Edited transcript from China Now, a top-rated political commentary show broadcast weekly in China.

President Trump’s launch of a global tariff war, particularly his decision to single out China for a showdown, is undoubtedly a foolish mistake. I recall in 2018, when Trump initiated the trade war with China, someone asked me how Deng Xiaoping might respond if he were alive. I said he would probably first launch a counter-strike in self-defense and observe whether his opponent would make even bigger mistakes. Once he detected a major error by his opponent, he would seize the opportunity to expand the gains, perhaps even turning a defensive counter-strike into a major offensive campaign. The current situation bears some resemblance to this hypothetical scenario. If the trade war Trump launched during his first term was a case of shooting his own feet, then the tariff world war he has unleashed today is a more suicidal error.

Many domestic commentators believe this will be a ‘protracted war,’ which has some merit. However, I am more inclined to believe that we have the potential to defeat U.S. tariff hegemony, and even the entire U.S. hegemonic system, through a series of decisive battles. If appropriate measures are taken, the time needed to determine the outcome of the crucial battles may not be very long. Undoubtedly, China is the most important nation in reversing the entire tariff war situation. China’s initial and robust counter-attack against U.S. tariff hegemony has inspired many countries that were initially inclined to submit to begin their own resistance. Traditional U.S. allies such as the European Union, Canada, and the United Kingdom have openly started to defend their own interests. Even President Milei of Argentina, a staunch Trump supporter, is not yielding to the U.S. The finance ministers and central bank governors of the ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, and South Korea recently issued a joint statement condemning the damage caused by unilateralism and protectionism to global trade.

I personally believe that, similar to military campaigns, defeating the instigator of this tariff war, the United States, through a series of decisive battles until it can no longer sustain the fight, would be a milestone in altering the global landscape. China’s strong counter-measures are striking from a higher dimension against U.S. hegemonic actions, they represent not only a subversion of U.S. tariff hegemony but also a subversion of the U.S. hegemonic system, which is based on four pillars: economy, technology, military, and public opinion. This will have a profound impact on the transformation of the entire global order.

Let’s look at the economic aspect. We stated back in 2018 that U.S. economic reliance on China already exceeded China’s reliance on the U.S., and this is even more the case today. Last year, Trump threatened to impose a 60% tariff on Chinese products. I said, ‘Impose 600% if you like; the U.S. will be left with nothing to eat.’ This tariff war has also further propelled the internationalization of the Renminbi. Previously, most Chinese foreign trade companies received payments from overseas clients in U.S. dollars. Now, an increasing number are starting to use RMB and the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). This not only avoids losses from currency exchange but also offers higher efficiency and lower costs.

This relates to our ability to strike from a higher dimension against U.S. hegemony in the technological field. CIPS itself has a technological advantage over the U.S. SWIFT system. CIPS is driven by a combination of blockchain and digital currency, reducing cross-border settlement time from several days with SWIFT to just seconds, and the transaction fees are only one-ten-thousandth of those of SWIFT. Over the past few years, we have also completed the construction of a digital regulatory system. For example, the China Rare Earth Tracing System achieves full-chain monitoring from mining to export to end-use, and employs quantum encryption technology to prevent data tampering. It is reported that this technology is now being widely used to control goods exported to the United States. In contrast, the U.S. system for imposing tariffs on Chinese goods frequently encounters breakdowns.

Over the years, the U.S. has been trying to curb China’s technological progress through the tariff war, but unexpectedly, this has accelerated China’s independent breakthroughs in areas such as aviation, semiconductors, and new energy. The domestic production of the C919 large passenger aircraft, Huawei’s global 5G deployment, and China’s leadership in the electric vehicle industry all demonstrate that U.S. sanctions and blockades are forcing China to innovate. When the time comes, we must not forget to award Trump a special contribution medal. To some extent, the Sino-U.S. tariff war is tearing apart the U.S. military’s decision-making core. The tightening of the U.S. defense budget, coupled with China’s countermeasures, has intensified the contradictions in the Pentagon’s resource allocation. The centrifugal tendency within NATO is also more evident. Trump’s ‘America First’ policy has alienated his NATO allies, and the Pentagon’s disarray has further undermined their sense of security. Some German members of parliament have openly questioned how the U.S. can fulfill its collective defense commitments to NATO if it cannot even stabilize its own Department of Defense.

