From July 12 to 18, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese embarked on his second visit to China. This trip marks his first visit since winning re-election in May and includes stops in Shanghai, Beijing, and Chengdu. Notably, the delegation features key figures from Australia’s business sector—including leaders from Rio Tinto, BHP, Fortescue Metals, and Macquarie Bank—underscoring the importance placed on China-Australia economic cooperation.
At a pre-departure press conference, Albanese made a pointed declaration: “Having a good relationship with China means jobs for Australia.” Citing trade figures, he noted that a quarter of Australia’s exports go to China—a volume exceeding its combined exports to Japan, South Korea, the United States, and India. Clearly, he sought to send a strong message to the public and business community alike: China is an indispensable partner in driving Australia’s economic growth and improving livelihoods. These upbeat remarks reflect Australia’s apparent sincerity in strengthening ties and advancing bilateral relations. Still, given Canberra’s past China policy and some recent statements from Australian officials, questions remain: Is Australia continuing to pursue a “dual-track strategy” even as it seeks to improve relations with Beijing?
A look back at recent China policy reveals that Australia has long tried to strike a delicate balance between the U.S. and China—a posture often summarized as “security with America, economy with China.” In areas of security and values, Australia maintains its alliance with the U.S. and actively participates in Washington-led frameworks such as the Indo-Pacific Strategy and AUKUS. On the economic front, however, Canberra emphasizes complementarity with China, its largest trading partner, and has worked to expand bilateral cooperation. This dual-track strategy is often framed by Australian policymakers as a pragmatic pursuit of national interest—but it inevitably results in a wavering China policy: eager to deepen economic ties with Beijing, yet wary of provoking Washington’s displeasure.
As a result, the Albanese government’s China policy has in practice taken on a “hedging and inching forward” character: on one hand, it emphasizes economic cooperation and complementarity, working to boost trade ties; on the other, it remains highly cautious in institutional arrangements and security policies.
One of the most telling examples came just before Albanese’s visit, when Australian Treasurer Jim Chalmers made it clear that Australia would not loosen its scrutiny of foreign investment in critical infrastructure and national security-related sectors. He reaffirmed Canberra’s push for the Chinese-owned Landbridge Group to divest its lease of the Port of Darwin. This move continued Australia’s longstanding trend of “securitizing” issues related to China, even at the cost of undermining contractual commitments, eroding commercial trust, and raising concerns among international investors—China included—about the predictability of Australian policy.
At the same time, Australia continues to restrict Chinese companies’ investment and cooperation in high-tech sectors such as energy and artificial intelligence, putting real limits on the principle of “mutual benefit and win-win cooperation.” Although Canberra has not explicitly tied economic engagement to political alignment, a series of exclusionary moves and policy freezes targeting Chinese ventures have effectively created trade barriers and systemic asymmetries—clouding the long-term outlook for China-Australia relations.
Albanese’s visit also comes at a moment of heightened U.S.-China tensions and ongoing sensitivity around the Taiwan Strait. In an interview with the Financial Times, former U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Elbridge Colby said the Trump team is reassessing the AUKUS agreement and has been pressuring Australia and Japan to clarify their roles in a potential Taiwan conflict. This kind of “pre-scripted wartime scenario” puts Albanese in an awkward position. In response to media questions, he stated that Australia wants to maintain the “status quo in the Taiwan Strait,” emphasizing that the country’s defense and aid spending is aimed at “preserving regional peace and security,” and that Australia has no intention of being drawn into any conflict.
Albanese’s remarks effectively signal that Australia is reluctant to blindly follow the U.S. in confronting China. Particularly on the Taiwan issue, Canberra has adopted a stance of “strategic ambiguity,” refraining from giving Washington concrete commitments on the potential use of submarines under the AUKUS framework. According to U.S. officials, Australia has refused to provide the Trump camp with “specific guarantees” regarding wartime deployment of Virginia-class submarines. Albanese’s response—“The question answers itself”—betrays a degree of frustration and resistance toward Washington’s efforts to pull Australia into a future conflict.
Australia’s Defense Industry Minister Pat Conroy reinforced this position, stating plainly: “Australia will not engage in hypothetical questions.” He emphasized that whether the country becomes involved in a war or allows its territory to be used in a conflict is a decision that rests solely with the elected government, in line with national sovereignty. These statements reflect not only Australia’s growing pursuit of strategic autonomy, but also a more cautious and pragmatic approach in navigating U.S.-China tensions.
