices had surged past $540 per ton, making soybean farming highly profitable. By March 2004, prices soared to $750, prompting many farmers to plant soybeans in April. But after the USDA’s announcements, prices plummeted to $300 per ton by June. At that point, it was too late—farmers had already planted their crops and had no alternatives. When the soybeans were harvested in August, prices remained stuck at $300, causing massive losses. Many farmers lost years of savings and swore never to plant soybeans again.

By 2004, American grain traders had monopolized China’s soybean industry from production to processing. To prevent further manipulation, China had to take action. However, U.S. grain traders controlled both the cheapest production and the largest supply, giving them absolute pricing power.

In 2004, when U.S. traders drove soybean prices to historic lows, attempting to wipe out Chinese farmers completely, the Chinese government stepped in. State-owned China Grain Reserves Group also known as Sinograin, began stockpiling vast amounts of soybeans—buying both domestic and imported soybeans at low prices and filling its storage facilities as quickly as possible.

In 2005, Sinograin continued accumulating soybeans. It conducted this stockpiling operation in secrecy, and to this day, no one knows exactly how many soybeans Sinograin stored during 2004–2005. If American grain traders had maintained the status quo, China’s reserves would have remained unused. However, after gaining full control of China’s soybean industry, U.S. traders only stayed quiet for a year before attempting to repeat their old tactics.

In 2006, citing natural disasters and reduced soybean yields, U.S. grain traders started restricting soybean exports and driving up prices. But unlike in 2004, this time China had reserves. When the price reached an unacceptable level, Sinograin began releasing its stockpiles in a controlled manner, selling soybeans at slightly below market price every ten days. Despite Sinograin’s moves, U.S. traders continued to push prices upward. In response, China increased the frequency of its releases—starting with ten-day intervals, then weekly, and eventually every three days. At the time, the U.S. traders remained unfazed, continuing to limit exports to sustain high prices. This standoff persisted until the 2008 global financial crisis, which devastated financial markets across Europe and the U.S., dragging the global grain market down with it. Only then did soybean prices finally collapse.

Interestingly, just before the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Sinograin announced that China’s soybean reserves had become excessive, with many soybeans in storage having exceeded their shelf life and becoming unsuitable for consumption. The corporation sought partnerships with livestock businesses to offload the stockpile as animal feed. This announcement further drove down soybean prices.

By the end of 2008, soybean prices had plummeted to a historic low, and Sinograin took advantage of the situation by massively restocking its warehouses, replenishing all the reserves it had sold at high prices over the previous two years. The corporation also continued expanding its storage capacity, ensuring that China could maintain a robust soybean reserve. The exact quantity of soybeans held by Sinograin remains a state secret, but independent estimates from various organizations suggest an astronomically high figure.

In 2020, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, global grain production declined, and eleven countries and regions suspended soybean exports to China. Yet, China’s soybean supply remained unshaken, thanks to its vast reserves.

When China first joined the WTO, the U.S. seemed to suffer a “natural disaster” every few years, causing massive soybean shortages. However, after China built extensive soybean storage facilities, these disasters just disappeared, and U.S. soybean production became remarkably stable—unaffected by floods or droughts. Who would have thought that Sinograin’s soybean reserves could control U.S. weather?

In recent years, China has not only expanded its soybean reserves but has also boosted its domestic production capacity. For example, intercropping soybeans with corn at optimal spacing has maximized land use and increased
crop yields. According to official data, China’s grain production has exceeded 650 million tons for nine consecutive years, with soybean output stable at over 20 million tons.

This model refers to the practice of alternating the planting of soybeans and corn on the same field in a strip pattern or at a fixed row spacing.

Compared to 20 years ago, China has reversed the power dynamics in agricultural trade with the U.S. If Trump continues to seek a Trade War II against China, it might not be China that should be worried—but American grain traders and soybean farmers.

The post How China Won the Soybean War Against the U.S. first appeared on China Academy.

From the early days of the nation, when everything needed rebuilding, to today’s thriving society, China’s agriculture has undergone tremendous changes. This article will comprehensively review and summarize the remarkable achievements China has made in agriculture, focusing on three aspects: strategic agricultural security, rural development, and the improvement of farmers’ livelihoods.