Furthermore, in order to secure more military spending, the U.S. military is also hyping up the so-called ‘China threat.’ Several U.S. media outlets recently reported a statement by U.S. Defense Secretary Hegseth, who said that China’s hypersonic missiles could destroy ten American aircraft carriers within 20 minutes. In the past decade or so, U.S. war games targeting China have consistently ended in failure. Regardless of his motives, this statement, to a considerable extent, exposes the nature of U.S. imperialism today, which appears to be strong but inherently weak .

In terms of public opinion, Trump has riled up almost the entire world. His pursuit of ‘America First,’ withdrawal from the World Health Organization and the Paris Agreement, threats to annex Canada and Greenland, announcement of a plan to ‘take over’ Gaza, and imposition of tariffs on global trading partners, among other actions, have rapidly turned the U.S. into a loner. He has presented to the outside world an image of extreme immaturity and a complete lack of credibility. The latest Ipsos poll also shows that his approval rating has plummeted to 39%, setting the lowest record for a U.S. president in his first hundred days in office. Meanwhile, Hands Off protests have swept across all 50 U.S. states, calling for the Trump administration to stop ‘Making America Chaotic Again.’

In summary, as the U.S. wields the tariff big stick, China refuses to be intimidated. Its strong countermeasures and strikes from a higher dimension against U.S. hegemonic actions have been met with cheers from around the world. Global internet opinion is almost unanimously in support of China. This reflects two fundamental facts: first, the world has long suffered under U.S. hegemony, and second, one wins hearts and minds with justice. In the face of China’s countermeasures, Trump has to ‘blink first’ time and again. A hegemonic superpower has today become so battered and exhausted. Behind this is the rapid decline of U.S. hard and soft power at a rate visible to the naked eye. A 2024 Pew Research Center survey showed that trust in the U.S. among people in 47 countries has plummeted to a historic low, while favorability towards China has increased by 9 percentage points. The latest 2025 Pew Research Center poll also shows that amidst the escalating U.S.-China tariff war, negative views of China among Americans have declined for the first time in five years, with only 33% of Americans defining China as an enemy, significantly lower than last year’s 42%. Last year’s 42% was the highest figure at the time. Undoubtedly, China’s strong counter-attack has won the support of the vast majority of people around the world, including many Americans. Therefore, we must carry this international economic and trade struggle to a complete victory. After this battle, the world’s perception of China will be transformed, because China has played a pivotal role in thwarting the U.S. hegemonic system, which will be of epoch-making significance. After this battle, the whole world will recognize who the world’s true largest and strongest economy is, and who represents a better future for human society. It is China, not the United States.

Round table and Q&A

Huang Renwei: From the moment Trump took office, he came on strong and aggressive, as if the whole world would prostrate itself and beg for his mercy with just a word from him. This approach of his first and foremost destroyed America’s credibility in the world; no one trusts him anymore. Even Obama and Clinton have come out to say that our greatest failure is the loss of America’s credibility. That’s the first point. Secondly, he believed that by putting unlimited pressure on China, China wouldn’t be able to withstand such immense pressure. But unexpectedly, China retaliated, and it turned out to be the U.S. that couldn’t handle the pressure. This is a completely opposite outcome. Thirdly, because China stood firm as a pillar, the whole world refused to yield, not even Japan, which was also unexpected. Following that, internal conflicts within the U.S. erupted, leading to a situation where he’s besieged on all sides.

