Guancha.cn: Last week you traveled to Manila, the capital of the Philippines, to attend the 14th Manila Forum. This year’s theme was “Safeguarding Peace and Security in the Asia‑Pacific.” Given some recent shifts in China–Philippines relations, especially the confrontations in the South China Sea, can you describe the venue and the atmosphere at the forum? How do Chinese and Filipino scholars differ in their views and attitudes toward the bilateral relationship and the South China Sea issue?

Victor Gao: Yes. On September 17 I had the honor of attending the 14th Manila Forum in Manila. The forum came at a time when China–Philippines relations were clearly sliding downward and finding themselves in the eye of the storm. Still, there were a few encouraging things.

According to the organizers, this was the forum with the most registrations in many years; the hall was full and preliminary counts show roughly 300 people in attendance. The composition of participants was also weighty: several important former Philippine government officials, including a former president and a former national security adviser, were present; multiple ambassadors attended; long‑standing advocates of China–Philippines friendship and many Filipino Chinese were also present — some third‑generation, and even overseas Chinese in their nineties attended. They came to hear our discussion of the current state of China–Philippines relations, the challenges, and ideas for improvement.

Overall, the forum was on point and timely, and it drew broad attention in the Philippines.

In terms of format and agenda, this forum resembled many Western forums in style — which was interesting. The discussion focused on two main areas: first, the South China Sea disputes; second, what kind of assistance the Philippines needs to achieve further development.

Of course, in the Philippines almost any topic circles back to the U.S.–Philippines relationship. Some people in China might be surprised: why does the United States have such a long reach here; is the U.S. stirring things up behind the scenes and causing damage to China–Philippines ties? I can say a few words about American influence in the Philippines.

My attention to Philippine issues began with my studies at Yale; afterwards I trained in law at Yale Law School and obtained admission to the New York Bar. The hosts noted this in their introduction. In the Philippine context, people who received high‑level education in the U.S. and have a professional background tend to earn basic respect — at least they are not taken lightly — so such an opening often smooths the way.

To date, five Yale alumni have served as U.S. president; the first among them was William Howard Taft, followed by the elder Bush, the younger Bush, Ford, and Clinton. Taft had deep ties to the Philippines: after the United States seized the Philippines from Spain in 1898, he served as the first U.S. Governor‑General of the Philippines. During the transition from Spanish to American rule he played an important role and had a key influence on the Philippines’ institutional arrangements, regulations, and national orientation as it moved toward becoming a modern state.

Perhaps because of his distinguished record, Taft later became U.S. president — the first U.S. president with a Yale degree — which is significant to Yale alumni. I still remember a large oil portrait of Taft hanging in the Yale library; I stood before it for a long time.

So my keynote in the Philippines began with the experience of that first U.S. Governor‑General, and naturally transitioned to the 1898 agreements concerning the Philippines. My discussion of the 1898 treaty was not off the cuff: I studied in the U.S., trained at Yale Law, and Taft is a prominent Yale alumnus — I know that history and legal background inside out. Having laid that groundwork, Filipinos should not imagine that we Chinese neither understand the U.S. nor the Philippines and are only the party that “suddenly creates a dispute” in the South China Sea.

We then turned to current China–Philippines issues. Here I want to stress and tell readers of Guancha.cn that the China–Philippines territorial disputes have a long history. For example, a Philippine warship has been grounded on Ren’ai Reef (also called Second Thomas Shoal) since 1999. That’s 26 years from now; Philippine occupation of some of our features also dates back decades.

In the past, China only reacted to provocations in the South China Sea. When other countries occupied one of our islands, we responded forcefully. So we regularly saw our coast guard use water cannons to drive Philippine vessels away from our sacred territory. We have a strong navy, coast guard, and militia; 1.4 billion Chinese stand united to defend territorial integrity. Any island or reef in the South China Sea that belongs to China, we will not give up an inch.

But I think we must pay attention to a somewhat newer concept: the 118°E meridian. Under the 1898 treaty between the United States and Spain, the western boundary of Philippine territory is the meridian of 118° east longitude. Why is that line important? Because before 1898 the U.S. knew very little about the Philippines; as a nation in the Americas, the United States’ war with Spain was not directly targeted at the Philippines.

The primary aims of the Spanish–American War were Spain’s holdings in the Americas — including parts of Mexico — and Caribbean areas like Cuba. After the U.S. defeated Spain, it took a series of territories and islands — for example parts of the American West and Southwest such as New Mexico on the continent; Cuba moved toward independence after Spain’s defeat; Puerto Rico, Guam, Saipan, and today’s Palau were also seized in that conflict, and the Philippines was among them.

