In today’s rapidly evolving international landscape, what concerns the Chinese public most is the recent surge of interactions and communications between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin over ending the Ukraine war. This concern is far from groundless. Although China is not a direct party to the war, the way it ends will inevitably shape the future global order. Put differently, U.S.–Russia engagement will not only impact China–U.S. relations, but will also have profound implications for the future of the “China–U.S.–Russia strategic triangle.”

Recently, Trump has once again made his thinking on China–U.S.–Russia relations publicly known. On March 19, 2025, during an interview with Fox News, he expressed caution about the growing closeness between China and Russia and outlined his plan to improve relations with these two countries, which he referred to as “the so-called anti-American alliance on the world stage.” Not long after a phone call with Russian President Putin, Trump stated, “As a student of history, which I am — and I’ve watched it all — the first thing you learn is you don’t want Russia and China to get together. ” He cast doubt on the foundation of the current friendly ties between China and Russia, suggesting that their relationship is not “natural.” He added, “They’re probably friendly now, but we’re going to be friendly with both. ”

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in a February 2025 interview, responded to the increasingly popular view in the U.S. and the broader Western world known as the “reverse Nixon” approach. He remarked, “I don’t know if we’ll ever be successful completely at peeling them [Russia] off of a relationship with the Chinese. I also don’t think having China and Russia at each other’s neck is good for global stability because they’re both nuclear powers, but I do think we’re in a situation now where the Russians have become increasingly dependent on the Chinese, and that’s not a good outcome either if you think about it .”

Whether during his first term, throughout his re-election campaign, or now in his second term, Trump has made numerous statements on the dynamics among China, the U.S., and Russia—and those statements have shown a high degree of consistency. At the very least, this consistency suggests that Trump has his own ideas about trilateral relations, and is not simply acting on others’ advice. In fact, this applies to his thinking on many other issues as well. The only difference is that his ideas are often so unconventional that they are neither understood nor accepted by the American elite or most Western policymakers—let alone by people in other parts of the world.
At a U.S. Senate hearing held on May 20 (local time), Secretary of State Marco Rubio engaged in a heated debate with Democratic lawmakers over State Department reforms and proposed budget cuts.
Video screenshot

Is Trump Playing the Role of a “Reverse Nixon”?

Around the world, perhaps the most closely watched issue in the trilateral relationship among China, the U.S., and Russia is whether Donald Trump is now playing the role of a “reverse Nixon.” If the original “Nixon” strategy refers to Washington’s Cold War maneuver of exploiting the Sino-Soviet split—specifically the Nixon administration’s efforts to “ally with China to contain the Soviet Union”—then the so-called “reverse Nixon” refers to a potential Trump strategy of embracing Vladimir Putin’s position on issues such as Ukraine in order to split Russia away from China, ultimately achieving the goal of “aligning with Russia to contain China.”

Whether this idea of a “reverse Nixon” comes directly from Trump himself remains unknown. But it is certainly a concept that has been circulating widely among the American policy elite. When Trump first entered office in 2017, U.S. media reported extensively that Henry Kissinger had advised Trump to pivot toward Russia as part of a broader strategy to “ally with Russia against China.” Since then, many voices in Washington have emerged advocating a “reverse Kissinger” strategy, urging the United States to realign itself with Moscow to counter Beijing.

In practice, during Trump’s first term, Washington officially designated China as its primary strategic competitor. Under President Biden, this positioning became even more explicit, with China being described as the only country with both the capability and intent to compete with the U.S. on a global scale. The Biden administration built up a network of what Chinese analysts often call “mini-lateral blocs” in the Indo-Pacific and beyond—small coalitions aimed at containing and countering China.

Now that Trump is back, he seems uninterested in maintaining America’s traditional alliance system—and is even attempting to disengage from it. The Biden administration had spent four years rebuilding alliances worldwide to confront both Russia and China under the banner of “democracy vs. autocracy.”

Trump, by contrast, shows no interest in ideology. He appears to be pursuing rapprochement with Russia—even at the cost of sacrificing Ukraine’s territorial integrity and “betraying” democratic allies. All of this is in service of reconfiguring America’s foreign policy priorities.

