The United States Accelerates Global Economic Fragmentation
Following his return to the White House, Donald Trump has ramped up trade protectionism under the banner of “America First,” employing unilateral measures to reshape global economic relations. On April 2, 2025, the Trump administration introduced a sweeping “Reciprocal Tariff” policy targeting all U.S. trading partners. The policy imposes a baseline 10% tariff on most countries and levies significantly higher duties on goods from China, India, Japan, ASEAN nations, and the European Union—triggering a cascade of global consequences.
First, the tariff measures have severely disrupted the stability of global industrial and supply chains. Many multinational corporations have seen their production, sales, and investment plans thrown into disarray. The international trading system has been thrown into turmoil, with escalating trade frictions between countries, a surge in protectionist sentiment, and rising challenges to the multilateral trading framework. As a result, global economic uncertainty has increased sharply. Financial markets have also experienced heightened volatility, investor confidence has eroded, and the risk of a global economic slowdown has grown substantially.
Second, developing countries and emerging economies are facing mounting pressure. Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework, the principle of “special and differential treatment” has long provided institutional support for the integration of developing nations into the global trade system. The U.S. “reciprocal tariffs” undermine this foundation, depriving low-income countries of their developmental space. For example, the Trump administration has labeled ASEAN as a “tariff evasion zone” and imposed high tariffs on countries like Vietnam to block the redirection of Chinese manufacturing capacity. This forced reshoring of supply chains to the U.S. represents a form of economic exclusion that accelerates global economic fragmentation and exacerbates the North–South divide. Consequently, developing nations and emerging markets are now seeking institutional innovation and regional cooperation mechanisms to hedge against rising risks.
On May 27, 2025, the inaugural ASEAN–China–GCC Summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
A New Path Toward Collective Empowerment for the Global South
In recent years, ASEAN and GCC countries have steadily increased their strategic autonomy and international influence, becoming prominent symbols of the Global South’s rise. When facing the strategic rivalry between China and the United States, both blocs have strived to remain neutral while actively managing multilateral relationships and mechanisms to promote regional integration and economic cooperation.
The inaugural ASEAN–China–GCC Summit marked a new phase of cross-regional cooperation against this backdrop, serving as a significant milestone. The combined GDP of the ten ASEAN nations (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), the six GCC members (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman), and China totals $24.87 trillion. Their combined population exceeds 2.1 billion—roughly one-fourth of the global total—and their trade volume accounts for over 30% of global trade. China brings to the table a strong manufacturing base, advanced technology, and a massive domestic market. ASEAN countries offer abundant labor resources and strong growth potential in manufacturing and agriculture. The GCC, meanwhile, holds notable advantages in energy and finance. Their cooperation promises complementary strengths and the potential to build a dynamic economic zone and a new engine for global growth.
On May 27, the summit produced a joint statement with over a dozen initiatives focused on promoting economic integration, strengthening industrial and supply chain resilience, building frameworks for energy security and sustainable development, boosting connectivity and digital transformation, and deepening cultural exchange and people-to-people ties.
This new mechanism is not only a systemic response to protectionist policies like the U.S.’s “reciprocal tariffs” but also an effort to reshape the global economic governance discourse. It opens a new path for collective empowerment across the Global South. The trilateral partnership seeks to form an “Asian economic loop” that rivals the West, creating a third global economic pillar. This decentralized economic network weakens the material foundations of American unipolar dominance. The summit’s joint statement explicitly supported the multilateral trading system centered on the WTO while opposing unilateralism and trade protectionism. The cooperation also aims to pioneer a new model of cross-civilizational, cross-developmental collaboration—combining China’s technology exports, ASEAN’s industrial uptake, and the GCC’s capital injection into a synergistic “1+1+1 > 3” dynamic.
The full implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the recent upgrade of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) to version 3.0 further expand prospects for trilateral cooperation. In June 2023, RCEP became fully effective for all 15 signatories, significantly boosting regional trade efficiency. Businesses across countries now benefit from tariff reductions under cumulative rules of origin. On May 20 this year, the conclusion of CAFTA 3.0 negotiations was officially announced, aiming to deepen cooperation in services trade and the digital economy. In 2024, trade between China and ASEAN reached $982.3 billion, with ASEAN remaining China’s largest trading partner for the fifth consecutive year. This model of “open regionalism” offers a valuable example for Global South collaboration.
