How Long Can Gaza’s Ceasefire Agreement in Favor of the U.S. Last?

This article was translated by AI and originally published on China’s largest political website, “Guancha.cn”. The original author is Liu Zhongmin, a professor at the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University.
On January 15 local time, after months of difficult negotiations, Israel and the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) reached an agreement on the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the exchange of detainees. The agreement will take effect from January 19, as announced by Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Muhammad in Doha.
The new round of Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been ongoing for more than a year. In addition to causing massive casualties and instability to those directly affected by the warfare, this conflict has also profoundly impacted Middle East geopolitics, international governance, big power coordination, and multilateral cooperation.
Why have both sides chosen to reach a ceasefire agreement at this moment? What were the key factors that facilitated the agreement? Will there be uncertainties in the implementation process? Observer.com spoke with Professor Liu Zhongmin, vice-chairman of the Chinese Middle East Society, to bring in-depth analysis.
Interview/Observer.com, Guo Han, compiled/Observer.com, Zhu Minjie
Guancha.cn: Why were Israel and Hamas able to reach a ceasefire agreement at this time? What are the considerations of both sides?
Liu Zhongmin: I think there are reasons from both parties and changes in regional situations, such as the transition of the U.S. government.
Firstly, considering Israel and Hamas’s respective situations, after more than a year of conflict, Hamas has suffered heavy losses, and Israel is also under heavy pressure domestically and internationally. However, both sides are quite clear that it is difficult to fundamentally achieve their goals through military conflict.
Previously, Israel only managed to rescue a limited number of hostages through a short ceasefire last November, but failed to achieve the three major military objectives of rescuing hostages through force, eliminating Hamas militants, and making Gaza no longer a threat to Israel. On the Palestinian side, at least 46,000 civilians died painfully. Hamas’s leadership, organizational strength, and armed forces have suffered severe blows, and Hamas’s external support, like Iraq, Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Syrian Bashar regime—the “resistance axis” forces—have also been destructively struck. From the power comparison situation of both sides, the situation is increasingly unfavorable to Hamas. Therefore, both sides have the intention to advocate for a ceasefire.
Israel’s core demand is hostage rescue. Its citizens, particularly hostage families, continue to pressure the government for immediate action. The ceasefire agreement is the only solution to rescue the hostages. Hamas, facing a severe survival crisis, also sees seeking a ceasefire as a core goal.
The desire to rescue hostages on the Israeli side and Hamas’s goal of achieving a ceasefire made signing the ceasefire agreement a reluctant choice for both. During this process, both parties went through a long period of bargaining. In terms of the agreement content, consensus is primarily reached on hostage exchange, Gaza ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal, and Gaza’s future reconstruction.
On January 13 local time, Israel bombed the Gaza Strip.
Secondly, in terms of the regional situation, the power comparisons between Israel and the “resistance axis” and the regional political and security situation are increasingly developing in favor of Israel. It’s safe to say that Israel has obtained an absolute safety and military advantage in the surrounding areas, giving it significant advantages in political, military, security, and psychological aspects and reaching an agreement under the weakening external support of Hamas will not change Israel’s advantageous position, while Hamas prefers to maintain survival through a ceasefire.
Lastly, the U.S. government transition could be considered a unique factor in facilitating this ceasefire agreement, especially since the agreement takes effect on January 19 — the last day of the Biden administration and the day before Trump assumes office.
For over a year, the Gaza war has been a significant burden on the U.S. The U.S., on the one hand, systematically supported Israel, while on the other hand, continuously increased military presence in the Middle East to deter anti-Israel forces like Iran to prevent war escalation. This has even led the U.S. into an exhausting dilemma.
Therefore, nearing the end of Biden’s term and as Trump’s inauguration approaches, both the incumbent and the incoming presidents exerted pressure on Israel in different ways. Biden aimed to regard the ceasefire agreement as an achievement of his administration, boasting that he was the only U.S. president not to pass a war onto his successor.
Trump wanted to consider the ceasefire agreement as a new start to the United States’ Middle East diplomacy, paving the way for his subsequent promotion of the Abraham Accords. Of course, Israel also took this opportunity to improve and reinforce its relationship with the U.S. Therefore, implementing this ceasefire agreement at the time of the U.S. power transition on January 19 is also a special arrangement to seek favor from the U.S.