Strategic Agricultural Security

1) Technological Independence

China’s agricultural progress is inseparable from the support of science and technology. From the renowned hybrid rice of Yuan Longping, to achieving seed independence after the soybean and corn battle, to the ongoing public debates surrounding genetically modified (GM) technology, China has effectively secured autonomy in breeding technologies and agricultural industries.

Academician Yuan Longping, known as the “Father of Hybrid Rice,” not only solved the issue of feeding China’s population but also made tremendous contributions to global food security. The super rice varieties developed by Yuan’s team consistently set new yield records, providing a solid foundation for China’s self-sufficiency in grain production.

In 2003, international grain merchants launched a “soybean war” against China, highlighting the importance of seed security. Since then, China has made significant progress in breeding major crops such as wheat, corn, and soybeans, achieving independence in seed production, reducing foreign dependence, and enhancing the resilience of its agriculture.

GM technology has been a subject of controversy since it entered the public discourse. A decade ago, heated public debates temporarily halted China’s progress in advancing GM crop research. During this period, agricultural researchers had to use terms like “molecular breeding technology” to avoid the stigma associated with GM crops.

Today, public perception of GM technology has returned to a more rational standpoint. Seed banks and molecular breeding platforms at major agricultural research institutes are now operating in an orderly manner, laying the foundation for the commercialization of GM crops in the future.

In addition, China has made significant strides in agricultural mechanization, transitioning from simple tools to today’s smart agricultural machinery. Notably, China has full control over the related industrial chain, with domestically produced equipment such as combine harvesters, rice transplanters, and seeders being both high-performing and reasonably priced, earning widespread favor among farmers.

Moreover, China’s capacity for independent agricultural machinery research and development continues to grow, particularly with the integration of digital technology. Domestic agricultural drones and robots, suited to China’s diverse geographic environments, have already gained a leading international edge.

With the rapid development of information technology, smart agriculture has become a new direction for the technological autonomy of China’s agriculture. Through the use of the Internet of Things (IoT), big data, and cloud computing, precise management and efficient control of the entire agricultural production process have been realized.

For example, smart greenhouses, precision irrigation systems, intelligent pest monitoring, and integrated water and fertilizer systems not only enhance resource efficiency but also reduce environmental pollution. The development of smart agriculture offers new pathways for sustainable agricultural development.

2) Establishment of the National Reserve System

Whether it was the rice and cotton crisis in the early years of the People’s Republic or the soybean war in 2003, these events have consistently underscored the importance of establishing a national grain reserve system.

On May 18, 2000, China Grain Reserves Corporation (Sinograin) was officially founded, and in 2005, it became the main body responsible for implementing the minimum grain purchase price policy to protect farmers’ interests and stabilize the grain market.

During the 2005 wheat and corn battle, Sinograin made a bold declaration to international grain speculators: “China’s grain reserves stand at 100 million tons, enough to feed the entire population for a year. If you dare to speculate on food prices, think about whether you can handle this 100 million tons first.”

The national grain reserve system is a crucial component of a country’s agricultural strategic security. Establishing and refining this system helps a nation cope with the impacts of natural disasters and market fluctuations.

China’s grain reserve system dates back to the Sui and Tang dynasties, when a systematic grain storage structure existed (a three-tier system of central, local, and relief granaries). Today, however, China’s grain reserve system has a broader scope, and its storage capabilities are not limited to staple grains but also include more perishable items like meat.

In 2018, when pork prices in China soared to around 40 CNY per pound due to the African swine fever outbreak, the national grain reserve system stepped in by releasing large amounts of stored pork, which helped stabilize the prices.

Similarly, in times of natural disasters, the national grain reserve system plays a key role, highlighting its importance to national strategic security.

On May 12, 2008, a massive 8.0 magnitude earthquake struck Wenchuan County in Sichuan Province, causing significant loss of life and property. The earthquake destroyed homes and infrastructure and severely disrupted local agricultural production, leading to grain shortages.

In response, the National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration quickly activated an emergency plan, transporting central grain reserves to the disaster-stricken area. The reserves promptly supplied grain, oil, and fuel to the affected areas, ensuring that the basic living needs of the victims were met.

To prevent market chaos due to food shortages, the national grain reserve system increased grain supplies in surrounding areas, stabilizing market prices.

During the post-disaster reconstruction, the national grain reserve system continued to provide food support, helping the affected population return to normal life and production. It also supported agricultural recovery by providing seeds, fertilizers, and other production materials to ensure future grain supplies.