For the United States, when it cannot transfer the pressure of its social development contradictions to the external world, this pressure will rebound on itself. Professor Zhang has also mentioned in his speech that the United States has four hegemonic pillars, which we have discussed in a previous program, including the economy, technology, military, and public opinion. So, I would like to ask Professor Zhang, regarding this new round of tariff war, do you think it will only shake these four hegemonic pillars temporarily, or will it really cause permanent and irreversible damage?

Zhang Weiwei: I believe it will cause a profound upheaval. This view was inspired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, who, after attending the United Nations General Assembly last year, lamented that countries in the Global South now know that there are alternatives to Western products in the economy, technology, military, and ideology or public opinion. In other words, he has seen that these four pillars of Western hegemony have been shaken. And in my own research on our countermeasures against the U.S. tariff war, we are in fact exerting efforts in all four areas. Whether or not we have coordinated in this way, the whole world is actually moving in this comprehensive direction. This presents an opportunity, and I think we should seize it.

He Jie: In warfare, opportunities are crucial; they must not be missed, as they may never return. Therefore, this counter-attack, especially the comprehensive, four-pronged counter-attack mentioned earlier, is also a very important opportunity that we must seize.

Huang Renwei: We can compare this to the Korean War: the all-out military confrontation lasted for a year, and then negotiations began in 1951. From 1951 to 1953, the time spent negotiating and fighting simultaneously was longer than the time spent on pure fighting. Moreover, the fighting in the later period of these concurrent negotiations and battles was even more brutal, because both sides were trying to force the other to yield and make concessions at the negotiating table. So the later fighting was even more brutal than the earlier fighting, but in the end, the United States could not bear it and accepted the armistice. I think this trade war and tariff war will be the same; there will still be fighting during the later stages of negotiations, and it will be even fiercer than before.

He Jie: Just now, Professor Huang used the Korean War as an analogy. We know that during the Korean War, when we fought, China was characterized by ‘high morale, low resources.’ We had the will of steel, but our overall industrial and especially military production capabilities were completely incomparable to those of the United States; the difference was many orders of magnitude. But now, we have both high morale and high resources, and the situation is even more different.

Zhang Weiwei: In warfare, decisive battles are crucial. Many articles talk about preparing for a protracted war, and I don’t disagree with that general principle. But in any war, no matter how long it lasts, there are always several decisive battles. For example, with CIPS and SWIFT, I saw Jeffrey Sachs say this morning that the lifespan of dollar hegemony is at most another 10 years. He believes that the dollar’s monopoly position may not even last 10 years. After Trump weaponized SWIFT and other systems, the consequences are clear: eventually, you won’t be able to repay your debts, and you’ll have major problems. Moreover, China’s CIPS technology is vastly superior; one system calculates in seconds, while the other takes days. Anyone who has used SWIFT knows that it typically takes 3 to 5 days and charges 3% or even more in handling fees, compared to CIPS, which has almost zero handling fees. As a result, more and more people are using CIPS. I remember Yanis Varoufakis, the former Greek Minister of Finance, said that China’s CIPS is a huge threat to the United States. America’s SWIFT is like an old, dilapidated highway full of potholes, with many users but in poor condition, while China’s CIPS is a first-class highway with all kinds of cutting-edge blockchain technology. Once it’s put into use, everything will accelerate in the internet age. After a few decisive battles, the United States will realize, if it’s wise, that it has already lost the war.

He Jie: Furthermore, you can imagine that SWIFT’s commission fees constitute a significant portion of the U.S. GDP’s service trade income. If this proportion declines, the inflated figures in the U.S. GDP will be greatly reduced, and people will see many changes in the numbers.

Huang Renwei: This tariff war has exposed the weaknesses of U.S. hegemony, or some fundamental aspects of its eroding power, quite thoroughly. First, the gap in the entire U.S. manufacturing sector is too large. The hollowing out of industry is now truly visible, with empty shelves in supermarkets, which cannot be remedied. Moreover, there aren’t enough workers; recruitment is difficult, and many young people would rather be unemployed at home than work in factories. This is a major, irreparable issue. Second, its finance, its currency, and its stock markets are taking a triple punch in the soft underbelly, which could be life-threatening.

