If a nuclear power plant one day lights up the Moon, who will have built it, can it reliably supply power, and is it genuinely necessary?

Concept art of a lunar power station proposed by the United States. Image source: NASA

In May 2025, China and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on jointly building a nuclear power station on the Moon. According to the Russian space agency Roscosmos, this nuclear project is intended to serve the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), jointly led by China and Russia, and is scheduled to deliver a nuclear reactor to the Moon between 2033 and 2035.

The announcement quickly drew widespread media attention. Many viewed it as a major leap in humanity’s efforts to build an energy infrastructure for deep space exploration. Some even interpreted it as a geopolitical counter to the U.S. Artemis manned lunar program.

Yet a closer and more level-headed examination reveals that the ILRS is still in its early stages of development. China’s Chang’e-7 and Chang’e-8 missions have yet to launch. There is no imminent energy bottleneck caused by power overload or permanent human habitation. Against this backdrop, Russia’s proposal to build a nuclear power station raises important questions: Is this a forward-looking plan, or a symbolic political gesture? More importantly, from an engineering perspective—and considering the China-led project timeline—when might such a lunar nuclear power station realistically become a reality?

Is a lunar nuclear power station viable?

The current concept of a “lunar nuclear power station” revolves around the China–Russia-led International Lunar Research Station. The ILRS is still in its “basic configuration” phase, with mission objectives focused on resource exploration, environmental monitoring, and communications testing. It does not yet involve long-term human presence or require continuous power for large-scale scientific equipment.
In simple terms, the station is more like a platform with a preliminary framework, undergoing preparations for power and systems testing, rather than a fully operational lunar base.

So, under such mission parameters, is a heavyweight energy system like a nuclear power plant really necessary?

Let’s first assess the feasibility of solar power. Even in the Moon’s south polar region—where sunlight is less consistent—many elevated locations can still receive relatively stable solar exposure. Unlike on Earth, where solar panels are typically installed horizontally, the Moon’s windless environment allows for the deployment of vertical solar panel arrays, significantly boosting energy efficiency per unit area.

A rough estimate suggests that a vertical solar array comprising 12 panels of 20 square meters each could generate around 30,000 kWh during the lunar day—enough to support a research station’s scientific and life-support systems for 6–10 days. Thus, photovoltaic systems alone are not a bottleneck.

The real challenge lies in surviving the lunar night—and storing energy for it.

On the Moon, one full day-night cycle spans approximately 29.5 Earth days. That means solar power is only available for half that period. The rest of the time is complete darkness and extreme cold. On Earth, we bridge solar intermittency with batteries or pumped-storage systems. On the Moon, however, storing enough power for two weeks is no simple feat—though not impossible.

Battery-based energy storage technology is already mature on Earth. Companies like CATL or BYD produce Tesla-style MegaPack units that are roughly the size of a shipping container and store about 4 MWh of electricity. It is technically feasible to develop lightweight, customized versions and launch them to the Moon using existing technology.

There’s also a workaround to lunar night power shortages: avoid the night altogether. A rotational human presence model could be adopted—sending crews to the Moon only during the lunar day for specific missions, then fully withdrawing before nightfall. Research equipment could be set to hibernate or operate in low-power mode.

This approach resembles seasonal polar research stations on Earth. In Antarctica, for instance, temporary stations are active during the austral summer (November to February) for resupply, sample collection, and testing, and are completely shut down in winter. It’s a common strategy for scientific exploration in extreme environments.

The same principle can be applied to the Moon: there’s no need to aim for uninterrupted year-round operation from day one. That’s a goal for 40 years down the line—not the current engineering target.

Thus, for the ILRS in its basic configuration phase around 2028, a combination of solar panels, storage units, and daytime operations is sufficient to fulfill most scientific objectives. Introducing a small nuclear reactor that hasn’t been flight-tested would not only be costly and risky to launch, but could also disrupt the current engineering roadmap and introduce additional uncertainties.

The conclusion is both simple and sober: the energy needs of the ILRS do not yet justify the deployment of nuclear power. Until the program reaches the phase of 24/7 manned operations, discussions of nuclear stations are, in effect, tackling a problem decades ahead of schedule.

Concept image of a space nuclear reactor by Rolls-Royce—a dazzling yet delicate flower of the cosmos. Image source: Rolls-Royce

Who Has the Capability to Build It?