In early 2020, China faced the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which quickly spread across the country, affecting social, economic, and public life. Many regions imposed strict lockdowns, leading to disruptions in logistics and tight market supplies.

In response, the National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration promptly activated emergency plans, coordinating with regional grain reserve warehouses to ensure ample grain supply.

To prevent market panic and rising grain prices due to the pandemic, the national grain reserve system increased its market supply efforts, helping to stabilize prices.

In summary, the establishment of a national-level grain reserve system has significantly enhanced the country’s ability to respond to natural disasters and market fluctuations.

3) Land Reclamation

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the country has undertaken large-scale land reclamation efforts, with the development of the Great Northern Wilderness (Beidahuang) and Xinjiang being particularly notable.

The Great Northern Wilderness was once a barren area, but through the tireless work of several generations, it has now become one of China’s most important grain-producing regions.

Similarly, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps transformed the desolate Gobi Desert into fertile farmland. In recent years, with the advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative, Xinjiang has once again become a hotspot for agricultural development. As a key starting point for constructing a new international order, this future granary will provide solid support for China’s globalization strategy.

4) Water Conservancy Projects

Water conservancy is the lifeblood of agricultural development. Since ancient times, great water projects like the Dujiangyan irrigation system have created fertile plains such as the Chengdu Plain.

Since the founding of New China, we have achieved remarkable success in water conservancy construction.

On a local level, we have built a series of irrigation canals to revitalize agricultural growth in various regions.

For example, the Hongqi Canal in Lin County, Henan Province, is one of the great engineering feats of the 1960s. Stretching 1,500 kilometers, it successfully diverted water from the Zhang River to Lin County, solving the region’s long-standing water shortage. It is known as the “man-made heavenly river.”

On a national level, to manage water resources across the country, we have constructed a network of water systems.

Among these, the South-to-North Water Diversion Project is a well-known and ongoing strategic endeavor. This project aims to address the uneven distribution of water resources in China, particularly the persistent water shortages in northern regions. By diverting water from the resource-abundant south to the north, the project meets the water needs of northern China.

The South-to-North Water Diversion Project is vast in scope, comprising three main routes: the eastern, central, and western lines. The eastern and central lines have been completed and are operational, while the western line is still in the planning phase.

The eastern route draws water from the lower Yangtze River in Jiangdu District, Yangzhou City, using a series of pumping stations and existing channels such as the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal. Water is transferred northward through several lakes in Shandong Province and supplies parts of Tianjin and Shandong. This route spans approximately 1,467 kilometers and diverts about 9.6 billion cubic meters of water annually.

The central route draws water from the Danjiangkou Reservoir in the upper and middle reaches of the Han River. Through newly constructed channels and existing waterways, it supplies water to Beijing, Tianjin, and other areas in northern China. The central route is about 1,432 kilometers long and diverts about 9.5 billion cubic meters of water annually.

In addition, the Dianzhong Water Diversion Project in Yunnan aims to address long-standing water shortages in central Yunnan Province (known as “Dianzhong”).

In summary, water conservancy projects form the foundation of agricultural revitalization. The achievements of New China in this field are widely recognized and represent the most critical material basis for ensuring increased grain production.

Rural Revitalization

The countryside is the operational ground for agriculture and the source of grain production. Therefore, rural development is directly tied to the health and sustainability of agriculture.

After enduring the difficult years of an industrial-first national policy, China, having fully embarked on industrialization, adopted the Rural Revitalization Strategy as the guiding principle for modern rural development.

As a result, policies such as the abolition of agricultural taxes, infrastructure investment in rural areas, and industrial expansion into the countryside were implemented, turning rural development into a crucial component for stabilizing the nation in the face of global challenges. Rural areas were connected with roads, electricity, water, gas, and the internet. Their appearance underwent a complete transformation, with many modernized villages springing up like mushrooms after a rain.

The improvement of rural infrastructure has not only enhanced transportation, communication, and electricity access but has also provided strong support for rural economic development. The diversification of rural industries—especially the rise of ecological agriculture and rural tourism—has opened up new avenues for increasing farmers’ incomes.

The structure of China’s rural economy has evolved from collective farming under cooperatives, to the household responsibility system, and now to a hybrid model. The industrial landscape has shifted from being closed and singular to open and diversified.

