On June 7, 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Pakistan’s PM Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif in Beijing

On May 20, Taiwan sent a significant signal of compromise toward Beijing.

During Lai Ching-te‘s speech marking the first anniversary of his inauguration, he called for replacing confrontation with dialogue, restarting tourism and educational exchanges, and jointly pursuing peace and prosperity. This was in stark contrast to his speech in October last year, in which he emphasized that “Taiwan and China are not subordinate to each other” and that “national sovereignty must not be violated.”

According to Chinese strategist Professor Wang Xiangsui, compared to the Tsai Ing-wen era, this does represent a positive signal for China’s reunification. However, the underlying reason is not so much a sudden moral awakening by Lai, a senior Taiwan separatist, but rather that a battle fought by Pakistan served as a wake-up call—or even a scare. He began to realize that the so-called “western protection” that he had relied on was nothing more than a sandcastle easily destroyed by a single blow.

On May 7, Pakistan shoots down Indian Rafale jets after air strikes

Beijing has always clearly retained the option of resolving the Taiwan question by force. Yet for a long time, the illusion of achieving split China through military means persisted in Taiwan island, under the belief that purchasing second-hand American weapons could somehow deter the PLA.

However, just two weeks ago, skilful Pakistani pilots flying Chinese-made J-10CE fighter jets shot down several Indian Rafale jets without suffering any losses. This made Lai realise that trying to resist reunification through Western arms is a dead end.

After all, Taiwan’s most advanced fighter, the F-16V, is just a fourth-generation aircraft. Meanwhile, China’s J-10—already no longer considered cutting-edge in the PLA arsenal—can easily outmatch the Rafale, a 4.5-generation fighter with superior beyond-visual-range combat capabilities compared to the F-16V. So, in the face of more advanced fighters like the J-20 or even sixth-generation jets from the PLA, what’s the point of bluffing?

PLAAF Chengdu J-20 elephant walk

Moreover, even before taking office, Trump had repeatedly suggested that the U.S. would not intervene militarily in a cross-strait conflict. His toughest statement was merely ‘If China takes back Taiwan, I’ll impose a 200% tariff.’ Yet today, in the face of China’s resilience against a 245% tariff war, it is the U.S. that is requesting a 90-day ceasefire.

This dramatic shift in the international situation has caused Taiwan separatists, who once relied on foreign support, to lose their backbone and transform into “advocates for peace.”
However, as Professor Wang emphasized, the change in the international landscape is merely a catalyst for reunification. What truly brought Lai back to the negotiating table was Beijing’s application of a strategy rooted in thousands of years of Chinese wisdom.

Previously, Taiwan separatists clung to the idea of “maintaining the status quo,” believing they could indefinitely delay a choice between peaceful or forceful reunification. However, in Beijing’s timeline, reunification is already underway—not in some binary of war or peace, but as a multifaceted campaign utilizing a range of methods, including force.

For example, through multiple joint military exercises, the PLA has steadily brought training zones closer to Taiwan island. These now involve not only the navy but also joint coast guard patrols, incorporating areas once controlled by Taipei and waters previously defined by Western politicians as international into routine jurisdiction.

With more “dollar-bought allies” switching to the One-China principle and a growing wave of early retirements from the Taiwanese military despite pay raises, even the most stubborn separatists are being forced to admit they’ve lost nearly all avenues. As a result, they’ve shifted from Tsai Ing-wen’s stance of “no talks for the sake of talks” to now actively seeking to “replace confrontation with dialogue.”

This dual pressure from the international environment and domestic reality may seem like a new shift. Yet all Taiwan separatists seem to have forgotten that during the Korean War, Mao Zedong successfully used the strategy of “fighting while negotiating, using combat to push for talks” to force the overconfident U.S. military back to the negotiating table. This approach actually has a much older name: 布势

On July 27, 1953, the signing ceremony of the Korean Armistice Agreement was held at Panmunjom in Kaesong

In the 布势 or “strategic positioning”. “Bu” (布) refers to the deployment of military power, resources, equipment, and terrain; “Shi” (势) refers to battlefield momentum, posture, and advantageous conditions. The concept was first proposed by the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Wu, author of The Art of War. His core idea—“he who holds the superior position wins”—emphasizes that once key elements in a confrontation are arranged to favour one side, it becomes possible to guide the opponent into actions that lead to that side’s victory.

Both sides of the Taiwan Strait share the same language and are the inheritors of Chinese wisdom. Yet in recent years, some Taiwanese politicians have sought to split Taiwan from China by aggressively promoting de-Sinicization, severing their ties to Chinese culture and distorting regional history. Their loss of the ability to understand such strategic thinking is, like reunification itself, an inevitable historical trend.

As unworthy descendants of the Chinese nation, Taiwan separatists must now face the reality—in the face of the mainland’s overwhelming power and unwavering resolve, they probably have no choice.

Editor: Charriot Zhai