He Jie: You just mentioned that young Americans would rather stay at home than go to work. Why is that?

Huang Renwei: They can’t cope with physical labor, the assembly line work is just too tough.

He Jie: They are not well-trained industrial workers.

Huang Renwei: They just can’t do that.

He Jie: There was no training opportunity, because there was no such work.

Huang Renwei:
Their Treasury Secretary said something about leaving clothing and toys to China, and keeping the strategic, cutting-edge industries in the United States. But that’s impossible. They can’t manage the low-end stuff, and they can’t manage the high-end either. Even their most advanced military-industrial complex relies on thousands of Chinese companies to provide components.

I met a Singaporean businessman who invested in the United States about two or three years ago. His biggest challenge, aside from legal obstacles and various conflicts, was the fact that he couldn’t recruit suitable workers. He said that more than half, even two-thirds, of the people they hired fell into a few categories: first, they were illiterate, lacking basic arithmetic and reading skills; second, drug abuse was very common—sometimes they said that if you did a blood test, it might be as high as 70% of the job applicants; and third, many people came to deceive the system because they also had unemployment benefits, and you needed to have a job or attend some courses to receive those benefits, so they would deceive the system. Once they got a job, they wouldn’t even show up. There’s no work ethic among this generation—that’s how they grew up.

He Jie: As you just mentioned, were the Singaporean businessman’s requirements for industrial workers too high, or were they just normal requirements?

Zhang Weiwei: Singaporean companies generally have slightly higher requirements because they no longer engage in low-end manufacturing but focus on either mid- to high-end manufacturing or the service industry.

He Jie: But this case precisely confirms what you mentioned earlier: the U.S. hopes to keep its mid- to high-end manufacturing domestically, but mid- to high-end manufacturing places higher demands on industrial workers—demands that they simply cannot meet. So this is a very objective situation.

Our program has also been discussing this. I’ll mention again that among the four pillars, the U.S. used to have hegemony in ideology. But recently, after USAID reduced its funding, it seems the internet has become a bit clearer. Yes, I’d also like to hear both of your opinions on whether they will reorganize and make a comeback in the future.

Zhang Weiwei: Recently, Harvard professor Joseph Nye passed away. He was the scholar who proposed the concept of soft power. Back in 2018, I gave a lecture at Harvard, and he was there, we had a dialogue. At that time, he was particularly disappointed with Trump, believing that Trump had destroyed America’s soft power.

Huang Renwei: Several core tenets of universal values are being trampled upon by Trump. He doesn’t talk about democracy or human rights, and he himself is a dictator. The very foundation of the nation has been turned to ashes by Trump. So how can such a country act as a champion of universal values? That’s one point. If the Democratic Party comes to power again one day, and they reverse course, overturning everything Trump did, then America’s credibility will be damaged yet again. With such back-and-forth destruction, America’s soft power will truly hit rock bottom, reduced to nothing. So, will they stir up new waves of anti-China sentiments? Yes, they will. For example, recently the U.S. Congress passed two Taiwan-related bills, refusing to acknowledge that Taiwan is part of China. Not a single member of Congress opposed them; they passed unanimously. These bills have no legal effect, but they require the State Department to comply. They are deliberately trying to provoke us, to make things difficult for us. They will continue to do things like this. In fact, everything the U.S. is doing now is unreasonable and even violates its own values. This is not just shooting themselves in the foot; it’s smashing their own heads with a rock.

He Jie: Now we open the floor for questions.

Audience: Last year, China’s exports to the U.S. reached over $500 billion. In the short term, how will the renewed tariff war impact China’s economy, particularly the manufacturing sector and foreign trade? Thank you.

