Introduction
On October 25, 2026, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was reelected president of Brazil with 64,256,232 votes (51.79% of valid votes), defeating Flávio Bolsonaro of the Liberal Party (PL), who received 59,826,041 (48.21%). Lula’s victory was marked by a remarkable electoral turnaround: he increased his vote total by approximately 10.4 million between the first and second rounds, a shift that reflected the mobilization of a broad coalition of voters and the consolidation of opposition to the Bolsonaro family.
The election was about more than competing candidates and government programs. It was a struggle over democracy, national sovereignty, political accountability, and Brazil’s place in the international order. It also exposed the influence of foreign governments and global technology corporations over domestic political competition. I argue that Brazil’s election must be understood through six interconnected dimensions: democratic mobilization, government performance, political accountability, foreign intervention, digital platforms, and strategic autonomy.
1. Electoral Mobilization and Democratic Resistance
Lula’s victory demonstrated the capacity of democratic and progressive forces to mobilize despite difficulties faced by his government. After a highly competitive first round in which Flávio Bolsonaro finished ahead, Lula broadened his coalition, bringing together Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) supporters, progressive movements, moderate voters, and citizens determined to prevent the return of the Bolsonaro political project.
Digital communication helped connect political messages with grassroots mobilization. Lula’s Army (Exército do Lula), an online mobilization network, illustrates how digital engagement can circulate information, organize supporters, and encourage electoral participation. Women, students, social movements, and other groups contributed to a broader defense of democratic institutions and social rights.
The election was therefore also a struggle against the far right. Bolsonaro-aligned politics draws strength from conservative values, anti-left sentiment, security concerns, alignment to the US-led order and distrust of institutions. Lula’s victory did not eliminate these forces, but demonstrated that they could be defeated through democratic mobilization.
The international dimension was equally significant. The New York Times editorial “Trump Should Stay Out of Brazilian Politics,” published on October 25, 2026, highlighted concerns about Donald Trump’s involvement in Brazil’s political contest. The underlying question is whether Latin American countries can preserve their political autonomy when powerful external actors seek to influence domestic outcomes.
2. Government Performance and Electoral Vulnerability
Lula’s reelection can be understood as an expression of Brazilians’ engagement with their country’s future and with the kind of society they want to build. Beyond choosing a president, voters made a decision about Brazil’s political direction, its democratic institutions, its social priorities, and its place in the world. The result reflected competing visions of the country and the mobilization of citizens around the future they wish to shape.
Datafolha’s February 2025 survey found that only 24% rated Lula’s government as excellent or good, while 41% considered it poor or very poor. By September 2025, the positive assessment had risen to 33%, while approval of Lula’s personal performance stood at 48%. These are distinct indicators: one evaluates the government, the other the president’s performance (Datafolha, 2025a; 2025b).
Economic pressures and communication failures weakened Lula’s position. Controversies and misinformation concerning the Pix payment system and taxation also demonstrated how public anxiety could spread through digital networks.
Nevertheless, the PT retained an important political advantage through its historical association with social inclusion. Policies involving income support, poverty reduction, education, and public services remain central to its political identity. Some voters supported Lula because of these policies; others voted primarily to prevent a Bolsonaro return. The result reflected this convergence rather than unqualified approval of the government.
Lula’s next challenge is to translate electoral support into renewed legitimacy through improvements in living standards, effective communication, and policies that address the concerns of a divided electorate.
3. Political Accountability and the Bolsonaro Family
Brazil’s polarization reflects competing visions of its social and political future. Lula’s coalition draws on organized labor, social movements, and policies aimed at reducing inequality. Flávio Bolsonaro’s coalition builds on his father’s political legacy, combining anti-PT sentiment, conservative values, and a fake law-and-order agenda.
Flávio Bolsonaro is currently under investigation in two separate cases. The first concerns possible irregularities in the transfer of nearly US$70 million from Banco Master to finance Dark Horse, a film about his father, former president Jair Bolsonaro (Schreiber, 2026; 2026). Investigators are examining the origin and destination of the funds, including suspicions of money laundering, corruption, and other potential crimes. The second investigation concerns alleged money laundering in partnership with lawyer Willer Tomáz. Both cases raise questions about financial transparency and the relationship between political influence and private financial networks. These are ongoing investigations, not final judicial findings of guilt, and Flávio Bolsonaro denies wrongdoing.
Moreover, Flávio Bolsonaro’s reported departure from Brazil shortly after receiving nearly 60 million votes in the presidential election raises serious questions about his political responsibility and respect for public accountability. A candidate who seeks a mandate to lead the country assumes a responsibility to the millions of citizens who voted for him, including an obligation to address legitimate questions about his conduct transparently. Leaving the country while facing serious financial controversies and ongoing investigations risks undermining public confidence, particularly when the circumstances of the departure raise questions about whether he intends to confront those allegations or avoid scrutiny. In this context, his departure is politically troubling and may reinforce suspicions surrounding the ongoing investigations.
The departures of Jair Bolsonaro to the United States in December 2022 and Eduardo Bolsonaro’s relocation there in 2025 illustrate a broader political pattern: members of Brazil’s far right turning to the United States while facing legal scrutiny at home. In Eduardo’s case, Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes explicitly argued that he was residing in the United States to evade legal accountability, amid proceedings concerning his alleged efforts to encourage US sanctions against Brazil (Agência Brasil, 2025). These episodes reinforce a central argument of this paper: the Bolsonaro family’s political project has become closely aligned with the strategic interests of the Trump administration, including its willingness to use economic pressure and sanctions to influence Brazilian affairs. From this perspective, their alliance with Washington does not simply reflect ideological affinity; it raises fundamental questions about Brazilian sovereignty, democratic self-determination, and the use of foreign power to constrain the choices of Brazil’s institutions and electorate.