From the township and village enterprises of the past to the burgeoning ecological industries of today, rural areas are no longer merely agricultural production units. Instead, they are becoming multifaceted spaces that integrate landscape, agriculture, and nature. This new industrial logic has given rural areas a unique ecological niche compared to urban environments, offering a sustainable path forward for rural development in China.

Improvement in Farmers’ Quality of Life

Farmers are the driving force behind agriculture and the very soul of rural areas. As the saying goes, a civilization without people is meaningless.

The improvement in farmers’ quality of life in the People’s Republic of China stands as one of the country’s greatest achievements, unmatched globally.

At the beginning of the country’s founding, the land reform movement granted farmers ownership of their land, liberating them from the exploitation of landlords in the old era. This initial reform improved their basic living conditions and alleviated hunger. Additionally, rural literacy campaigns were launched, gradually raising the cultural level of the rural population.

In 1958, the People’s Communes were widely established across the country, operating under the “one big and two public” system. Despite the domestic and international challenges of the time, these communes effectively organized rural grassroots communities, maintaining social stability and fostering collective rural economies, laying the cultural foundation for later forms of “new collective economies” in rural China.

Though material resources were scarce during that period, spiritual life was relatively rich. The People’s Communes organized farmers to complete much-needed national infrastructure projects at a relatively low social cost during the early years of the Republic.

In the early stages of China’s reform and opening up, the Household Responsibility System was introduced to unleash economic productivity. This gave farmers greater autonomy over their agricultural output, significantly boosting their incomes and elevating their standard of living.

Moreover, the restoration of the national college entrance examination (Gaokao) provided rural residents with opportunities for upward mobility through education. My own father, for example, was the only person in his village to be admitted to university, a chance that opened up a broader life path for him.

As urbanization accelerated, township and village enterprises thrived, reshaping the industrial landscape of rural areas. These developments led to economic success stories like “Huaxi Village,” which became emblematic of rural prosperity. Additionally, many rural youth found employment opportunities in urban areas, spurred by the cityward migration trend.

This allowed for flexible survival strategies: when there was less work to be done on the farm, rural laborers could take factory jobs. This provided them with more flexible livelihoods.

The rise of new rural industries also offered farmers opportunities to earn higher incomes without leaving their hometowns. For instance, the “Huanglongxi Happy Farm” project in Shuangliu District, Chengdu, created many local jobs, increasing the villagers’ monthly income by an average of 3,000 yuan. Some core positions even provided villagers with agricultural management roles and technical guidance, allowing them to earn more than 10,000 yuan a month.

With farmers’ incomes rising, their consumption levels also significantly improved, and their spending patterns shifted from meeting basic needs to addressing higher-level desires.

The state heavily invested in rural infrastructure, providing universal access to utilities such as roads, electricity, water, gas, and internet. The benefits of information technology have trickled down to rural areas, and cost-effective, efficient logistics and delivery systems now reach even remote villages, making life for farmers more convenient.

As someone born in the 1980s who spent several months each year during school vacations in rural areas, I have witnessed these changes firsthand. When I was a child, my grandmother’s house was heated by coal briquettes, meals were cooked over a wood fire, and kerosene lamps lit the home. We children entertained ourselves with mud and insects. But in 2010, I returned home to find my nephew playing an online racing game, and I was completely stunned.

Last year, I visited again and found that the local new village had gained a reputation for its stunning beauty. The village had even built a children’s amusement park that rivaled those in big cities. What struck me most was that the annual pass for locals was less than 100 yuan—a price unimaginable in urban areas. One of my friends from Chengdu, who brought her child home for a visit, even joked about wanting to become a villager.

Furthermore, the elimination of agricultural taxes and the increase in agricultural subsidies have greatly boosted farmers’ per capita disposable income, which has grown by 331.2 times compared to 1949 and by 108.4 times compared to 1978.

China’s rural social security system has also been steadily improving, with the new rural cooperative medical care system and rural minimum living guarantee system expanding their coverage.

Although there is still much room for improvement in the overall sense of well-being among rural residents, and although there are micro-level disparities when comparing China’s rural population to those in developed Western countries, it is important to recognize the impressive progress that has been made. Considering China’s late start in modernization, its massive population, its diverse geography—which presents uneven development challenges and costs—and the fact that it has not benefited from colonial wealth accumulation to fund social programs, the continuous improvement in the living conditions of China’s farmers is a remarkable achievement. Even if we refrain from boasting out of humility, we should not be overly critical of ourselves.