Even if we set aside the question of whether now is the right time to build a lunar nuclear power station, we must ask: Who is actually capable of doing so?

Let’s begin with China. In recent years, China has been advancing basic research on small-scale space nuclear power systems. Western media have reported that China is planning to develop megawatt-class nuclear systems for deep space exploration. However, no Chinese nuclear power system has yet been tested in orbit or on the Moon.

For comparison, the U.S. Kilopower project, developed by NASA, its maximum power output is only 10 kilowatts, and its prototype has only undergone ground testing. It has yet to reach the launch stage.

To “light up the Moon,” these reactors must do far more than simply be launched. They need to autonomously deploy, resist lunar dust, maintain thermal equilibrium, dissipate heat effectively, and operate independently without human intervention for at least a decade. These are not just engineering challenges—they represent a full-scope system integration test. And if something goes wrong, there’s no repair mission. A failed reactor isn’t just offline—it becomes a source of nuclear contamination.

Then there’s the issue of launch capacity. China’s only upcoming lunar-capable rocket, the Long March 10, has an estimated payload capacity of around 27 tons to lunar transfer orbit. Theoretically, it could launch a compact nuclear reactor. But this is not just “swapping a battery.” It would occupy a precious launch window—a high-stakes, limited-resource mission. Long March 10 will be tasked with future manned landings, crew modules, and communications satellites. Allocating a slot for a high-risk, unproven reactor is a questionable trade-off.

Russia does have historical experience in nuclear reactor engineering. During the Cold War, it deployed nuclear-powered satellites and built compact reactors for submarines. But that was the Soviet Union. Today’s Russian space program faces far more sobering realities: the Luna-25 probe crashed, the Angara heavy-lift rocket suffers repeated delays, and the national space budget is shrinking annually. Russia struggles even with basic lunar landing capability, let alone delivering a high-risk, cross-system international space nuclear project.

The realistic path forward is clear: China should continue to develop space nuclear capabilities through independent R&D, starting with experimental systems and building capacity step-by-step. Russian cooperation can be welcomed in an “open, participatory, and backup” framework—but should never be relied upon or used as a crutch.

The recently signed “China–Russia MoU on jointly building a lunar nuclear power station,” in legal and technical terms, is non-binding. It is neither a contract nor an implementation agreement. It does not trigger budgeting, resource allocation, or set technical milestones. More accurately, it is a political expression—a declaration of mutual interest and a willingness to explore future cooperation.

Beneath The Strategic Heat, Engineering Cool-Headedness Is Crucial

In the long term, a lunar nuclear power station will inevitably become reality. It is a necessary step toward permanent lunar bases, industrial activity on the Moon, deep space propulsion, and even off-planet energy exports. In a sense, it will mark the moment humanity’s energy system begins to go interplanetary.

But precisely because of its significance, it must be approached with caution. Especially now—when the ILRS is still in the “basic build-out” stage, lunar missions rely on narrow launch windows, and a rotational human presence has yet to become routine—a nuclear station is far less pragmatic than a reliable solar array and a mature crew rotation and mission planning system.

Interestingly, while conducting research, I came across an article on the official website of the China National Space Administration titled “Deploying Nuclear Reactor Power on the Moon: A Beautiful Vision with Major Challenges.” It mentioned a U.S. lunar nuclear reactor design: with a planned output of 40 kilowatts, capable of operating continuously on the lunar surface for at least ten years, and able to withstand both launch stresses and the structural loads of the lunar environment. When folded, the system can fit into a cylindrical space with a diameter of 4 meters and a length of 6 meters, weighing no more than 6 tons.

However, this reactor remains only a conceptual proposal and is still far from becoming a finished product.

The ILRS led by China, has always adhered to the principle of “extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits.” It sets no exclusive boundaries and welcomes global partners—including Russia—to participate in its development. This open posture reflects China’s global vision for space exploration and helps pool technological expertise from different countries in areas such as probe design, energy systems, and mission planning.

However, openness does not mean relinquishing leadership, and cooperation does not imply dependence. While the doors to strategic collaboration remain wide open, the core technologies of energy and propulsion for the lunar research station must firmly remain in our own hands.

Editor: LQQ