But does this really constitute a “reverse Nixon” strategy? According to Trump’s own recent statements, his goal is actually to “get along with both China and Russia.” In a March 19, 2025 op-ed, New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman cautioned readers to “not believe a word he says” when it comes to Trump. While Friedman’s skepticism is not without merit, a closer examination suggests that the logic of a “reverse Nixon” and Trump’s personal strategic instincts may, in fact, diverge significantly.
Archival images: President Richard Nixon (left) and President Donald Trump (right)

China Must Stand Firm On Its Own Stance

Naturally, it remains uncertain whether Trump has the ability to alter U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China relations, whether he can reshape the strategic triangle among China, the United States, and Russia, or what kind of triangular relationship he ultimately intends to create. Nonetheless, as the world’s second-largest economy, China must formulate its own independent thinking, strategic approach, and goals. In this triangular relationship, China should not allow itself to be led by other major powers—whether the United States or Russia—but should instead shape the dynamics according to its own national interests.

The current situation, however, is not optimistic. Since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, Chinese online public opinion has been deeply divided. Some support Russia, hoping China will openly side with Moscow in opposition to the U.S.-led West. Others favor the West, wishing China would publicly break with Russia and align with the United States. Similar divisions can be seen in the reaction to Trump’s approach of seeking rapprochement with Russia at the expense of Ukraine. Those sympathetic to Russia welcome Trump’s behavior as a positive development for Moscow. In contrast, those previously leaning toward the United States are angered by what they view as Trump’s betrayal and express sympathy for Ukraine, celebrating Europe’s firmer stance in support of Kyiv.

Although Chinese netizens’ reactions to Trump are not unique compared to those in other countries, the Chinese—coming from a nation that was repeatedly bullied, invaded, and partitioned under unequal treaties imposed by imperial powers—should neither idolize Trump’s power politics nor advocate for Zelensky to submit to humiliation. Such views represent a betrayal of China’s own historical experience. The phrase “a weak nation has no diplomacy” is a succinct summary of China’s modern history.

When witnessing Trump publicly scolding Zelensky, the first image that should come to mind is not geopolitical gain, but Chinese diplomat Li Hongzhang being forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki in Japan after China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War. In essence, what is the difference between Zelensky’s current humiliation and Li’s experience? Aside from the difference in era, the underlying logic is strikingly similar.

In shaping the China-U.S.-Russia triangle and the future global order, China—as a major civilization—must establish its own position. It should not see itself as an extension of the United States, nor as a replica of Russia. Without a clear civilizational stance, China will find it difficult to achieve genuine prominence and influence on the international stage.

Western “Expansionism” and the Collapse of the “Liberal Order”: Why Is China Different?

The decline of both Russia and the Western liberal international order is an inevitable consequence of expansionism. The seeds of Russia’s decline were sown during the Soviet era of expansionism. After World War II, both the Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union and NATO led by the United States embarked on expansionist paths—one representing socialist imperialism, the other capitalist imperialism. The Soviet Union’s overreach ultimately led not only to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact but also to the disintegration of the Soviet Union itself, giving rise to today’s Russia. From any perspective, contemporary Russia is no longer comparable to the former Soviet Union.

Similarly, the disintegration of the liberal international order centered on the United States can also be traced back to expansionism. The root of the problem lies in the word “liberal,” not in “international order.” The dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War, and the West mistakenly assumed this signaled the final and total victory of liberal democracy. Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis became widely influential, asserting that liberal democracy was the best and final form of human governance. At the time, liberal ideology in the West reached an unprecedented high point. Russia under Boris Yeltsin hoped to be integrated into the Western system; both the EU and NATO were seen as ideal platforms for Russia’s stability and security. Vladimir Putin, in his early years, held similar aspirations. In pursuit of becoming a part of the West, Russia, the United States, and Europe did make some efforts.

Unfortunately, Russia was rejected and excluded by the West. This outcome reflected a fundamental truth: one form of expansionism cannot tolerate another. The logic is simple—the United States cannot accept challengers from outside, let alone from within. If Russia were to become a full member of the Western system, would it not then be in a position to challenge U.S. dominance from within?