Conclusion

China’s greatness does not lie in being flawless or leading the world in every aspect. Rather, it stems from its self-reliance, its relentless pursuit of strength, and its ability to forge a unique path of modernization and globalization—one that does not harm others but continuously pushes itself forward.

This is a monumental practice that challenges the hegemonic path of colonial plunder, a path that “robs the weak to benefit the strong.” It is also a profound embodiment of the “kingly way,” which “takes from the strong to support the weak.” It is this spirit that forms the foundation of China’s ability to break through the unprecedented global transformations of the last five centuries.

China’s agricultural development is a microcosm of the nation’s broader progress. By reflecting on the development of agriculture, we are also revisiting the heart and soul of this great republic’s journey!

The post Before Competing with the US, China Built the World’s Largest Granary first appeared on China Academy.

In fact, the United States has always implemented this quote. Through the renowned ABCD global grain giants—ADM, BUNGE, Cargill, and France’s LDC—and the financial means of Wall Street, the United States controls 80% of the global grain trade. These companies have established worldwide comprehensive logistics, storage, and futures trading systems. By infiltrating the grain industry of other countries through capital penetration, they repeatedly use food wars to destabilize many countries and extract excessive profits in the process.

The four grain giants were founded even earlier than many developing countries. | Source: Taichi Shipping

What if a country refuses to be controlled by the United States and starts resisting?

In the 1970s, Chilean President Salvador Allende won the election and took office. However, the country was then marked by significant wealth disparity and heavy foreign control. He implemented large-scale nationalization to restore the autonomy of industries. However, his aggressive stance against foreign capital provoked retaliation from the grain traders. Chile, long reliant on U.S. agricultural aid, suddenly found this aid cutoff, leading to severe food shortages and exacerbating internal conflicts. Meanwhile, the U.S. orchestrated a military coup led by General Pinochet. Refusing to surrender to the rebels, the anti-American champion sacrificed his life at last.

Salvador Allende, Democratic Socialist, 28th President of Chile | Source: Historica Wiki Fandom

In fact, the left-wing anti-American movements that surged in South America during the 1960s and 1970s ultimately failed largely due to the decisive role played by grain wars. Similarly, in the 1990s, the notorious Monsanto and the four grain giants got Argentina’s grain industry nearly bought off. Using the advantage of cheap grain, they forced Argentine soybean plantations to adopt genetically modified soybeans. Domestic seed companies in Argentina then went bankrupt under the impact of these foreign soybeans and were subsequently acquired by Monsanto.

Monsanto then turned its attention to the Argentina family farmers, suddenly demanding patent fees, pushing them to the brink of bankruptcy, and ultimately acquiring them. Finally, 90% of Argentina’s grain industry fell into the hands of American capital.

Argentina citizens protested against Monsanto in the streets | Source: GM Watch

The basic tactics of the four grain giants can be summarized as follows: dumping (in the name of aiding) low-priced grain in other countries → squeezing the local market with cheap grain and seeds → leveraging financial methods to create price fluctuations that bankrupt local businesses → acquiring these businesses at low prices, thereby gaining control over a country’s grain industry.

The reason why this tactic has been repeatedly successful over the past few decades is that:

The Downfall of Chinese Private Cooking Oil Companies

The Chinese people seem to have no sense of the grain war, but in fact, China has already fought with the ABCD grain traders earlier.

The early decades of the People’s Republic of China were not affected by the food war, mainly because of the strict quota system applied to the food supply at that time. Food markets are not fully open, especially for overseas imports.

In 1974, Monsanto took advantage of the opportunity presented by the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and the United States to steal China’s high-quality soybean germplasm. They then developed new genetically modified soybeans, significantly increasing their domestic soybean production capacity, which is the root cause of Argentina’s grain industry falling under U.S. control.

In the 1980s, China and the United States strengthened cooperation, signed a bilateral food trade agreement, and opened food markets for US imports. Later, to meet the requirements of accession to the WTO, China signed the “Agreement on U.S.- China Agricultural Cooperation ” in 1999 with the US, opening agricultural technology exchanges between the two countries. As a result, barriers to U.S. agriculture in the Chinese market have been removed, arousing American multinational agribusinesses covet.