4. US Intervention, Imperialism, and Brazilian Sovereignty
Brazil’s election unfolded amid pressure from the United States. On July 30, 2025, the US Department of the Treasury announced sanctions against Supreme Federal Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes under Executive Order 13818, implementing the Global Magnitsky framework. Washington justified the action by accusing Moraes of serious abuses of judicial authority and restrictions on freedom of expression (US Department of the Treasury, 2025).
From a Brazilian sovereignty perspective, the issue is whether unilateral sanctions and economic pressure are appropriate instruments for addressing disputes involving another country’s constitutional institutions. Efforts by Bolsonaro-aligned political figures to enlist support from the Trump administration, in the context of US tariff pressure on Brazil and sanctions against a Brazilian justice, raised concerns about the use of foreign coercion for domestic political purposes.
Reports published immediately before the election described efforts within the Trump administration to support the Bolsonaro political camp. The New York Times editorial “Trump Should Stay Out of Brazilian Politics” also argued that Trump’s actions effectively took sides in Brazil’s political contest. Taken together, these reports raise serious concerns about foreign interference and the use of US economic and diplomatic power to influence Brazil’s political future (Reuters, 2026; The New York Times, 2026).
In my assessment, Brazil’s election became a frontline in the struggle against US imperialism and the prospect of Washington’s hegemonic domination over the Americas. The contest was not simply between two domestic political projects: it also concerned whether Brazil and other Latin American countries could preserve their sovereignty in the face of external pressure, sanctions, tariffs, and political alliances. By choosing its own president despite this pressure, Brazilian voters reaffirmed their right to determine the country’s future without coercion from Washington.
The stakes extend across Latin America. They concern the region’s capacity to make independent political choices, diversify international partnerships, and resist a hemispheric order organized around US predominance. This does not require rejecting relations with the United States; it requires defending the principle that international relations must be based on sovereignty, reciprocal respect, and non-interference.
5. Meta and Electoral Sovereignty
The struggle over Brazil’s political future also involved global technology corporations. Meta, which controls Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, occupies a central position in Brazil’s political communication infrastructure, influencing how candidates reach voters and how political messages circulate.
In the 2026 electoral context, concerns about unequal treatment, restrictions on campaign communication, and algorithmic distribution raised questions about Meta’s influence over electoral competition. In my assessment, Meta interfered in the electoral process by privileging one political side over the other. When one candidate’s reach is restricted while the opposing side benefits from algorithmic recommendations, the balance of political communication can be affected.
These are not merely technical questions. Content moderation, recommendation systems, and account restrictions can shape the information environment in which voters make decisions. Even where a company attributes incidents to technical failures or disputes partisan intent, unequal effects deserve public scrutiny.
The concentration of these functions in a private corporation headquartered outside Brazil creates a democratic accountability problem. Electoral sovereignty must encompass not only the integrity of voting and counting, but also transparency in algorithmic distribution, equal treatment of candidates, and effective oversight of digital platforms. Brazil must be able to protect its public sphere without surrendering it to opaque corporate systems.
6. China, Strategic Autonomy, and South–South Cooperation
Lula’s reelection creates political space to deepen relations with China, strengthen engagement through BRICS and the G20, and revitalize South–South cooperation. China is Brazil’s largest trading partner, but the relationship should move beyond commodity exports toward technology, industrial development, renewable energy, infrastructure, and scientific cooperation.
Strategic autonomy does not require unconditional alignment with China or hostility toward the United States. It requires the capacity to pursue national development priorities, diversify partnerships, and make independent foreign-policy choices.
South–South cooperation can connect regions through practical collaboration while supporting policy autonomy, development rights, and a more balanced distribution of global power. Brazil can use these partnerships to expand its options, strengthen dialogue among countries of the Global South, and promote international institutions that better reflect contemporary realities.
The objective is not to replace one dependency with another, but to expand the capacity of Brazil and its partners to negotiate, cooperate, and shape the international order.
Conclusion
Brazil has become a frontline in the struggle against the prospect of total US domination over the Americas. The 2026 election was not merely a domestic contest between competing political projects; it was also a test of whether Latin American countries can preserve their sovereignty in the face of Washington’s growing willingness to use economic pressure, sanctions, and political alliances to shape the region’s internal affairs. By rejecting the Bolsonaro political project, Brazilian voters reaffirmed their right to determine the country’s future without external coercion.
The next administration must address economic pressures, rebuild public confidence, and ensure that political accountability applies equally across the spectrum. Internationally, Brazil must defend its sovereignty while remaining engaged with the world. Stronger relations with China, BRICS, the G20, and other Global South partners can support a more multipolar order and expand Brazil’s room for independent action.
Democracy, sovereignty, and development are interconnected. Brazil’s challenge is to turn electoral resistance into durable institutions, inclusive development, and international cooperation that protects its autonomy and contributes to a more equitable world order.
References
Agência Brasil. 2025. “Moraes diz que Eduardo Bolsonaro está nos EUA para fugir da lei.” 29 September. https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/justica/noticia/2025-09/moraes-diz-que-eduardo-bolsonaro-esta-nos-eua-para-fugir-da-lei.
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U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2025. “Treasury Sanctions Alexandre de Moraes.” July 30, 2025. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0211.
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). 2026. “Presidente do TSE anuncia reeleição de Lula e faz balanço do 2º turno das eleições 2026.” October 25, 2026. https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Outubro/presidente-do-tse-anuncia-reeleicao-de-lula-e-faz-balanco-do-2o-turno-das-eleicoes-2026.
Editor: Zhiyu Wang
