The U.S. Threatens a Drone War in the Taiwan Strait— Seriously?

Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, once remarked that the Taiwan Strait could become a “hellscape” if conflict erupts. Meanwhile, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks has been hyping up the idea of a drone war in the region. But who exactly are they trying to intimidate here?

The U.S. seems aware of its own limitations—namely, that it lacks the production capacity to back up its bold claims, even if it prides itself on having the technology.

Just days ago, a group of 26 drone manufacturers gathered in Taiwan to discuss potential drone production. It seems like a good place for it, because Taiwan’s labor costs are lower than the U.S., and it has a better manufacturing base, from brands like Giant bicycles to its chip-making capabilities.

The island could churn out drones for the U.S., no problem. But what wasn’t clear from the reports is whether Taiwan would simply be supplying parts or if this would be a “Made in Taiwan, labeled in the U.S.” situation—probably a mix of both.

Taiwan’s authority, however, threw a bit of cold water on things, suggesting that drones produced in Taiwan might not carry a Taiwanese brand but could just be part of the global supply chain. This set off a flurry of outrage on the island. “The whole world is making drones—Iran is exporting them to Russia—and now Taiwan can build them but not even slap its own label on them?”

But that’s not the island’s biggest concern.

During the Ukraine war, the U.S. sent over what it considered to be a large number of drones. But when you compare that to the sheer volume of drones produced by DJI, a Chinese tech giant, and used by Ukrainian forces, the U.S. numbers seem pretty modest. This is because American drones underperformed on the battlefield—easily jammed, unreliable, and sometimes simply failing to operate. In the end, Ukrainian troops found themselves relying on DJI drones—cheaper, more reliable, and now a staple in the drone world.

DJI drone

Meanwhile, the Switchblade drones produced by U.S. military supplier AeroVironment were criticized by Ukrainian troops.

The Switchblade is a miniature loitering munition used by various branches of the U.S. military. Small enough to be carried in a backpack, the Switchblade is launched from a tube, flies to its target area, and crashes into the target, detonating its explosive warhead upon impact.

The Switchblade comes in two models: the smaller 300, which is similar to a guided mortar round that a single soldier can use, and the larger 600, which can take out tanks and armored vehicles. But even the 600, with its 110 km/h speed, 40 km range, and 40-minute flight time, pales in comparison to China’s loitering munitions produced by NORINCO, a state-owned defense corporation. These Chinese drones have a speed of 144 km/h, a range of 200 km, and can cruise for 105 minutes—enough to strike Taiwan island from mainland China.

Switchblade 300

Sure, a flight time of an hour and a half is a bit long, but for fixed targets, it’s good enough. Whether that communication tower gets hit at 8:00 or 9:30 doesn’t make much of a difference.

And even for targets farther south in the strait, these drones could be launched from almost any vessel. As long as they don’t nosedive into the water, they’re good to go—launch conditions are almost irrelevant.

The U.S. is selling 1,000 “Switchblade 600” drones to Taiwan for $990 million, or about $990,000 per unit. Taiwan has long been accustomed to playing the fool in such deals, but this price for loitering munitions is outrageous—at nearly $1 million per unit, you’re approaching the cost of a Tomahawk cruise missile. Even the launch and fire control systems are excessively priced, despite the fact that loitering munitions require only simple launch mechanisms, and the fire control system is equally uncomplicated.

Switchblade 600

If NORINCO’s “Chinese Switchblade 600” were priced at 1 million RMB (about $137,000), it would only be one-seventh the cost of the American version. However, if it were released to the market, such a price would undoubtedly attract a flood of buyers, leading to the familiar criticism of overcapacity, much like China’s electric vehicles. In reality, even at 100,000 RMB ($13,700) per unit, that’s still an overcharge.

For comparison, Iran’s Shahed drones reportedly cost only $20,000, and they boast a range of 2,500 kilometers, though it’s too large and cumbersome for deployment and launch.

Cost is China’s secret weapon in the arms race. A U.S. C-17 transport plane costs $340 million, while China’s Y-20 costs $160 million—a 2.12 times difference. An Arleigh Burke-class destroyer costs $2.2 billion, compared to China’s 055 destroyer at $1 billion—a 2.2 times difference. And while the C-17 is arguably larger and more advanced than the Y-20, the Burke-class can’t compare to the 055—it’s far behind.

Chinese Type 055 guided-missile destroyer Nanchang

One of the biggest lessons from the Ukraine war is that quantity sometimes matters more than quality.

China’s military believes “quantity is quality,” but it also believes “quality is quality.” You need both to win.

This isn’t just about winning a war but winning it with minimal losses. After all, isn’t it better for future generations to hear stories from their grandfathers rather than pay respects at a cemetery?

China’s new generation of military equipment is catching up to or surpassing the U.S. in performance, while beating the U.S. in cost and quantity. This is the true meaning of “acting from a position of strength,” a phrase that the U.S. government once frequently used when engaging with China.

In fact, F-15s and F-16s had dominated Soviet aircraft in both quality and quantity for years. And the Aegis system came out decades before anyone else’s and still leads in numbers. From the Los Angeles-class to Virginia-class submarines, the U.S. always had the edge in numbers and capability.

But now, China’s quietly turning the tables. Since 2010, China’s newly launched warships have surpassed the U.S. in tonnage, not just in number. The J-20 fighter jets have outnumbered the U.S. F-22s. China’s Y-20 fleet is approaching 100 aircraft—still fewer than the C-17, but give it time. The Y-20B, equipped with WS20 engines, is just rolling off the line, and with refueling aircraft, China could easily surpass the U.S. fleet.

Chinese J-20s on the runway

China started late, with a weak foundation, lagging technology, and limited imagination. It had no choice but to compete on price, squeezing every margin. When price competition hits a ceiling, China shifts to differentiation. When that no longer works, they move to cutting-edge tech. But even today, while China has gained an edge in quality, it still manages to maintain a competitive advantage in pricing.

This relentless competition, beginning with basic technology and advancing all the way to military hardware, now seems to be heading toward a scenario with only one likely winner. As the old Chinese saying goes: “When my flowers bloom in September, all other flowers will wither.”