A Brave & Grave New World of Trump 2.0?

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China Academy interviewed Professor YU Bin, a political science professor with experience in top-tier think tanks and policy research centers in both China and the United States, regarding Trump 2.0's foreign policy. Professor Yu sees Trump's presidency as an opportunity to improve US-China relations and looks forward to a potential second honeymoon period between the two nations.
January 23, 2025
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YU Bin is a senior fellow of the Shanghai Association of American Studies, senior fellow of the Russian Studies Center of the East China Normal University in Shanghai.
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Compared with his first term (2017-200), Donald Trump’s return to the White House in 2025 is perhaps not a “shock-and-awe” for many.  There is, however, a considerable sense of uncertainty regarding the trajectories of his domestic and foreign policies, which could be unconventional, dramatic, and even disruptive. So, buckle up, and be prepared for the bumpy road ahead.

Two Trumpian Presidencies: Domestic Constraints vs. Foreign Policy Surprises?

Such a sense of uncertainty is the result of two outcomes of the 2024 election. On the one hand, Trump possesses unprecedented political prowess, and even a mandate, from his electoral victory over his Democrat opponent Biden.

The Republicans also gained control over the legislative and judiciary branches of the government. This fusion of power, which frequently happens in parliamentary democracy, is rarely seen in the U.S. On top of all of this is Trump’s exceptional charisma and persuading power among his supporters, or 50% of Americans.

On the other hand, Trump’s domestic agenda (MAGA, etc.) is facing a lot of hurdles and opposition, such as the perception of a “deep state”, real or perceived; a deeply divided elite; and a dysfunctional, and highly politicized, civil service (such as during the LA fire). This is what Samuel Huntington defined in 1968 (Political Order and Political Decay), and later Francis Fukuyama in 2014 (Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy) called “political decay.”

Last if not least, the US society is plagued by inflation, violent crimes, a culture of gun-related violence, random or politically motivated, too many drugs, a growing homeless population (almost 800,000), an increasingly unaffordable healthcare system, etc.

Given these domestic hurdles, foreign policy is perhaps an area where President Trump could achieve some quick and visible gains. This was why Trump, in his inauguration speech, focused on domestic challenges, while giving only lip service to foreign policy issues.

Historically, and particularly after WWII, there has been an increasing concentration of presidential power over foreign policy.  This is the phenomenon of the so-called “two presidencies” in the U.S.: a constrained president on domestic issues, and a president who reigns supreme in foreign affairs. And the Trump presidency is no exception.

“Three Strikes” of Trump’s Foreign Policy

His foreign policy priority can be summarized as the “Three Ts”: tariff or trade wars against all; territorial acquisition (Greenland, Canada, Panama Cannel, etc.); and terminating, or ending, the Ukraine War.

There is, however, always a gap between the highly rhetorical and moralistic campaign promises, and actual policies once the president is in office. It remains to be seen to what extent candidate Trump’s “three strikes,” or “three Ts,” can be played out in his first 100 days (or, in Chinese, it is called 新官上任三把火).

Each of these three issues is a league of its own, and there are limits how much Trump can achieve these goals. Tariffs, for example, may generate some quick pocket money, but not without pain. It will add pressure to the already high inflation. Moreover, it may not lead to eventual import substitution. This is because the U.S. lacks engineers and skilled workers and it takes decades to train them.

In fact, the US manufacturing sector has continued to decline in the past decade despite increasing Federal subsidies. Just look at the cases of Boeing, Intel, US Steel, etc. Even the US military finds itself highly dependent on China’s supply chains according to some recent Pentagon estimates. Moreover, new investments are more likely to use automation and AI, rather than hiring more expensive workers. Last if not least, the US manufacturing sector, which is about only 10% of the GDP, is particularly vulnerable to retaliations from other countries. President Trump, therefore, will have to navigate carefully in a trade war, which usually produces losers.