The U.S. left itself a legal safeguard on the Philippine issue: although it had won on the battlefield and seized many places, could it “buy” the Philippines with money? I think the U.S. did this mainly out of caution: in case Spain recovered strength later, would the lands taken be lost again? So they fixed legitimacy by “purchase,” similar to the purchase of Alaska from Russia.

Because it was a purchase, boundaries had to be defined. Just as when buying a house you must specify building, floor, unit and area, the 1898 Treaty of Paris clearly defined the relevant boundaries — the western boundary of the Philippines was the meridian of 118°E. That’s carved in stone and is a prominent treaty in diplomatic history.

Why did I have to make this point so explicitly when I went to the Philippines? Look at the map first.

I even bought a South China Sea map published in the Philippines at a bookstore. Whether it’s a Chinese map or a Philippine‑published map, the 118°E meridian is clearly marked. West of that line lies an island called Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal). So it’s clear to everyone that Huangyan Island lies west of 118°E, not east of it.

Thus, according to common international interpretation of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the territory Spain sold to the U.S., or the territory the U.S. took from Spain — that which constituted “Philippine territory” — did not include islands west of the 118°E meridian like Scarborough Shoal, nor did it include certain islands and reefs that the Philippines covets, seeks to occupy, or has actually occupied but which belong to China.

What does this imply? Why did I need to underscore the 118°E question in person to Filipinos? In fact, my geographic placement of “Gao Zhikai’s 118°E line” matches the treaty’s meridian, but people interpret its meaning differently.

The 1898 treaty quite plainly sets 118°E as Spain’s westernmost limit in the Philippines. So I directly asked the Filipinos: over the years you have crossed the 118°E line and gone to its west side; you have been grounded on Second Thomas Shoal for 26 years, you covet Scarborough Shoal and have your eye on other features — haven’t you crossed your own accepted western boundary at 118°E? What do you mean by that? Do you still want the 118°E western boundary of your territory?

If they say they want the 118°E boundary, then please withdraw from Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, and other relevant features and return to the east of the 118°E meridian; don’t “come into my house” or covet my territory.

If the Philippines says “we don’t recognize the 118°E line” and will continue to cross westward, eyeing our Second Thomas Shoal, Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal), and other features, then we must explain to the Philippines: if you abandon the 118°E meridian as your western boundary, that means your boundary no longer exists. Once you can cross 118°E to the west, China and other countries can also cross 118°E to the east.

Imagine that.

At that point the Philippine president, government, and foreign ministry should carefully weigh the consequences: once you cross the line, you are effectively giving up the 118°E western boundary and the consequences would be dire — tantamount to self‑destruction — allowing foreign powers to cross 118°E to the east; that’s like digging your own grave.

This is the first time in decades that I have so explicitly explained the critical significance of the 118°E meridian. The Philippines faces a “use your own spear against your own shield” dilemma. So whenever China and the Philippines are in dispute, the core question is simple: do you, the Philippines, acknowledge the 118°E meridian as your western boundary? If you acknowledge it, then withdraw from Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal), Second Thomas Shoal, and similar features to the east of 118°E. That way everyone can live in peace and we can develop as friendly neighbors. If you don’t acknowledge it, then don’t blame me — I would then have a legitimate basis to begin crossing 118°E eastward.

Listen — this move will force the Philippines into a dead end. Why? Because their prior justifications collapse on their own.

Some may ask why no one has used this approach before. The answer is simple: know yourself and know your enemy. The Philippines’ provocations in recent years have largely been stirred up by Americans. Many of those advising them were likely trained similarly to me in law, perhaps even admitted to the New York Bar and taught by the same professors, using the same curriculum.

Because of these shared backgrounds, I better understand how to deal with the Philippines. To deal with the Philippines you must first know yourself and know them; we must not only understand China’s own situation but also who is behind them. So now I confidently ask Filipinos one question: Brother, do you still acknowledge the 118°E meridian? That puts them in a dilemma: say you don’t recognize it and the consequences are severe; say you do recognize it and you must withdraw east of the line.

Therefore I believe attending the 14th Manila Forum and engaging deeply with many Philippine officials, scholars, and figures was very rewarding. With a country like the Philippines, we do not need to resort to force at the drop of a hat; what we need is to lay out the logic clearly so they understand that every step has a cost — a cost that can corner them.

So my advice is: under no circumstances abandon the 118°E meridian as your western boundary, unless you’re ready to bear the consequences.

Editor: Zhiyu Wang