Furthermore, with the support of high-yield genetically modified soybeans, the United States heavily subsidized its agriculture, drastically reducing the cost of soybean cultivation. At its most extreme, the comprehensive cost of U.S. genetically modified soybeans, including land and sea transportation to China, was still half that of China’s domestic soybeans.

Consequently, under the guise of the so-called free market, U.S. soybeans, with their cost advantage, completely dominated the Chinese market, laying the groundwork for the eventual collapse of China’s entire soybean industry chain.

In August 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture suddenly announced that due to weather conditions, U.S. soybean stocks would be adjusted to a historical low, and there would be no increase in production that year. Meanwhile, Wall Street financial giants seized the opportunity to massively stockpile soybeans, driving the price up to a historical high of $532 per ton (compared to the usual price of $278 per ton). This caused panic among Chinese cooking oil manufacturers who heavily relied on U.S. soybean imports. With their supply channels limited and fearing a shortage of raw materials, they formed a group to buy expensive soybeans from the U.S.

Ironically, less than a month after the Chinese cooking oil companies rushed to buy the exorbitantly priced U.S. soybeans, the U.S. Department of Agriculture suddenly announced an increase in soybean production and stock levels. Wall Street then sold off soybeans, causing prices to plummet. To avoid the burden of the high-priced soybeans, most of the Chinese cooking oil companies that had rushed to buy chose to default on their contracts. The four grain giants then seized this opportunity to sue the Chinese cooking oil companies, demanding exorbitant compensation and blocking their supply channels, prohibiting them from purchasing cheap soybeans through imports.

As a result of this chain of events, nearly a thousand Chinese cooking oil companies went bankrupt, leading to widespread devastation. International capital took advantage of the situation to acquire these companies, ultimately gaining control over China’s soybean-related industry chain. Even today, the control of foreign capital over China’s cooking oil industry chain remains significant, with many common brand names in the Chinese market backed by the four grain giants’ capital.

The devastating defeat in the 2003 soybean war led to the downfall of all Chinese private cooking oil companies. Only state-owned enterprises like COFCO and Sinograin survived due to government backing. This defeat resulted in the entire Chinese soybean industry, from upstream cultivation to midstream processing and downstream production, falling under the control of the four grain giants. The most direct consequence was that U.S. genetically modified soybeans entered the Chinese market unimpeded. This further increased China’s dependency on imported soybeans, particularliy those from the US.

Comparison of China’s corn and soybean self-supply rate | Source: Institute of Minmetals Securities

This battle had a profound impact on the structure of China’s soybean industry. The U.S. continues to influence China’s soybean oil consumption through trade wars and media campaigns, aiming to squeeze out the remaining market share of COFCO and Sinograin.

The Battle for the Sovereignty of Corn and Wheat

The painful loss of independence in the soybean industry made China determined to safeguard its other staple crops, leading to the strengthening of the national grain reserve system. In 2005, the four grain giants tried similar tactics, driving up the prices of corn and wheat. From 2005 to 2008, the prices of corn and wheat on the international market nearly quadrupled. However, this time, they found that corn and wheat prices in China remained remarkably stable, increasing by only 0.7 times.

The reason China’s corn and wheat prices remained steady amidst the turmoil caused by international grain traders is that China utilized its national grain reserves. Sinograin released reserves to stabilize domestic prices, ensuring that China’s corn and wheat markets stayed strong despite the global price surge.

Like the 1998 financial defense battle in Hong Kong, whenever international grain traders bought grain, Sinograin would release reserves accordingly. They started by releasing reserves every ten to fifteen days, then every week, and eventually every couple of days. This seemingly bottomless reserve capacity instilled a deep fear in the four grain giants and their financial backers:

“How much grain does China actually have in its national reserve?”

Unable to gauge the depth of Sinograin’s reserves, the international grain traders were also met with a bold statement by Sinograin on the international market: “China’s grain reserves amount to 100 million tons, enough to feed the entire country for a year. If you dare to speculate on grain prices, first consider whether you can afford it.”

This statement made the four grain giants and their financial backers reconsider their capabilities, ultimately giving up. Sinograin’s formidable reserve capacity thwarted the four grain giants’ conspiracy to buy off China’s corn and wheat sovereignty.