Guancha.cn: The key obstacle to Israel-Palestinian ceasefire negotiations has long been the withdrawal arrangements for Israeli forces along the Philadelphia Corridor on the Gaza-Egypt border. Based on the current agreement content, the Israeli military will completely withdraw from this corridor within 50 days after the agreement takes effect, and Israeli domestic dissatisfaction is strong, yet Netanyahu still chose to make concessions. Does this mean he succumbed to immense pressure from the U.S., or is the strategic significance of the Philadelphia Corridor not that crucial anymore?
Liu Zhongmin: As mentioned earlier, in the current round of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the military and security advantages Israel gained—whether over Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, or Syria—have significantly improved compared to before the war, and have even become overwhelmingly dominant. To a certain extent, a security buffer zone along the Israeli border area has been established.
Even though Israel promises to withdraw from the Philadelphia Corridor, I believe that even after withdrawal, Israeli forces will continue to maintain military presence in the border areas between Israel and Gaza, or beyond the extensions of the corridor.
Thus, I think Israel is willing to compromise to U.S. pressure partly because it has control over the corridor, establishing absolute political and military security advantage over Gaza, and possibly due to Israel’s considerable confidence in Hamas’s difficulty in rebounding in the short term.
The Philadelphia Corridor in the south of the Gaza Strip borders Egypt. Israeli military involvement in this area has long been a contentious issue in the stalemate of ceasefire negotiations.
On the other hand, from a broader regional perspective, Israel has significant advantages over regional powers like Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran. It should be noted that the one-and-a-half-year-long conflict, although costing Israel on moral and diplomatic grounds, has indeed gained military and security advantages for Israel and given it considerable confidence about the surrounding security environment from the north to the south border areas.
Guancha.cn: In the U.S., Biden and Trump competing to claim credit for this ceasefire agreement is worth noting. On the one hand, a spokesperson for the U.S. State Department thanked Trump’s team for their contribution. On the other hand, according to Israeli media, Trump’s nominee for Middle East envoy catalyzed a breakthrough after a conversation with Netanyahu. Yet, Trump hasn’t officially taken office, and his appointee doesn’t officially hold an official status. Could it be said that Trump’s personal influence or his private rapport with Netanyahu played a role?
Liu Zhongmin: I think this reflects efforts from the final stages of the Biden administration and the role of Trump’s diplomatic and security team after winning the election. However, for Israel, a ceasefire is also acceptable.
But why do Trump’s factors seem more influential than Biden’s? Over the past year, Biden’s administration provided enormous support for Israel, be it the systemic backing or protection in international arenas like the United Nations. Nevertheless, despite continuous efforts to prompt a ceasefire, Biden’s administration couldn’t achieve it.
Israel probably understood Biden’s administrative limitations: the U.S. couldn’t stop supporting Israel, nor did it want to see an escalation of conflict; Israel knew escalating the conflict would result in additional security support, including the THAAD system from the U.S. Israel’s proactive control over the situation led to the Biden administration lacking effective means of control over Israel.
The root cause of the ceasefire agreement lies with Israel and Hamas. Both sides realized the unsustainability of the conflict and showed willingness to negotiate, despite the American factor appearing to influence the agreement’s reach.
Of course, both Biden and Trump had demands: the former wished for a closure to his Israeli-Palestinian policy, albeit awkwardly, while the latter sought a positive start to U.S.-Israel relations for his tenure. Netanyahu recognized Trump’s assertive style and possibly wanted to create goodwill to gain Trump’s support.
When asked if the credit for the ceasefire agreement goes to Trump or Biden, Biden returned the question: “Are you kidding?” Screenshot
Gancha.cn: Could you predict how long this Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement is expected to last and its impact on the Middle East situation? In addition, during Trump’s upcoming four-year term, will he continue to pursue the “Deal of the Century,” or advocate decreasing Middle East investment as in his previous term?
Liu Zhongmin: Based on the content of this agreement, it seems just a starting point, but it may provide some time for Trump to plan future Middle Eastern diplomacy.
It should be noted that the execution of the first phase is relatively simple: releasing 33 hostages within 42 days and opening humanitarian aid channels into Gaza. But for the later phases, the news currently revealed seems rather vague. Hamas must release all the detainees, while Israel will fully withdraw from Gaza. The third phase is more forward-looking, involving the implementation of a three-to-five-year reconstruction plan for Gaza. How well the latter two phases will be executed remains questionable.