Behind these signals lies a hard-headed calculation in Australia’s foreign policy: China, as its largest trading partner, is vital to the national economy, while its alliance with the U.S. places it in a strategic dilemma. While the Albanese government has made a show of cooperation during this visit, it has opted for ambiguity and neutrality on critical defense issues in the face of pressure from Trump-aligned U.S. circles pushing for a harder line on China. This is not merely a rational defense of national interests—it also hints at a reassessment of past policies that allowed economic ties to be held hostage by security concerns, or let security priorities suppress meaningful cooperation.
At the same time, however, internal divisions within Australia over its China policy have become increasingly apparent. In recent days, both Treasurer Jim Chalmers and Foreign Minister Penny Wong have taken notably guarded stances toward China, particularly regarding investment review, strategic positioning, and alliance commitments. Wong’s remarks at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Kuala Lumpur laid bare Australia’s strategy of “superficial cooperation, underlying vigilance.” Instead of criticizing U.S. trade pressure on ASEAN countries—such as the imposition of high tariffs—she focused on hyping the supposed threat of “Chinese military expansion,” claiming that routine Chinese naval exercises in the western Pacific disrupted the “regional balance of power” and expressing so-called concerns over the “pace and transparency” of China’s conventional and nuclear buildup. She also emphasized Australia’s firm alliance with the United States, stating that America’s presence in Asia was “critical” to regional stability.
Such rhetoric seems more aligned with Washington’s strategic narrative than a reflection of genuine concern for regional peace. In response to Australia’s criticism of Chinese naval drills earlier this year, China had already clarified that these were routine annual exercises not directed at any specific country and fully compliant with international law and regional norms. China remains committed to a diplomatic approach characterized by amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness, and it rejects Cold War thinking and spheres of influence, with no ambition to dominate Asia. In contrast, some Australian officials continue to court the Chinese market on one hand while criticizing and drawing red lines against China in security forums. This two-faced approach—one for China, another for the U.S.—risks further eroding the strategic trust between Beijing and Canberra.
What’s particularly striking is Wong’s attempt to brand Australia as a “trusted partner,” touting its trade liberalization since the 1980s. Yet in light of Australia’s systematic discrimination against Chinese enterprises, such self-praise rings hollow. While Treasurer Chalmers insists that investment restrictions are not targeted at China alone, he also admitted the policy is designed to distinguish between “trusted investors” and “strategic competitors”—with China clearly placed in the latter category. Such a predetermined classification amounts to differential treatment, violating principles of openness, transparency, and mutual trust that underpin international cooperation. The claim of “non-targeted” policy thus appears more as a fig leaf than a genuine commitment, and in effect institutionalizes a policy of containment toward China.
Australia is now at a critical crossroads: will it continue to drift in a cycle of expedient hedging, or will it elevate China-Australia ties to a true strategic level backed by a stable cooperation framework? China’s position is consistent and clear: it staunchly advocates multilateralism and trade liberalization. This is not only a matter of upholding the foundational principles of bilateral relations—it’s also a commitment to maintaining global trade stability. If Australia genuinely seeks long-term development, it must discard Cold War-style zero-sum thinking and adopt a future-oriented perspective focused on building shared platforms and collaborative goals.
Looking ahead, the potential for China-Australia cooperation is vast. China is demonstrating strong momentum in areas such as infrastructure, green energy, and digital technology, while Australia holds unique advantages in resources, education, and scientific research. If both sides can deepen collaboration based on mutual trust and equality, the rewards will be considerable. But if Australia continues to erect artificial barriers to Chinese investment and attach political strings to trade, it may prompt China to accelerate its diversification away from Australian markets—leaving Australian businesses to bear the brunt of a “passive decoupling.”
Albanese’s visit to China should serve as a crucial opportunity to usher China-Australia relations into a new phase. Trust is the foundation of cooperation, and trust depends on consistent policy expectations and clear strategic commitments. The future of the relationship will be defined not by grandstanding slogans, but by meaningful actions.
The year 2025 marks the beginning of a new decade in the China-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the tenth anniversary of the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement’s entry into force. This historic milestone signals a shift from the stabilization of bilateral relations toward a new phase of high-quality development. Despite challenges over the past decade, the political wisdom and economic resilience of both sides have enabled a full recovery and paved the way for even deeper engagement.
Standing at the threshold of this new decade, we hope Australia will cherish the hard-won achievements in the bilateral relationship and approach its ties with China with greater maturity and confidence. The two sides possess both the capacity and the wisdom to move beyond short-term disagreements and external interference, and to seize the opportunities of our time. By focusing on shared interests and enhancing practical cooperation—especially in areas like climate change, green transition, and the digital economy—China and Australia can bring tangible benefits to their peoples and inject powerful momentum into building a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.
We wish Prime Minister Albanese a successful visit to China and look forward to both countries moving toward each other to open a new chapter of mutually beneficial and enduring cooperation.
Editor: Zhiyu Wang
