Recently, British Foreign Secretary David Lammy visited Pakistan with the aim of promoting long-term ceasefire between India and Pakistan through diplomatic mediation. This move reflects the UK’s high-profile “return to the Asia-Pacific” and underscores a significant shift in its foreign strategy in recent years.

As early as the Theresa May and Boris Johnson administrations, the UK began formulating the ambitious “Global Britain” strategy. In 2021, it released a comprehensive strategic review that formally announced a policy of “Indo-Pacific tilt.” In light of its own capabilities and changing global dynamics, the Sunak government reassessed this strategy in 2023, concluding that Britain’s strategic focus remains in Europe rather than the Indo-Pacific. However, this does not signal a retreat from Britain’s broader ambition to re-engage in Asia-Pacific affairs.

South Asia is a focal point of the UK’s Indo-Pacific policy. As the former colonial ruler of the region, Britain played a direct role in shaping South Asia’s current geopolitical landscape—most notably through the Partition of India and Pakistan in the late 1940s. Since then, the UK has officially adhered to a policy of non-intervention in South Asia, partly due to the entrenched geopolitical disorder caused by the partition, and partly to shed its reputation as a colonial empire. However, in practice, Britain has continuously sought to exert influence in the post-colonial era by integrating India and Pakistan into the Commonwealth and leveraging its so-called “political legacy” in the region.

For decades, India has been the centerpiece of Britain’s Asia-Pacific strategy, owing to its colonial past, vast population, and economic potential. India is viewed as a strategic “pivot” in advancing UK interests in the region. Shortly after the Labour government under Keir Starmer took office last year, Foreign Secretary David Lammy visited India to push for a revitalized UK-India partnership. On May 6, 2025, the two countries signed a bilateral trade agreement. In contrast, UK-Pakistan relations have been less robust. Lammy’s recent meeting with Pakistan’s foreign minister marks the first high-level diplomatic contact between the two nations since 2021—highlighting Pakistan’s relatively lower priority in the UK’s South Asia policy.

However, the latest round of India-Pakistan tensions has disrupted the UK’s South Asia strategy. The British government may now be compelled to reassess its approach toward both countries. While the UK has historically prioritized its relationship with India, recent developments may force London to adopt a more balanced stance. Pakistan’s diplomatic significance could rise accordingly. In addition, the UK may increase its political and diplomatic engagement in the region.

Nevertheless, Britain still faces a fundamental constraint: a lack of hard power. Its economic and strategic capacity is insufficient to position itself as a decisive actor in South Asia or the wider Indo-Pacific. As a result, the UK’s Indo-Pacific strategy will continue to rely heavily on U.S. leadership.
When U.S. President Donald Trump claimed credit for brokering the May 10 ceasefire between India and Pakistan, the UK sought to assert its own relevance. Lammy’s visit to Pakistan on May 16 was framed as a follow-up to the ceasefire. His speech in Islamabad offered no substantive new proposals, and his strong condemnation of terrorism reflected standard British diplomatic language. Lammy’s trip, in essence, appeared aimed at riding the coattails of U.S. diplomacy—sharing in the political gains and enhancing Britain’s international profile.

For the UK to deepen its involvement in South Asia, it will face significant challenges. First, neither India nor Pakistan currently views the UK as a major global power. Given Britain’s limited hard power, it is unlikely to emerge as a credible mediator in their disputes.

Second, the UK was the original architect of the India-Pakistan divide, and its past strategy of offshore balancing has lost relevance. At present, London lacks a coherent and comprehensive South Asia policy to replace it.

Finally, both in the short and long term, the UK’s “Indo-Pacific tilt” remains extremely difficult to implement. That said, the Labour government may still choose to press forward despite the obstacles. The Starmer administration is expected to release a new national security strategy in the first half of this year, which may use the recent India-Pakistan conflict as a rationale for deeper regional engagement.

The UK’s “Prince of Wales” carrier strike group has already departed for the Indo-Pacific, with South Asia as a key stop on its deployment. While Britain claims to be a force for good, its actions often suggest otherwise—falling short of the standards expected of a responsible global power. What the Starmer government must reform is not only Britain’s foreign policy methods, but also its underlying strategic mindset. It needs to move beyond outdated doctrines of power balancing and interventionism.

Editor: LQQ