Upon Trump’s inauguration, under his administrative style, the U.S. Middle East policy may reflect transactional and punitive characteristics. The transactional approach involves maximizing U.S. interests by considering policy costs and benefits. Meanwhile, punitive approaches include leveraging threats, sanctions, or even military deterrence to achieve objectives.
Specifically regarding the Israel-Palestine issue, Trump may further push the “Deal of the Century” (or the Middle East New Peace Plan) and integrate it with the Abraham Accords. A favorable aspect for him is that Hamas is severely weakened, and Palestine is in a significantly disadvantaged position, increasing the possibility of Trump imposing the “Deal of the Century” on Palestine, as Hamas and Palestine’s bargaining power has diminished significantly compared to Trump’s first term.
Moreover, external support for Hamas and Palestine has weakened. The Arab world has further fragmented, and the new Syrian government is unlikely to resist the West and America significantly. Lebanon is shifting towards a pro-West and pro-Saudi direction, with the newly-elected president making Saudi Arabia his first visit. Hezbollah is already severely hit, and Iran has withdrawn its force from Syria, leading the “resistance axis” to a quandary. These factors favor Trump’s promotion of the “Deal of the Century” once in office.
However, some unfavorable factors remain, notably a severe lack of trust towards the U.S. among Palestinians. Additionally, Saudi Arabia, a key state in the Abraham Accords, earlier expressed reluctance to sign a security defense agreement with the U.S. in exchange for normalizing relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia has also set a precondition for normalizing ties with Israel, asserting that Israel must accept the “two-state solution.” Therefore, how Trump attempts to liaison Saudi Arabia, the pivotal Arab nation, to achieve breakthroughs in the Abraham Accords is a point of observation. I believe Trump will attempt some form of transaction between the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia that can benefit all, but possibly at the expense of Palestinian interests.
Another potential variable is the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, which doesn’t favor Trump’s plan for a united front against Iran between Israel and Saudi Arabia, although recent subtle changes in Saudi-Iran relations include the death penalty for six Iranian drug dealers by Saudi Arabia without notifying Iran, inciting strong opposition from Iran.
Overall, I think Trump has opportunities to advance the “Deal of the Century” and the Abraham Accords but also faces challenges, possibly from Saudi Arabia. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has enhanced its strategic autonomy, realizing U.S. demand for itself.
Additionally, U.S. policy towards Iran is two-sided. Trump’s first term saw withdrawal from the “Iran Nuclear Deal” and end-of-the-line pressure on Iran. Secretary of State Blinken also posed 12 demands on Iran, with over half concerning significant aspects of opposing Iran and its leadership of the “resistance axis,” like ceasing support for proxies, halting external revolution exporting, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ceasing external intervention.
In the early stages of Trump’s second term, there’s a high probability of restarting end-of-the-line pressure on Iran. Yet, he previously declared the aim of a new agreement with Iran, and even expressed interest in including Iran in the “Abraham Accords.” Therefore, after applying enough pressure on Iran, the U.S. may seek interactions, even potentially achieving a new nuclear deal.
From Iran’s perspective, it currently faces an external and internal challenging situation. The manifestation of the U.S.-Iran conflict is “The Iran Nuclear Deal,” but the fundamental issue lies in the geopolitical and ideological confrontation since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Iran’s ambition to influence the Palestinian issue through the “resistance axis” is also part of its confrontation with the U.S. and Israel.
Though Iran desires improved relations with the U.S., abandoning its anti-U.S., anti-Israel goals, and revolutionary ideology could affect its domestic legitimacy. Iran’s recent actions, such as announcing new missile technology, conducting large-scale military exercises, and accelerating nuclear projects, showcase its continued confrontation stance.
From the U.S. standpoint, Trump aspires to improve relations with Iran within the broader goal of fully integrating the Middle East by simultaneously normalizing Saudi-Israeli relations and even incorporating Iran into the Abraham Accords. Earlier, predictions suggested Trump might become the first U.S. president to visit Tehran akin to Nixon’s historic China visit, boosting his prestige. However, achieving this requires the U.S. to abandon a longstanding regime change strategy in Iran and Iran compromising its anti-U.S. and proxy policies.
To accomplish such an ambition, whether the U.S. and Iran break the ice, both parties need fundamental adjustments in perceptions and policies. This isn’t an easy accomplishment.
Editor: Zhongxiaowen