We are living through what can rightly be called an era of turbulence and transformation. The old international order is eroding, yet a new architecture has yet to crystallise. This is not a series of localised or linear adjustments, but a profound reshaping of global power structures, rule systems, and even value systems.
Against this backdrop, the question of whether and how China and Russia should work together — to strengthen regional security and safeguard world peace — is no longer a theoretical one. It is urgent, practical, and in need of clear answers.

I.Key Features of the Era

Let me briefly outline several defining features of this era.

First, nations around the world are once again placing defence and resilience at the top of their strategic priorities. Protectionism is rising, supply chains are being restructured, and the global economy is shifting from an “efficiency-first” to a “security-first” logic — a shift that has fundamentally altered trade flows and investment rules.

Second, the momentum for de-dollarisation is real and growing. However, a fair and reasonable global currency has not yet emerged. The contradictions between crypto currencies and sovereign fiat currencies remain difficult to reconcile. For now, local currency settlements — and even the proposed “BRICS Bridge” — appear to be transitional tools at best.

Third, the rise of middle powers is unmistakable. China’s rise and the China-Russia partnership have, in some ways, driven the United States into a state of agitation, and have forced powers such as Canada and Europe to hedge their bets. Yet the emergence of “middle powers” as a concept and a political reality only confirms that the narrative of a multipolar world is no longer avoidable.

Fourth, regional conflicts and flashpoints are multiplying. Following Europe, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, war now appears to be approaching China’s periphery. We must face this reality with open eyes.

II. The China-Russia Relationship: Doubts and Their Real Meaning

Given this environment, there are understandable doubts about the China-Russia relationship — including within our own intellectual communities.

On the one hand, the parallel existence of the China-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the “three-noes” principle — no alliance, no confrontation, no targeting of third parties — has created an illusion of “strategic ambiguity” for outside observers. This has also made it difficult to explore how to deepen strategic coordination in practice.

On the other hand, within both Chinese and Russian academic circles, there are schools of thought both supporting and opposing closer ties. Few experts openly advocate for a formal alliance, while ambiguous, balanced, and noncommittal statements remain the majority view. This reflects a genuine sense of uncertainty.

But let us be clear: managing the China-Russia relationship in this way is precisely a genuine effort to accommodate each other’s core concerns and to safeguard world peace. This is not strategic ambiguity, but pragmatic clarity. It reflects the political wisdom of the leaders of both countries.

III. China-Russia Coordination: Feasible and Necessary

So how should China and Russia coordinate?

First, an alliance is not realistic, but coordination is necessary. When some Russian elites strongly advocate a “China-Russia alliance” to confront the United States, their underlying concern — that the Ukraine war could end badly, and that the US and Europe might again join forces to exhaust Russia — is entirely understandable. However, a formal alliance would serve neither China’s nor Russia’s long-term interests, nor would it contribute to global strategic stability. Instead, we should pursue higher-quality, more resilient coordination on the basis of non-alliance.

Second, China-Russia coordination should not be limited to security, defence, or geopolitical affairs, nor should it remain at the level of vague “economic complementarity.” We should design and implement five-year and ten-year plans for bilateral coordination and common development — making strategic cooperation tangible, measurable, and sustainable.

Third, in this new context, resilience matters more than raw power, and adapting to change is more important than pursuing dominance. This is the essence of avoiding unnecessary confrontation, winning the trust of neighbouring countries, and earning the respect of the international community. I call this “Realism for a New Era” — a genuine Kingly Way, or Way of Benevolent Rule.

Fourth, while China and Russia have every right to defend their own interests, it is even more important to understand and respect each other’s core concerns. Mutual benefit, mutual assistance, and long-term good-neighbourly relations are the foundation and purpose of our bilateral ties. Mutual suspicion or purely transactional exploitation would inevitably sow future trouble.

Fifth, in Central and South Asia, China and Russia should work within the framework of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. By using technological and market openness to promote regional investment and development, and by strengthening the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to maintain security, we can jointly resist external interference.

Sixth, history and experience tell us that even after the current conflicts in the Middle East subside, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Syria will remain sources of instability on the Eurasian continent. China and Russia must join forces to contain these challenges — not through confrontation, but through preventive coordination. This is an inescapable responsibility.

Seventh, stability and security in Northeast Asia are of vital importance to both China and Russia. We cannot afford to ignore Japan’s growing ambitions. A responsible balance must be maintained — and achieving that balance will be a critical step toward securing peace in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia.

Finally, I want to emphasise: the ultimate goal of China-Russia coordination is to strengthen regional security and safeguard world peace — creating a stable space for development for ourselves and our neighbours. We are not seeking to compete for spheres of influence or to carve up territory. Therefore, we have no reason to hide our intentions, nor need we fear misunderstanding or distortion from others.

Note: The above is a summary of author’s talk at the annual China-Russia Dialogue of the Valdai Discussion Club that took place during June 26-27, 2026 in Shanghai, China.

Editor: Zhiyu Wang