Huang Renwei: Your question is excellent and touches on a comprehensive aspect of China’s trade structure. How dependent is China on U.S. trade? In 2012, 34% of China’s total exports went to the U.S.—the peak. By the end of 2024, this share has dropped to 12%, a decline of over 20 percentage points. While 12% remains significant, our reliance on the U.S. has markedly decreased. Since the first trade war, China has undergone substantial adjustments, most notably by deepening ties with the Global South. For instance, trade with Latin America surged from $100 billion in 2018 to $500 billion in 2024—a fivefold increase—and continues to grow. Today, ASEAN and Latin America are China’s largest trading partners, surpassing the U.S. and the EU. Though U.S. trade still matters, its impact is far less critical than a decade ago. It now accounts for just over 2% of China’s GDP. While a 2-3% loss is substantial, it is not catastrophic. By expanding investments in the Belt and Road Initiative, we simultaneously boost trade—more investments mean more exports of products and equipment, especially in infrastructure projects like high-speed rail, highways, bridges, and hydropower plants. Trade with Europe and developing nations now overshadows that with the U.S.

Let me add a case study. The trade war didn’t erupt overnight. Since Trump’s actions began in 2018-2019, preparations have been underway. My hometown, Jinhua, Zhejiang, is home to Yiwu—a global trade hub. From Trump’s first term, Yiwu strategically shifted exports from the U.S. to BRI countries, the Middle East, and other regions. When new tariffs hit, Yiwu adapted swiftly.

Huang Renwei: Yiwu is also a focal point in our BRI research.

He Jie: Thanks to the Yiwu-Xinjiang-Europe Railway.

Huang Renwei:
And the tens of thousands of foreign traders based there. We are in close contact with Yiwu.

Zhang Weiwei: You summarized it well: First, the BRI and Global South offer new growth engines. China-ASEAN trade, nearing $1 trillion, is now our largest partnership. Second, domestic demand is pivotal. Policies like the trade-in program have spurred consumption. Third, after seven years of trade war, most enterprises—unless complacent—have diversified. Opportunities abroad are abundant.

He Jie: Impact varies by sector. Some industries face minimal disruption or even thrive, while others reliant on tax rebates and slow to adapt suffer more. Some foreign trade companies enjoying export tax rebates are slower to adapt and respond, may face heavier blows.

Huang Renwei: Speaking of tax rebates, the U.S. tariff war has pushed us to adjust our policies.

He Jie: Must be adjusted.

Huang Renwei: By reducing export tax rebates, Chinese enterprises are compelled to raise their export prices. This price increase alleviates cutthroat internal competition among domestic firms, effectively shifting the cost burden outward. Consequently, the U.S.—despite its attempts to curb Chinese exports—not only fails to halt them but is forced to accept higher-priced goods. This dynamic benefits China by easing fiscal burdens, reducing domestic market infighting, elevating export values, and optimizing the overall trade structure.

Zhang Weiwei: Let me add another example: the U.S. pressure has brought China and Europe into consensus recently, a favorable outcome. Initially, the EU planned to impose tariffs as high as 45% on Chinese EVs. Now, instead of tariffs, they’ve set a price floor, effectively banning ultra-low pricing while allowing Chinese automakers to charge premium rates. As discussed earlier, this forces Chinese firms to elevate their prices.

He Jie: We’re eager to sell at premium prices. Leveraging China’s comprehensive strengths, even at comparable price points, we retain a competitive edge—thanks to superior service and product quality. That said, many SMEs in foreign trade still face challenges. This is where government intervention becomes critical. Local governments nationwide have rolled out targeted measures—financial subsidies, tax relief, and other forms of assistance—to help these businesses weather the storm. It’s a multi-pronged approach to ensure no one is left behind.

Audience: During the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, the USSR collapsed under arms race pressures. As China tackles chokepoint technologies via its whole-nation approach, how can we avoid repeating Soviet mistakes?