The U.S.-led West not only refused to accept Russia but also initiated a rapid expansion of NATO, pushing it deep into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence—its “backyard.” From this perspective, the war in Ukraine is a natural reaction from Russia, a nation known for its martial spirit. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced Russia from a massive empire to a state widely seen in the West as “second-tier” or even “third-tier,” Russia remains a major nuclear power. It could not avoid seeking adequate strategic space. In this context, whether framed as a counterattack or a renewed expansion, Russia’s actions toward its former republics were rooted in the pursuit of national security.

China’s situation, however, is fundamentally different. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rising “liberal international order” directed its attention toward China. The decision by the U.S.-led West to allow China to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), still dominated by Western countries at the time, had clear strategic motives. The goal was to transform China—to shape it into a country more like the Western world, one that the United States could easily influence or even manipulate.
On November 11, 2001, China signed the agreement to join the WTO in Doha, the capital of Qatar. A month later, China officially became a WTO member, integrating into the global multilateral trading system.

But the U.S. failed, and China succeeded. China’s modernization model, as articulated at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, achieved both development and independence. By joining the global trade system, China secured economic development while becoming more politically autonomous. Moreover, once it had developed, China launched globally influential initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, expanding its presence in the Global South and enhancing its influence among developing countries. China’s rise on the international stage created mounting pressure for the United States and some Western nations. Neither China’s internal development nor its external expansion had been anticipated by Washington.

Today, the greatest question haunting U.S. elites is: Why didn’t America transform China—instead, how did China transform America?
Though U.S. elites failed to identify a clear answer, they have reached a consensus: China’s rise must be contained. Whether during the COVID-19 pandemic or amid the Russia–Ukraine war, the United States and some Western countries have launched wave after wave of ideological offensives, using the narrative of “democracy versus authoritarianism” to isolate China or to undermine its relationships with other countries. This pattern is strikingly similar to the Cold War, when the U.S.-led Western bloc sought to suppress the Soviet Union and its allies.

During the pandemic, the U.S. slandered China’s effective pandemic governance as “digital authoritarianism.” Following the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war, the U.S. and the West portrayed the conflict as a battle between the “democratic camp” and the “authoritarian camp,” constantly lump China and Russia together and portraying Russia as China’s principal supporter. In both academic and policy circles, the U.S. has promoted the concept of a so-called “Global East,” lumping together Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, and demonizing them as an “axis of evil.”

This strategy of pressure, framing, and opposition has also directly exacerbated tensions in the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, the international community has increasingly framed and even equated the Taiwan issue with the Ukraine issue. The U.S. and other nations have significantly ramped up support for Taiwan, emboldening separatist forces on the island.

Can Trump’s transactional worldview bring about a major shift?

From this perspective, Trump might indeed represent a significant shift—if he succeeds. He is a stark, old-school realist. Unlike the traditional American elite, Trump openly acknowledges the reality of China’s rise. Mainstream U.S. elites—such as Biden and many Republicans—firmly believe that the U.S. must and will defeat China. But Trump and many in his administration have come to accept China’s rise as an undeniable fact. This recognition is a necessary precondition for any meaningful engagement between China and the U.S. His geopolitical thinking, while marked by a certain imperialist flavor, is nonetheless grounded in realism.

Moreover, Trump’s basic judgment is not without merit. He believes that if the old order no longer serves U.S. interests, or if the U.S. can no longer sustain it, then it should be abandoned in favor of a new order for the future. Historically speaking, while it’s hard to claim that global orders are entirely shaped by great powers, they do play a pivotal role in creating and sustaining them. Therefore, any reshaping of the world system must begin with reconfiguring the U.S.-China-Russia triangle.

That said, Trump’s stated desire to maintain friendly relations with both Russia and China raises doubts. Achieving this would almost require him to change American political culture itself. Although one could argue that Trump’s political project is, in essence, a kind of cultural revolution (a topic worth separate discussion), few believe he is capable of carrying it out. For over half a century, during and after the Cold War, American political culture has been shaped by deep-seated hostility toward Russia. Changing that is no small task—one that even Trump cannot easily accomplish. This is precisely why many members of the U.S. elite remain skeptical of him.