Meanwhile, GCC countries are actively seeking to establish financial and diplomatic alliances with external partners beyond trade, creating natural synergy in trilateral cooperation. The GCC is implementing economic diversification policies to reduce reliance on oil, advancing economic integration through customs unions, common markets, and rail connectivity, and expanding investments in Asia via sovereign wealth funds to strengthen regional ties. Simultaneously, the bloc is pushing forward free trade agreement negotiations with China, the EU, and other partners. In 2024, GCC–China goods trade reached $288.1 billion.
On August 19, 2024, sixteen students from King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals in Saudi Arabia visited the Sinopec Exhibition Center.
A Further Reflection of the GCC’s Diversified and Balanced Foreign Policy
The trilateral summit is a further reflection of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries’ pursuit of a diversified and balanced foreign policy in recent years—namely, maintaining good relations with major powers while actively developing cooperation with other countries and regions. In partnering with ASEAN and China, the GCC hopes not only to deepen engagement with emerging Asian economies and expand its economic space and markets, but also to balance its relations with Western nations. In a complex international environment, this approach helps maintain strategic autonomy, avoid over-reliance on any single bloc, and enhance the GCC’s influence in both regional and international affairs.
This policy serves as a strategic hedge against great-power competition. In the face of U.S.-China rivalry, the GCC has adopted a “Look East for economics, Look West for security” approach. On the one hand, it is strengthening economic and trade cooperation with China and other Asian nations—extending from traditional oil and gas trade to investment, hydrogen energy, nuclear energy, and advanced technologies. On the other hand, it continues to maintain its security partnership with the United States. During Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE in May this year, the two sides signed military and economic cooperation agreements totaling $3.6 trillion. The GCC has refused to take sides and instead seeks to play a “bridge role” between East and West to maximize its own interests.
This policy also supports the GCC’s energy transition and geoeconomic restructuring. The GCC is leveraging its energy advantage to drive global energy governance reform and climate action. For example, Saudi Arabia proposed its “Vision 2030” in 2016, aiming to raise the share of renewables to 50% and cooperating with China to build “Red Sea New City” and other zero-carbon projects. In 2023, the UAE hosted COP28 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The GCC actively participates in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with China being its largest trading partner and top destination for energy exports. At the same time, GCC countries are engaging in the U.S.-led “India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor” (IMEC) and are enhancing cooperation with the EU, India, Japan, Africa, and Central Asia. This “function-first” model of cooperation avoids ideological disputes and focuses on pragmatic development.
Today, the GCC is leveraging its energy and financial capital to further promote diversified and balanced diplomacy. While consolidating traditional economic ties with the West, it is accelerating its “Look East” strategy—becoming a key buffer against unilateralism.
Challenges and Responses
Amid intensifying geopolitical tensions—particularly under the broader context of U.S.-China rivalry—tripartite cooperation among ASEAN, China, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) faces several potential challenges.
First, the United States may attempt to leverage its “Indo-Pacific Strategy” and interventionist policies in the South China Sea to entangle regional actors in its strategic competition with China, thereby disrupting the progress of trilateral cooperation. For example:
Second, the tripartite framework spans 17 countries, encompassing a wide array of political systems, levels of economic development, and cultural backgrounds—factors that may lead to communication barriers and market competition issues. For example:
Furthermore, rising protectionist sentiments aimed at safeguarding domestic industries, shifting political dynamics in the Middle East, and other complex geopolitical and non-traditional security risks add to the difficulties of trilateral cooperation.
To address these issues, establishing a trilateral coordination mechanism would be instrumental in managing potential disagreements. In the face of geopolitical competition, the three sides must enhance communication and resolve differences through dialogue and consultation, jointly safeguarding regional peace and stability and fostering a conducive external environment for cooperation.
They should also fully respect each other’s economic characteristics and development needs, seeking the broadest consensus under principles of equality, mutual benefit, and win-win outcomes. Efforts should continue in areas such as deepening free trade negotiations, promoting mutual recognition of technical standards, and strengthening financial cooperation.
In conclusion, the ASEAN–China–GCC Summit represents a strategic response by emerging economies to external shocks through cross-regional collaboration. It marks a shift for the Global South—from passive adaptation to proactive shaping of the international order. Through institutional innovation, regulatory coordination, and industrial integration, the trilateral framework is building a more resilient economic cooperation network, contributing much-needed stability to a turbulent world.
Despite external pressure and internal coordination challenges, the mechanism demonstrates a growing degree of strategic autonomy and cooperation depth. It is becoming a critical variable in the multipolar era and may offer an “Asian solution” to the reform of global governance.
Editor: LQQ