Zhang Weiwei: The USSR mistakenly engaged in an arms race with the U.S. In retrospect, it was not wise, especially when it competed quantitatively, they had to outnumber the U.S. in every aspect. China now avoids this arms race. We have our overall assessment. By U.S. calculation, China’s military spending is far less than that of the U.S., but every dollar we spend produce the same result as five dollars of theirs. I think the ratio is actually greater.

He Jie: Could be greater. A bag of bushings cost tens of thousands of dollars.

Zhang Weiwei: Recently, Jensen Huang also addressed this, albeit diplomatically. He noted that while the U.S. still maintains a lead in AI research, China’s dominance in real-world AI applications is undeniable. We are far ahead in this area, driving new demands.

He Jie: Critics often claim China lags in ‘0 to 1’ basic R&D, this is outdated. Our basic research today is robust, especially good at the ‘1 to 100’ phase—applied iteration. China’s vast, dynamic application scenarios allow us to continuously upgrade technologies, and solve technical challenges iteratively.

Huang Renwei: Takes chips for example, While the U.S. appears to be ahead, China dominates market competitiveness in key nodes—7nm, 14nm, and 28nm processes—where we are now the world’s largest producer. In fact, China has already become the top global exporter of chips.

He Jie: More than 30% market share.

Huang Renwei: A huge market bring a huge return, and then we can use this return to develop 5-nanometer and 3-nanometer technologies. In fact, China is catching up with the U.S. in terms of military equipment. We are not the follower, we are blazing new trails, such as the sixth-generation fighter jet.

Zhang Weiwei: Striking from a higher dimension.

Huang Renwei: From a higher dimension, and U.S cannot catch up. The Soviet Union’s arms race was quantitative, if the U.S. had 1,000 nuclear missiles, and the Soviet Union had to have at least 2,000. Later, when the U.S. had 4,000, the Soviet Union had already 10,000. When it reached 10,000, the Soviet economy collapsed. China will not follow this path.

He Jie: We are talking about systems, about industry, about information-led. So getting back to his major, which is information, is particularly important. We are overtaking the U.S. in new fields, not following them.

Audience: Is the recent tension between India and Pakistan related to the United States? The tariff war launched by Trump has already failed. Will the U.S. provoke military conflicts around China to force China to make concessions? Thank you.

Zhang Weiwei: There is not enough information about whether the U.S. is behind the India-Pakistan conflict. However, the basic fact is that the so-called terrorist attack occurred when Vice President Vance was in India. One possibility is that the U.S. hopes to support India and put pressure on China. Another possibility is that the U.S. may not have such a strong desire, but the Indian Prime Minister wants to show that the U.S. supports us. So there is not enough information now, and it depends on how to analyze it. But in any case, from the results of the war so far, frankly speaking, it should be said that Pakistan has a clear advantage in the air force, and the equipment behind it is made in China, so you can see that our netizens are very happy.

Huang Renwei: The United States is likely to create frictions and small conflicts around China. The most typical example is the Philippines. In the South China Sea and Huangyan Island, it hopes that China and the Philippines will fight, but we will manage the situation- firmly upholding our sovereignty while keeping the conflict under control. Secondly, there may be various minor frictions around China, but none will escalate into full-scale war. For instance, terrorism along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is something we can handle. Small issues like these won’t be able to disrupt China’s broader strategic goals—that’s simply impossible. So there’s no need for excessive concern. As for larger potential flashpoints, such as the Diaoyu Islands or the Korean Peninsula, I believe we are fully capable of managing those as well.

He Jie: We have actually managed the scattered fires ignited by the U.S. around our periphery very effectively. The primary reason behind this is our comprehensive national strength—our economic power, military capabilities, and strong capacity to build platforms for dialogue and mediation. All of this reflects our overall strength.

So, returning to the new round of trade wars launched by Trump and the broader question of where American hegemony is headed, I believe the ultimate answer lies in China’s formidable comprehensive strength. While we all acknowledge that this battle will be, to some extent, a protracted one, we have both the strong capability and unwavering resolve to ensure that victory will ultimately be ours.

Editor: yanghanyi