The second T is about territorial acquisition. As presidential candidate and president-elect, Trump repeatedly voiced his desire for land acquisition regarding Greenland, Canada, and Panama Canal. Given the huge power disparities between the US and these smaller and weaker states, the US does have the power to prevail. The question is whether the US has the authority, or the legitimacy, to take land from others in such a forceful manner. Even back in 1900, Teddy Roosevelt preferred “speaking softly” while carrying a “big stick.”  

The Trump team, therefore, will have to choose between “leading” (Americans love to talk about leading the world) by example of power, which was prevalent in times of colonialism and imperialism, or leading by the power of example of being a more benevolent hegemony able to persuade others with meaningful diplomacy. Of course, Trump’s articulated desire for land acquisition may be a kind of high-pressure negotiating tactic. Real policies could be more prudent. I hope so.

The third T is how to terminate, or end, the Ukraine war. On the campaign trail, Trump promised many times to that he would end the war in 24 hours. Ending the war, or any war, could be far more difficult than starting one, according to Henry Kissinger’s 2014 op-ed in the Washington Post on the Crimea crisis. For him, “[T]he test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.”

Regardless, ending the bloody war in Ukraine is now on the agenda. For Trump, the Ukraine war was caused by NATO expansion. This is very similar to George Kennan’s 1997 warning in the New York Times that NATO expansion “would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.”

Unfortunately, Kennan’s warning was ignored by the post-Cold War liberal interventionists and neocons. Five rounds of NATO eastward expansion eventually led to the Ukraine War and the death of tens of thousands of Ukrainians and Russians.

For China, and perhaps for most people in the Global South, letting others die for one’s own interests, be they geopolitical or ideological, is amoral and immoral. Worse, to win a war with the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, which is Russia, is like looking for winners in the Los Angeles fire, or the 1989 San Francisco earthquake. In the age of WMD and AI, there will be no winners. In this regard, Trump’s promise to end the Ukraine war is in line with China’s “principled neutrality” (that I will elaborate later).

If his war-ending effort would lead to some kind of de-escalation, conflict management, a ceasefire, or even long-term peace, the 47th president of the United States deserves serious consideration for a Nobel Peace Prize. This is my opinion. At least, that will be far more credible than the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize for Barack Obama, who did nothing except by being elected as US president.

Trump’s “China Issue”: Beyond another “Honeymoon”?

Finally, of all the three “Ts” of President Trump’s foreign policy priorities (tariff, territories, and terminating the Ukraine war), China is a ubiquitous factor behind all of them in the mind and rhetoric of Trump.  

But China can be America’s best friend or worst enemy. I forget who said this first. These extremes of bilateral ties are, nonetheless, still possible.

For the two great powers of totally different political, economic, and cultural attributes, finding a middle, or pragmatic way between the two extreme possibilities in order to co-exist in a turbulent world is perhaps far more important for the two sides than getting a Nobel Peace Prize.

At the moment, President Trump has taken the first step to reach out to China, as he indicated that he would like to visit China in his 100 days as US president.

China has reciprocated and is ready to live and thrive with a totally different great power like America. This is what tens of thousands of TikTok “refugees” have found out in the past few days in the little Red Note, and pleasantly “shocked-and-awed.”

It is, however, far from clear if the U.S. is willing and able to do so, given the highly ideological anti-China hawks among the US political elite.

But even if Trump’s reach-out is genuine, one recalls a US-China “honeymoon” four years ago: in Mar-a-Lago first in April 2017 and then in Beijing in November of the same year. It did not last long and was quickly replaced by trade wars, and finger-pointing across the Pacific during Covid times.

What is hoped is that the two sides will be more realistic about this unfolding second “honeymoon” between the two same heads of state in order to escape the familiar “love-hate” oscillation. The goal should be building bilateral ties on a normal, more pragmatic, and more predictable and durable basis. And this will be good not just for the two great powers. Ultimately it will make the world safer and more peaceful again.

Editor: huyueyue

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YU Bin is a senior fellow of the Shanghai Association of American Studies, senior fellow of the Russian Studies Center of the East China Normal University in Shanghai.
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