After gaining significant recognition in a battle in India, the J-10 aircraft has become a sought-after commodity in global military procurement.

Recently, I came across a news piece reporting that on May 20th, the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition in Malaysia officially opened. At the exhibition, Malaysia’s Deputy Prime Minister was visibly impressed by the J-10, directly stating: “China’s J-10 fighter jet is very advanced, and we aspire to enhance bilateral cooperation in defense in the future.”

In essence, his meaning was clear: a straightforward hint from our side—can we consider providing a couple of these planes?

Moreover, it’s not just Malaysia; since the 57 Indo-Pakistani air conflict, the J-10’s value has surged. Pakistan quickly ordered an additional 50 units, followed by Egypt, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Algeria, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan, all expressing an intent to purchase.

However, purchasing J-10 is not straightforward. How does China sell its advanced equipment? Who should it be sold to, and how much? There is much to consider here. Today, I will analyze the potential future clients for the J-10.

Let’s start by eliminating the countries we are unlikely to sell to.

The first category comprises countries with significant historical and interest conflicts with us.

Typical representatives are the United States and Japan. If Trump were to attempt to purchase China’s J-10, he would be promptly voted out of office in 2026 by the electorate, as it would be akin to a strategic surrender to us. As for Japan, due to millennia-long historical disputes, both national interests and public sentiment indicate that Sino-Japanese military procurement is unlikely in the short term due to enormous public pressure.

The second category covers countries that regard themselves as equals to China.

The most typical examples are Russia and Iran. Even though it’s globally acknowledged that only China and the United States are players at the same level, historically, Russia was our elder brother, and emotionally, they haven’t yet adapted to the new global dynamics, making military procurement from us unlikely for at least 5-10 years as they transition.”

As for Iran, there is a significant misunderstanding around this country. Many believe, within Chinese online circles, that Iran is “lesser” to China, but in reality, Iranian perception views themselves as a leading player, aiming to lead the Islamic world. Therefore, for them, aligning with Russia and China at the same level in their mindset (despite the world not fully recognizing it), conceding in major military acquisitions is difficult.”

If you closely observe, even in challenging times, Iran has not been supplied with J-10, KJ-500, or 052D, nor has Russia provided them with SU-35, Tu-95, and Il-76. This stems from Iran positing itself on par with China and Russia, and potentially being a competitor in the Middle East if the US wanes in influence. So, the likelihood of Iran seeking major military systems from us at this stage is indeed low.”

Additionally, the current situation in Iran is well-known. With overwhelming domestic capitulation power, Iran has, to some extent, lost the basic trust of both China and Russia, and it’s probable that China will be seeking new allies in the Middle East.”

The third category involves countries that have other major allies.

Here, I’m not referring to the US allies but an unexpected country—North Korea. Many domestically perceive North Korea as a lesser partner or reference past special alliance treaties. However, those with historical insights understand that North Korea was the Soviet Union’s and now Russia’s ally, housing massive Soviet-equipped arsenals. North Korea was the only country to publicly support Russia during the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, indicating their unique relationship.

Globally, most news reports confirm that Sino-North Korean collaborations largely remain within the economic and industrial sectors, such as grain and industrial products, but military fields remain carefully distanced to maintain the buffer zone north of the 38th parallel.

Thus, North Korea might source SU-30 from Russia than the J-10 from us.”

The fourth category involves countries with geopolitical conflict risks.

A typical example is Vietnam, a country with historical disputes and ambitions, leading to a careful approach in military transactions.

The fifth category comprises countries without military procurement needs.

A quintessential example is Switzerland, a nation disinclined to set up armed forces; as a permanent neutral country, it’s free from foreign invasion threats. Even if you provided extraterrestrial technology, they wouldn’t purchase it due to the lack of necessity.

After reviewing these five non-purchasing categories, the countries poised to procure the J-10 become clear.”

First, there’s the well-known case of Pakistan.

The relationship between Pakistan and China mirrors that between Israel and the US, serving as strategic regional footholds—Israel in Europe and Pakistan in ensuring the South Asian balance and countering India.

Post-independence division was universally accepted without British, American, or Soviet dissent, aligning with their shared interests.

Especially with current discourse suggesting India as the next China (though probabilities are low), from a national interest perspective, deep Sino-Pak cooperation harbors a robust foundation. Future military transactions might surpass the J-10, potentially involving even core equipment.”

Bangladesh shares similar needs with Pakistan, both under India’s threat and in need of safeguarding sovereignty, making it likely for them to procure the J-10.

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The second category includes Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

While ASEAN’s trio is addressed collectively, their circumstances vary.