Sinograin granaries in Shanxi Province, China | Source: Sinograin

China’s ability to defeat international speculators in 2005 owed much to Sinograin, the cornerstone of the nation’s food security. Since then, the four grain giants and overseas speculators learned a crucial lesson: to destroy China’s food security, they must first dismantle Sinograin and eliminate all state-owned grain enterprises in China.

After being defeated in this round, Western capital remains unwilling to concede, continuing to buy off Chinese public intellectuals and opinion leaders to speak on their behalf. As a result, China’s public opinion arena was filled with voices advocating for the liberalization and privatization of all industries and stigmatizing the public-ownership economy for a long period. Even today, some online influencers are still promoting privatization.

The Battle to Rebuild Homebred Soybean Industry

After the U.S.-China trade war and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Chinese government has repeatedly emphasized the importance of food security. The battle to regain sovereignty in the soybean industry is quietly underway.

Firstly, the Central Government’s No. 1 Document of 2023 explicitly called for the expansion of domestic soybean production. As of 2023, China’s soybean planting area has reached 10466667 hectares, with a production of 20.84 million tons, an increase of 23000 hectares year-on-year. Especially since 2022, following the COVID-19 pandemic, soybean production has shown a steady upward trend, indicating that domestic soybean production in China is gradually taking shape.

To break free from reliance on imported soybean seeds, China has also made significant breakthroughs in soybean breeding in recent years.

For example, the Dongsheng 118, developed by the Northeast Institute of Geography and Agroecology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, is a soybean variety with excellent salt and alkali resistance, which can yield 3,600 kilograms per hectare even in saline-alkali environments where conventional crops struggle to survive. The “Jiyu 269” variety, developed by the Jilin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, can achieve a yield of 3,900 kilograms per hectare, exceeding the yield of conventional soybean varieties in China by 20%.

Dongsheng series of soybean varieties bred by China | Source: Northeast Institute of Geography and Agroecology, Chinese Academy of Sciences

In 2024, the Oil Crops Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences achieved the world’s first successful cloning of a rust-resistance gene from soybeans, addressing the global challenge of a lack of rust-resistant genes in soybeans. This breakthrough holds promise for long-term prevention of soybean rust disease.

With the widespread adoption of molecular breeding technology, China’s breeding techniques are now on par with those of the United States. Breakthroughs in related agricultural technologies are progressing steadily, and more competitive soybean seeds are emerging rapidly. This will eventually break the monopoly of U.S. genetically modified soybeans.

At the same time, China is gradually reclaiming its lost soybean industry chain, attempting to open a new market for domestically produced soybeans.

With the triple support of increased production, advanced technology, and a robust industry chain, the sovereignty of China’s soybean industry is growing strong. What’s more, the Belt and Road Initiative is also helping China build more secure food import channels.

The post How did China Lose 1.4 Billion People’s Soybean Market to the US? first appeared on China Academy.

Indeed, but those watermelons are grown by the Chinese themselves.

Many young people may not feel the great abundance of fruits, vegetables, grains, and meat because they were born into a time of good living conditions.

In 2022, China’s fresh vegetable consumption reached a staggering 616 million tons, while the United States had only 27 million tons, making China 23 times greater. Chinese per capita vegetable consumption is 440 kilograms, compared to just 77 kilograms for Americans, making it six times higher in China than in the United States. In 2022, Chinese per capita fruit consumption was 221.68 kilograms, while the United States had only 110.67 kilograms.

China’s consumption of fruits and vegetables surpasses the total of the second to tenth-ranked countries in the world, leaving most so-called developed countries in the dust.

It’s worth noting that in the United States, a significant indicator of social stratification is the grocery bill at Whole Foods. Those who can afford to eat fruits and vegetables are considered upper class. However, in China, access to fresh fruits and vegetables is considered a basic human right.

Among them, the most astonishing example is watermelons. China’s watermelon production exceeded 60 million tons annually from 2010 to 2020. The second-largest watermelon-producing country, Turkey, produced less than one-tenth of China’s output. Chinese people consume a staggering 16 billion watermelons each year, averaging 100 pounds per person annually. Currently, China’s watermelon consumption accounts for 70% of the world. In contrast, in countries like the United States and Germany, ordinary people can only afford small packaged portions of watermelon, and it’s quite expensive… If people from Japan or South Korea see how we eat watermelons, they would go crazy.