Indeed, from the perspectives of both culture and strategic interests, fears about the difficulty of carrying out a U.S.-Russia alignment are not unfounded. Though both countries are rooted in Caucasian Western civilization, they follow different religious traditions and share expansionist impulses. They are now also perceived as representing fundamentally different political systems. As previously mentioned, today’s U.S.-Russia dynamic is shaped by the clash of two expansionist powers. So how could Trump realistically achieve peaceful coexistence between them?

From China’s standpoint, peaceful coexistence with the U.S. is a common aspiration of the Chinese and American peoples. But few in China would place their hopes for that peace on Trump alone. While we welcome his gestures, real peace will require our own efforts and initiative.

Trump’s transactional worldview of treating everything as a deal has deeply shaped his approach to foreign policy. For him, almost everything is negotiable. While diplomacy inevitably involves a degree of bargaining, not everything can—or should—be treated as a deal. In matters of trade, where buying and selling are part of the process, negotiation is natural. But what about territorial issues? How does one “trade” over sovereignty? Yet Trump applied this mindset even to territories such as Canada, Panama, Greenland, and Gaza. If he were to pressure Ukraine to sacrifice territory in exchange for peace, the world would be reverting to an era of old-style imperialism. Such arrangements are not legitimate “deals”—they are unequal treaties. That’s why many view his behavior as absurd, and why he has so far failed to succeed.

Furthermore, Trump has only four years in office. How could he possibly complete so many “deals” in such a short time? Even if he had more time and managed to translate his thinking into action, what happens when he realizes that not everything in the world is up for negotiation?
Still, we shouldn’t dismiss Trump’s worldview too quickly. One might even hope that his transactional approach could help the U.S. break through its current diplomatic deadlocks. If applied reasonably, such a method might prove more civilized—and less destructive—than traditional force-based diplomacy.

How Should China Participate in Shaping the “China-U.S.-Russia Dynamism”?

For China, it is essential to recognize that the future configuration of the China-U.S.-Russia triangle will not be determined by Trump-style deal-making. While some aspects may be negotiable, the fundamental structure of this triangle cannot be established through transactional logic. Rather, it will be shaped by the dynamic interplay among the three major powers—China, the U.S., and Russia. Because this trilateral relationship will largely define the architecture of the future international order, China must take an active role in shaping it, rather than simply reacting to changes initiated by others.

First, independence and autonomy must remain our guiding principles. We should develop bilateral or even multilateral relations with both the United States and Russia. But every relationship must be rooted in autonomy and not hijacked by any single party. As mentioned earlier, both American and Russian expansionism follow similar strategic logic. But China is not part of that logic. Our civilization does not carry expansionist ambitions. Today, we possess both the capability and the confidence to defend our interests—but we are not interested in territorial or political expansion.

Second, in managing this trilateral relationship, we must guard against the worst-case scenario: a so-called “reverse Nixon” moment in which the U.S. and Russia form an alliance to divide or marginalize China and its interests. This scenario, while unlikely, is not impossible. History has shown that such alignments have occurred before. To forget history is to risk betrayal.

Third, if we can avoid this “reverse Nixon” situation, then a more desirable outcome might emerge: China may find itself operating between two expansionist powers—playing a balancing or mediating role. If American and Russian expansionist tendencies serve as mutual checks, then in moments of imbalance, an external stabilizing force is needed. That force can and should come from China.

Fourth, on all major global issues—such as the Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Palestine conflict—China must articulate a clear position rooted in our civilizational values and national interests. Among these, the principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity must remain paramount.

Fifth, and most importantly, these principles must be applied to resolving the Taiwan issue. For years, the West has deliberately blurred the lines, conflating Ukraine and Taiwan. But the two are not the same. Ukraine is a sovereign, independent nation. Taiwan, however, has never been one. If the Russia-Ukraine war is about Russia’s perceived geopolitical security, then China’s approach to Taiwan is fundamentally about sovereignty. This is not a war for influence—it is a defense of our territorial integrity.

Editor: LQQ