China’s Biggest Worry Now: The US Is Falling Too Fast

Chinese President Xi Jinping (left) speaks to Communist Party of Vietnam chief To Lam in Hanoi on Monday. | Bloomberg

From April 14 to 17, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Vietnam and Malaysia. At a White House press conference, Donald Trump claimed that China-Vietnam talks are part of plans to ‘screw’ the US.

However, Professor Qiu Wenping from Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences pointed out quite the opposite: China’s biggest current worry is that the U.S. is declining much faster than expected, forcing China to expand its influence in two regions—intended or not.

The first is Africa

On April 2, Trump imposed tariffs on 53 African countries. In Lesotho, for instance, the tariff rate soared to 50%, even higher than EU levels.

According to World Bank’s data, Lesotho is one of the world’s poorest countries, with more than half of its 2.3 million people living below the poverty line. Perhaps only Trump knows how such a country is “exploiting” the U.S. Lesotho’s Minister of Trade, Mokhethi Shelile, told Bloomberg that Trump’s tariffs could affect 52,000 domestic jobs and trigger a liquidity crisis.

Seeing how Trump treats Africa’s most economically vulnerable nations, even the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was shocked, and suggested that African leaders should embrace BRICS countries instead. As of 2022, BRICS accounted for around 23% of Africa’s total exports, with 65% of those going to China. Increasing exports to China could benefit least-developed African countries like Tanzania and the Congo. To fight against Trump’s bully, the CSIS emphasized that “No African country should reach out to the United States or announce its trade policy until all of us play our cards together.”

Not all U.S. think tanks support Africa’s growing trade ties with China. When Lesotho formally joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2019, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) criticized the BRI in 2021, arguing that it gave China economic leverage for geopolitical gain in Africa. However, what they likely didn’t foresee was that Trump’s  tariffs would prove more damaging than so-called “Chinese leverage.” In 2024, U.S. imports from Lesotho totalled $237.3 million, while China imported only about $30 million. Now, with the U.S. retreating, China’s trade influence in Lesotho could potentially expand sevenfold. Ironically, even China may not have anticipated this opportunity.

The second region is Central Asia

Former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski once warned of Washington’s worst geopolitical nightmare: a united front between China, Russia, and Iran driven by shared hostility toward the United States. So far, this “sword of Damocles” has not fallen—largely because Iran has clung to the hope of eventual reconciliation with America. However, recent actions by the Trump administration are steadily eroding that fragile red line.

Right now, more Palestinian children are dying; two U.S. aircraft carriers are bombing Yemen; and on April 13, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth hinted at the possibility of war with Iran if the nuclear talks fail. Professor Qiu Wenping observed that Trump’s policies are pushing Iran to abandon its illusions and prepare for confrontation—reviving previously stalled cooperation between China and Iran.

Take the 2021 Iran–China 25-Year Cooperation Program as an example. This agreement includes joint projects in banking, telecommunications, ports, railways, and energy. It allows China to directly invest in Iran’s oil sector in exchange for discounted energy. While implementation has been slow due to fears of further U.S. sanctions, Trump’s renewed pressure may push Tehran to move forward.

On April 16, the U.S. imposed three new sanctions targeting Iran’s oil sector. If Tehran is being sanctioned even without escalating tensions, what incentive does it have not to pivot more fully toward Beijing?

Reuters acknowledged that China and Iran have already established a trading system largely based on the Chinese yuan. Iran’s former Vice President Ali Akbar Mohammadi said Iran needs to increase its oil production to at least 8.5 million barrels a day in order to remain a player in the global energy market, and for that, Iran needs China. Former Iranian diplomat Fereydoun Majlesi pointed out, “Every road is closed to Iran, the only path open is China.”

On April 15, former U.S. President Joe Biden delivered his first public speech since leaving the White House, sharply criticizing Donald Trump for having “done so much damage and so much destruction” in just the early weeks of his return to power. The facts appear to support Biden’s claim: economically, Trump’s tariff wars wiped out more than $6 trillion from the U.S. stock market; militarily, despite deploying every operational B-2 stealth bomber, the U.S. failed to prevent Houthi attacks on American and Israeli vessels; diplomatically, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky rejected Trump’s proposed “peace plan”; and politically, the Trump administration dismantled the U.S. Agency for International Development and cut government funding for outlets like Voice of America.

These are all good news for China—But the worry is that it’s all happening so intensively. This is the largest global strategic contraction in U.S. history. The Cold War taught us that sudden power vacuums can bring major risks.

Consider North Korea, which once relied on cheap, stable oil supplies from the Soviet Union. That support enabled it to mechanize agriculture, cultivate previously barren land, and sustain a growing population. But after the USSR collapsed, market-priced oil hindered the development of country’s agricultural sector—leading to famine and destabilization. Similarly, when Britain abruptly ran off from Asia, it irresponsibly drew the McMahon Line, a legacy that continues to fuel tensions between China and India. At the time, China lacked the strength to manage these risks—but that’s no longer the case.

Today, the United States is experiencing a more rapid decline than many anticipated, driven in large part by Trump’s deliberate dismantling of the international order in favor of strategic retrenchment. In contrast, China—now the world’s largest exporter—has a vested interest in maintaining global economic stability and the free flow of trade. This divergence in strategic priorities between the U.S. and China is naturally reshaping alliances across the globe. Admittedly, there remains a gap in the existing stock of comprehensive national power between China and the US—but history shows us that when the Titanic, the once world largest ship begins to sink, few are inclined to remain on board.

Editor: Charriot Zhai