When studying the history of Thailand, one will see that its greatest threat has always come from Vietnam to the east. Our relationship with Vietnam is quite delicate as well; however, since Thailand has never considered provoking us, the foundation for cooperation between the two countries is extremely strong.

More importantly, Thailand is known for its balanced approach, often purchasing equipment from countries like France, Japan, the USA, and China, which is a common occurrence.

Looking at Indonesia, it is a nation that often gets overlooked despite having a population of 281 million, accounting for 40% of the total population of ASEAN. By size, it views itself as the leader of ASEAN, but its military strength is not widely recognized. Especially now, as Indonesia has equipped itself with numerous French Rafale jets. After the Indo-Pak air conflict, Indonesian officials faced widespread criticism, and there is a possibility that in the future, they might turn to purchasing the Chinese J-10 jets, which are both affordable and effective compared to the Rafales.

As for Malaysia, the main threats come from Indonesia and Singapore, particularly Singapore. Those familiar with history will know that Singapore was separated from Malaysia and remains under pressure due to Singapore’s acquisition of US-made equipment. Therefore, if we have any strategic plans involving the Malacca region in the future, collaborating with Malaysia could be highly feasible.

Let’s turn our attention to

the third category of countries: African nations.

I’ll focus on two examples, Algeria and Egypt.

Reading the international news, I noted that the Algerians were most delighted about the recent incident where the French Rafale was downed by the J-10. Algeria, long seeking to break free from French colonial control, is a wealthy nation that makes $50 billion annually from natural gas sales alone, affording them the possibility of purchasing the Chinese J-10.

Regarding Egypt, it has serious geopolitical conflicts with Israel, being a central adversary in past Middle Eastern wars. Previously reliant on Soviet equipment which proved ineffective, Egypt desired advanced US equipment but was denied over concerns of affecting Israel. This led to discontent until Chinese military prowess became evident, prompting Egypt to take action.

Next, let’s discuss the fourth category of countries: Brazil and Venezuela.

Recently, China and Brazil issued a joint statement containing 31 agreements that elevated bilateral relations, highlighting plans for comprehensive, deep cooperation in politics, economy, industry, technology, and more. Brazil also renewed a $190 billion currency swap agreement with us, making the purchase of Chinese J-10s a logical step for bolstering influence in South America.

As for Venezuela, long under US sanctions, it turned to work with us, opting to settle oil transactions in RMB, laying groundwork for military collaboration. Yet, due to Venezuela’s geography, premature cooperation might spark a strong reaction from the US, suggesting a cautious short-term approach.

In summary, the countries listed above are the most likely purchasers of the Chinese J-10. Keep an eye on future developments to verify this.

Reflecting on the Indo-Pak air conflict, an interesting notion arises:

The process of China surpassing the US may unfold faster than expected.

Those who have followed me for a while might recall my assertion that for China to overtake the US, it must navigate six major challenges: Industry, Economy, Military, Technology, Finance, and Culture.

Currently, we have essentially surpassed the US in the industrial and economic sectors.

Recent years have seen an explosion of achievements in technology, with China leading in many areas.

In culture, the decline of American influence is surprising; pre-pandemic, the US was seen as a beacon of hope, but now Hollywood has lost its luster, American culture is deteriorating, and its global image has plummeted. At this rate, losing cultural hegemony is just a matter of time for the US.

Even in the previously believed insurmountable military sector, significant shifts are emerging.

This year has seen not only the emergence of sixth-generation aircraft and the dominance of the J-10 but also a major event with the upcoming maiden flight of our Jiutian drone in June.

I previously analyzed this drone, which is considered a game-changer in the global arms market. It boasts a maximum takeoff weight of 16 tons, a payload of up to 6 tons, a maximum flight altitude of 15,000 meters, and an impressive range of 7,000 kilometers. Equipped with eight external hard points, it can carry up to 1,000-kilogram guided bombs, or multiple air-to-air, air-to-ground, anti-ship missiles, and loitering munitions. Astonishingly, it also features a heterogeneous hive mission bay capable of deploying hundreds of small drones at once, as confirmed by CCTV media.

With this aerial carrier, alongside ground-based robotic systems like mechanical dogs and wolves, it is no exaggeration to say that the future warfare landscape is being revolutionized. Should other countries seek to capture the advantage in warfare, they will very likely need to procure large quantities of unmanned equipment from us, given 80% of global drone manufacturing capacity is based here.

By then, our influence in the global arms market will rival the Soviet Union at its peak, even surpassing the United States at its height. Given more than a decade, the global military landscape could undergo a dramatic transformation.

Consequently, America’s six pillars of hegemony will collectively crumble, marking the formal onset of a new era led by China.

Editor: Zhongxiaowen