Here’s an unbelievable fact: China’s per capita protein supply has surpassed that of the United States. According to the data from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the average daily protein supply per capita in China is 124.92 grams, surpassing the United States (122.88 grams) and ranking ninth in the world, far exceeding developed countries and regions like Germany, Japan, South Korea, and certain islands… Note that this is the per capita ninth in the world. If you consider the total population of 1.4 billion, you will realize what a remarkable feat this is. Even those who live in the United States have to admit that they eat much worse there compared to China.

Interestingly, we spend less money on food than Americans. Americans need to spend at least $5,000 per year on their diet, while China only requires $1,622.

Chinese people, if they wish, can have a variety of options every day, including fresh meat, seafood, fruits, and vegetables. In contrast, ordinary Americans can only choose processed meats like canned goods and sausages. Fruits and vegetables are too expensive for them, and they end up eating broccoli every day.

China’s per capita GDP is only one-fifth of the United States, yet the per capita food quality far exceeds that of Americans… So, what good is GDP?
interferes in our elections.”
The per capita consumption of vegetables and meat products best reflects the living standards of ordinary people in a country because even if the elites open up their eating habits, one person cannot eat for ten people. The amount of meat I eat every day is not much different from what Jack Ma, Liu Qiangdong, or Lei Jun eat… They might even eat less for the sake of their health. Not to mention them, even ordinary Chinese people have started to consciously lose weight.

As an individual born in the 1980s, from the era of scarce resources in the 1990s to the present, it’s only been over 30 years. So, let me ask you a question: “When Chinese people have enough to eat and eat well, is it because of the farmers’ improved positivity?”

In fact, it has nothing to do with positivity. Today, fewer farmers works the land, and the prices of grains, vegetables, and meat have not increased. However, farming, animal husbandry, and transportation have become easier and more efficient.

All of this is due to industrialization, the world’s leading fertilizer production, advancing agricultural technology, unbeatable water and power resources, infrastructure development, and transportation. It is all thanks to the visionary shopping basket program.

Why do we say that increased grain production and abundance of fruits, vegetables, and meat have nothing to do with positivity? It’s because for thousands of years, rural land in China has been privately owned, but it didn’t ensure that farmers had enough to eat. What allows farmers to have enough food is socialist industrialization.

So, do you know when China began constructing large-scale agricultural water conservancy projects? The answer is in the 1960s and 1970s. Do you know when China started building fertilizer factories on a large scale? It was also in the 1970s.

But the investment in agriculture, water conservancy, transportation, and energy infrastructure is not something that can be achieved overnight. It requires long-term arduous investment and struggle, and success is difficult to achieve in a short period. However, as long as we persist, we will definitely see returns in the future.

By the way, China’s cheap watermelon, which is envied by the world today, also originated from the watermelon breeding project that began in the 1970s.

It was not until 1984 that watermelon breeding expert Wu Mingzhu cultivated a sweet and crisp watermelon variety in the 24th group of seeds. She named this watermelon variety “Zaojia 8424.” Since then, the high-quality and affordable 8424 watermelon quickly took root and sprouted across the country. Wu Mingzhu also made it possible for watermelons to be grown three seasons a year, accelerating China’s transformation into the world’s largest producer and consumer of watermelons. For over 30 years, China has been the country with the largest watermelon and muskmelon planting area, the most diverse cultivation varieties, and the highest yield, as well as having the largest and most comprehensive professional scientific teams for watermelon and muskmelon.

Don’t think that industry and agriculture are unrelated. In fact, only a strong industrialized country can undertake large-scale water conservancy and irrigation projects, resist the impact of climate disasters, produce pesticides and fertilizers on a large scale, conduct efficient scientific breeding, and have a robust transportation network to deliver fresh vegetables, fruits, and meat to all parts of the country.

When did the lives of farmers improve? It was not in the 1980s or the 1990s. It was after 2000, when industrialization significantly supported agriculture, following a new round of rural infrastructure development. The agricultural programs on CCTV have openly popularized this knowledge. The two major contributors to increased grain production in China are fertilizers and improved seed varieties.

This is a scientific, pragmatic, and materialistic attitude.

The post How has China made 1.4 billion people well-fed? first appeared on China Academy.